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Since 1991 the homicide rate of the United States declined by more than 40%. Such a 
dramatic change in the crime rate of any country, particularly one of the size of the 
United States, is highly unusual. Numerous studies have proposed explanations for 
this event, yet experts agree that the causes of the homicide decline are still a 
mystery.  
Recent comparative research found that many countries worldwide experienced very 
similar homicide declines as the United States’, suggesting that the homicide decline 
was actually an international event. This finding has several implications for the study 
of crime trends. In particular, it shifts the search of causes from domestic policies, to 
shared international phenomena. 
This study tests whether changes in the relative size of countries’ youth populations, 
  
an event that is occurring globally, explain international homicide trends since 1960, 
including the international homicide decline of more recent decades. 
While strong theories exist predicting a relationship between age composition and 
homicide trends, empirical studies on the topic have consistently found a null 
association between the two variables. This dissertation contextualizes that literature, 
discussing how its shortcomings may have artificially created a contradiction between 
the expected and the observed effect of age composition on homicide trends. 
To investigate this topic, this study makes use of a novel dataset on international 
homicides from the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, spanning the 
previous seven decades. These data were combined to other sources to provide 
evidence that changes in the homicide rates of countries are largely driven by the size 
of their youth population, and that the international homicide decline has been a 
consequence of a global process of population aging. Moreover, by showing that the 
effect of age composition is most visible at the safest countries of the world – in the 
absence of competing criminogenic forces driving the homicide trend – this study 
also explains why the most violent countries are failing to accrue the safety benefits 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
While wars get much attention for their atrocity, homicides are actually the 
cause of a much greater number of killings. Combined, all of the world’s wars and 
conflicts are estimated to have been the cause of around 66,700 deaths in 2015 
(Melander, 2015) while, according to estimates of the current study, there were 
360,000 homicides globally during the same year. In the past 10 years, more people 
died from homicides globally than the population of Connecticut, and that of 21 other 
American states (United States Census Bureau, 2018). However, despite the 
tremendous loss caused by homicides, social scientists still lack a comprehensive 
understanding for the causes of changes in homicide rates over time (Baumer et al., 
2018; Rosenfeld, 2018). 
In the United States alone, more than one million lives were lost to homicide 
since the 1950s (World Health Organization, 2018). Moreover, the homicide rate of 
the United States is considerably higher than of other developed democracies around 
the world. In 2015, the homicide rate of the United States, at 4.96 per 100,000 
individuals, was more than three times greater than the rate of Finland (at 1.5 per 
100,000), and almost six times the rate of countries such as Greece, Germany, or 
Italy. 
 The United States homicide rate also had considerable changes over time. In 
1960, the U.S. homicide rate per 100,000 population was 4.5, from which point it 
increased two-fold up until a peak of 10.3 per 100,000, in 1991. From that peak, 
however, homicides started a decline that lasted until 2002, when the rate stabilized at 





of 46% in less than 10 years. The 1990’s crime drop is observable across multiple 
data sources (e.g. police records, self-report victimization) and was shared with other 
types of violent crime (Blumstein & Wallman, 2006). Figure 1.1 presents the United 
States homicide trend from 1990 to 2016, using data from the United Nations Office 
on Drugs and Crime, which is described in Chapter 4. 
Figure 1.1: The United States Homicide Decline – 1990 to 2016 
 
Source: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 
 
The 1990’s homicide decline is one of the most relevant social events in the 
last few decades. Indeed, it is very rare that the homicide rate (or any other macro-
level indicator) of a country changes so dramatically in a period shorter than a 
decade. Perhaps for that reason, the homicide decline was largely a surprise for social 
scientists, some of whom actually predicted even greater rates of violence during the 
early 1990s, supposedly caused by the aging of a generation of “super-predators” 
(Dilulio, 1995). Moreover, there is still little consensus in criminology about the 






















Identifying the causes of changes in social phenomena is a very challenging 
task and a subject of much debate across the social sciences. Societies are extremely 
dynamic entities. At any given time, there are numerous events and social forces in 
play, each with its own effects and interactions. Hence, it is very difficult to isolate 
the impact of any single event or social force from everything else happening at the 
same time. Consequently, there are several divergent explanations for the 1990’s 
crime drop. Blumstein and Wallman’s (2006) book on the topic mentions a 
combination of causes, discussing the impact of gun laws, mass incarceration, the 
receding crack market, innovations in policing, improvements in the economy, and 
demographics. A highly cited paper by Levitt (2004) reviews ten purported causes for 
the crime drop, finding significant impacts for the increase in the number of police, 
the increases in incarceration, the receding crack market, and the legalization of 
abortion. More recently, a report by the Brennan Center for Justice (Roeder et al., 
2016) argued for the impact of an increase in real income, coupled with data-driven 
improvements in policing, and the aging of the population. 
Several studies about the 1990’s crime drop attribute at least some of the 
decline to changes in the age structure of the population as Americans were getting 
proportionally older during the 1990s. However, recent criminological literature 
about the 1990’s crime drop, and about crime trends in general, argues for “the 





1999), in favor of alternative causes (Steffensmeier & Harer, 1999, Blumstein et al., 
2000; Cook & Laub, 2002; Phillips, 2006).1 
The findings from these studies are surprising. At the individual level, age is 
one of the strongest correlates of offending and of victimization (Farrington, 1986; 
Hirschi & Gottfredson, 1983; Miethe & Meier, 1994). The age-crime curve describes 
a highly uneven distribution of crime involvement by age, sharply increasing from the 
end of childhood until a young-adulthood peak, from which point individuals 
progressively age out of crime. In the United States in 2015, individuals aged 15 to 29 
corresponded to 20% of the population, but were responsible for 50% of all arrests for 
violent crimes (Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2015). 
  






1 Interestingly, Dilulio (1995) partially based his forecast on the effect of age 
composition, as he argued that there would an increase in the number of youth 





Figure 1.2: Distribution of Violent Crime Arrestees and Population by Age 
Group – United States, 2015 
 
Source: Federal Bureau of Investigation (US) / World Population Prospects (UN) 
 
A macro-level association between age composition and homicide rates 
cannot be automatically inferred from an individual relationship between age and 
criminality, under the risk of an atomistic fallacy. However, unless due to the 
interference of some unknown social mechanism, the consistency of the relationship 
between age and criminality should have macro-level repercussions. In addition, 
strong theories exist predicting an association between a greater proportion of 
younger individuals and higher crime rates (which are reviewed in Chapter 2), while 
there is not yet a compelling explanation for the absence of a macro-level relationship 
between age composition and homicide rates. 
I argue that this contradiction between the expected and observed effect of age 
composition on homicide rates is a consequence of limitations in previous research on 
crime trends. First, research usually uses data from a small number of years, which may 
be inadequate to observe the influence of broader social and economic processes that 

















focus on average effects, perhaps overlooking important nuances. Finally, I argue that 
factors that explain the differences in homicide rates between countries may be 
different from the causes of changes within countries – a distinction that, I argue, 
should be better accommodated in crime trends research. I elaborate on each of these 
points in Chapter 3. 
Age and the United States 1990’s Homicide Decline 
The following graphs compare homicide rates with the proportion of the 
population between 15 and 29 years of age in several individual countries from 1950 
to 2016. The age range between 15 to 29 years of age includes the ages most prone to 
violent criminality in the United States, and that age range is very frequently used in 
criminological research to measure of size of the youth population (Cole & Gramajo, 
2009; Gartner, 1990; Lee, 2001; Neapolitan, 1997; Trent & Pridemore, 2012).2 
Subsequent analyses also explore the use of other measures of age composition which 
have been employed by extant research, in particular the percent of the population 
between 15 to 24 years of age, and the percent of individuals who are males and 
between 15 to 29 years of age (Rogers & Pridemore, 2017; Trent & Pridemore, 2012), 
finding no substantial differences.3   






2 A detailed discussion about the motivations for the use of the ages between 15 and 
29 years, as opposed to other age ranges is included in Chapter 4.  
3 While it is not the central focus of this study to investigate the effect of sex 
composition on homicide trends (e.g. the percent of males), it should be noted that a 





Figure 1.3 uses data developed for the current project, which corresponds to a 
combination of the United Nations Homicide Statistics with the World Health 
Organization Mortality Database. The figure presents the trends in percent youth and 
in homicide rates for the United States between 1950 and 2016. Population by age 
group was collected from the United Nations. Data and methods are described in 
Chapter 4. 
Figure 1.3: Homicide Rate and Percent of Population 15 to 29 – United States, 
1950 to 2016 
 
Source: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime / World Health Organization / World Population 
Prospects (UN) 
 






Messner & Sampson, 1991). Generally, the literature suggests that, contrary to 
expectation, a smaller proportion of males is not associated with lower homicide 
rates, and is instead indicative of an imbalance in a society, which may be a 
consequence of conflict or some other source of social disruption (Hesketh & Xing, 
2006; Pridemore, 2008; Trent & Pridemore, 2012). More specifically, a decrease in 
the proportion of males in a country is indicative that these individuals are dying at a 











































The figure shows the impact of an aging cohort of post-World War II baby-
boomers on the percent of the population between 15 and 29 years of age, which peaked 
at over 27% in 1980. During the 1960s and 1970s there is a clear association between 
that proportion and the increase in homicides of the period, a relationship which was 
noted by criminological research in subsequent decades (Cohen & Land, 1987; 
Wellford, 1973). A slight decline in homicides during the 1970s was possibly related 
to the Vietnam War, which ended in 1975. More than 2.7 million Americans served in 
the war, mostly young men close to the peak of the age and crime curve, but who were 
fighting abroad and unable to attribute to the domestic homicide rate. Moreover, during 
the war the United States suffered around 58,000 casualties, and 75,000 severe 
disabilities (National Archives, 2018). In effect, wars can change the age composition 
of populations. 
The graph also shows a decline in homicide rates beginning in 1980, which 
follows a trend of a decreasing youth population, but which was interrupted in 1985 by 
a crime spike that lasted until 1991. This was the era of the war on drugs and of tough 
on crime policies that profoundly changed the American criminal justice system. This 
was also the time of the crack epidemic, and the corresponding escalation of violence 
among youth in the inner cities (Blumstein, 1995). However, in 1992 homicide trends 
resumed their decline, returning to a strong relationship with age composition which 







Figure 1.4: Selected Period Effects and the United States Homicide Trend – 1950 
to 2016 
 
Source: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime / World Health Organization / World Population 
Prospects (UN) 
 
Alternative explanations for changes in homicide rates in the United States are 
often able to display a bivariate association with the 1990’s homicide decline, but they 
often are not able to account for other longer-term features of the homicide series, such 
as the 1960’s increase. While the current study does not attempt to test or to disprove 
alternative explanations for the 1990’s homicide decline, the following two figures 
highlight the benefits of a longer-term perspective in evaluating drivers of homicide 
trends. Figure 1.5 addresses the proposition that the homicide decline was driven by an 
improving economic outlook during the 1990s (Blumstein & Wallman, 2006; 
Gerdtham & Ruhm, 2006; Gould et al., 2002). Data on the Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP) per capita, an aggregated measure of a countries’ wealth, was obtained from the 

















































Figure 1.5: Homicide Rate and GDP Per Capita – United States, 1950 to 2016 
 
Source: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime / World Health Organization / World Bank 
 
As the figure shows, one of the most remarkable features of the United States 
economy is its ability to produce increased value over time, at an almost constant rate 
through more than five decades since 1960. The homicide trend appears to be 
irresponsive to the trend in GDP per capita. Even the economic downturn between 2008 
and 2009, the most notable break in the generally improving economic outlook of the 
United States, actually happened at the same time as a decline in the homicide rate of 
0.4 per 100,000 population. 
Figure 1.6 address the proposition that the United States homicide decline could 
have been driven by an increase in incarceration rates during the 1990s (Blumstein & 
Rosenfeld, 1997). The following figure replaces the GDP per capita with the number 
of prison inmates per 100,000 population. Historical data on the prison population 
excludes jail inmates, and was obtained from the National Prisoner Statistics (NPS) 









































Figure 1.6: Homicide Rate and Prison Rate – United States, 1950 to 2016 
 
Source: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime / Would Health Organization / National Prisoner 
Statistics (US) 
 
While homicides where doubling during the 1960s, the prison rate was stable. 
Between 1985 and 1991 the homicide rate increased by 32%, while the incarceration 
population increased by 55%. The 1990s was one of the few periods of all 66 years 
during which the prison population trend and the homicide trend displayed a negative 
association.  
An analysis that selectively encompassed only data since 1990 would find a 
negative bivariate association between homicide rates and GDP per capita, and between 
homicide rates and the prison rate. A longer-term perspective however, illustrates that 
these associations are highly dependent on the years of data used to evaluate them. In 
contrast, the percent youth series maintains a strong association with the homicide trend 
in the United States since the 1950s, including during times of increases in the homicide 








































Age and the International Homicide Decline 
Similar to mass incarceration, most explanations for the 1990’s crime drop are 
about domestic policies and events specific to the United States. As such, the 
outcome of these policies in terms of lower levels of crime should also be limited to 
the United States’ borders. However, research comparing the crime trends across 
countries has consistently presented evidence that the 1990’s crime decline was also 
experienced by several other countries around the world (Farrell et al., 2014; Rennó 
Santos & Testa, 2018; Sidebottom et al., 2018; Tilley et al., 2018). A comparison 
between Canada and the United States over the past century shows that homicide 
rates in these countries closely follow each other, including with regard to the 1990’s 
decline (Ouimet, 2002; Zimring, 2006). However, Canada did not have a drastic 
increase in incarcerations, did not increase their police force, nor the aggressiveness 
of its police tactics. A cross-national study using data on wealthy countries from the 
International Crime Victims Survey (ICVS) compared rates of theft, burglary, and 
assault from cities within 26 countries across the developed world, finding evidence 
of a global crime drop, which was experienced in several countries throughout the 
1990s and into the 21st century (Tseloni et al., 2010). Other studies have also found 
that the 1990’s homicide decline was shared by several western, wealthy democracies 
with available data (LaFree et al., 2015; Weiss et al., 2016; Rennó Santos & Testa, 
2018). Therefore, the homicide decline was actually an international event. 
Very few of the explanations for the United States homicide rate decline are 
applicable internationally. Like Canada, most other countries do not share the same 





changes in policy over the past three decades. What they do share, however, are 
changes in the age structure of their populations. 
There is a strong, global trend of population aging (Kinsella & Phillips, 2005). 
Immediately following the end of World War II, much of the world experienced a 
sudden increase in fertility rates (i.e. the average number of children per women), 
leading to a spike in proportion of adolescents and young adults in the ensuing 
decades. At the same time, improving hygiene standards, coupled with developments 
in health care since 1950 increased the global life expectancy by more than 20 years, 
increasing the average age of populations globally, while decreasing the proportion of 
youth relative to total population sizes (He et al., 2016; United Nations, 2013). 
At the same time, lower levels of mortality at the youngest age groups 
increased the proportion of newborns able to survive into adulthood. This increase in 
survival is a key turning point in populations, as it triggers a well-known 
demographic phenomenon called the Demographic Transition (Coale, 1989; Kirk, 
1996). In 1950, a woman had an average of five children (United Nations, 2013). 
Such a high rate did not translate into population growth, because many of these 
children died before having their own children. As mortality rates declined, and as 
women maintained high fertility rates, societies experienced a spike in population 
growth. Over time, however, reproductive patterns changed and families adjusted 
from having a high, to a low number of children. Particularly in developing countries, 
sudden Demographic Transitions generated disproportionally large cohorts, which 





In a third demographic process, several developed countries are recently 
experiencing changes in family formation and in reproductive preferences, which 
may be triggering what has been defined as the Second Demographic Transition (Van 
de Kaa, 1987). In these countries, individuals are increasingly delaying, or completely 
avoiding parenthood (Lesthaeghe, 2010). Consequently, countries worldwide are 
experiencing sharp declines in fertility, sometimes to numbers below replacement 
level fertility, which is the level necessary to replace previous generations and to 
maintain the population size (United Nations Population Division, 2018). 
Together, these processes have produced substantial shifts in the participation 
of younger individuals in the demographic composition of populations worldwide, 
relative to the elderly. The following figure is based on country-level data on 
population by age group from the World Population Prospects of the United Nations 
(2018). This source is described in Chapter 4. The figure displays trends for the world 
and by region in the percent of the population between 15 and 29 years.4  
  











Figure 1.7: Percent of the Population between 15 and 29 years by Region and 
Year – 1950 to 2015 
 
Source: World Population Prospects (UN) 
 
Though at different times and intensities, all regions of the world experienced 
a decline in the proportion of their population between ages 15 and 29 (hereafter also 
referred to as percent youth, or percent young). Moreover, this declining trend is 
particularly strong in the most developed regions, which have participated in the 
International Homicide Decline (LaFree et al., 2015; Tseloni et al., 2010; Weiss et al., 
2016). For example, in Northern America, the percent youth declined from 27.5% in 
1980, to 20.7% in 2015, and in Western Europe the percent youth declined from 
23.7% in 1987 to 17.2% in 2015. 
As an equally international phenomenon, I argue that changing aging structure 
is a plausible cause for the International Homicide Decline. The following figure 
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and Japan. In parenthesis is the Pearson Correlation between both series. Besides the 
United States, these were the three countries which had the largest positive correlations. 
Figure 1.8: Homicide Rate and Percent of Population 15 to 29 – Selected Positive 
Cases, 1950 to 2016 
 
  
Source: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime / World Health Organization / World Population 
Prospects (UN) 
 
Each of these countries is in a different region of the world. However, despite 
their geographical distance, these three countries share many commonalities. First, all 
three have experienced sharp declines in their populations between 15 and 29 years of 
age, while homicide rates were declining. All three are also developed democracies, 
where their populations enjoy social and political stability (Marshall & Elzinga-
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strong association between age composition and homicides trends since 1950. There 
are, however, countries where this relationship is not as robust, as illustrated in the 
following figure. 
Figure 1.9: Homicide Rate and Percent of Population 15 to 29 – Selected 
Negative Cases, 1950 to 2016 
 
  


































Brazil (r = -0.76)






























Brazil, Mexico and Puerto Rico also share many commonalities.5 They are all 
in Latin America, all three have some of the highest homicide rates of the world, and 
all three have experienced the influence of organized crime, social instability, and an 
economic downturn or other source of social instability over the course of the last 
seven decades (Briceño-León et al., 2008). While all three countries also experienced 
a sizable reduction in their population between 15 to 29 years, homicide rates have 
not followed the same trend as in countries with greater social stability, and instead 
have increased considerably in the most recent decades. 
Dissertation Overview 
The above descriptive analyses suggest that changes in age composition 
generate major demographic pressures on homicide trends. That effect, however, is 
not observable when levels of violence are already high, or when there is a 
heightened influence of other sources of social and political instability. Therefore, the 
directly observable effect of age composition on homicide trends appears to be 
conditional on the absence of other criminogenic forces driving homicide trends.  
As exemplified by the crack epidemic in the United States, some period 
effects and other social forces can have a major impact on crime that can interfere 
with the pacifying influence of an aging population. One possibility is that, by 






5 These three countries had the largest negative Pearson Correlations amongst the 





dictating much of the change in homicides over a certain period, certain events can 
hide the association between homicides and age composition – a relationship which 
may become of second-order importance when other criminogenic forces gain 
prominence. Moreover, as may have been the case during the crack epidemic, these 
social phenomena themselves may be a consequence of an increased proportion of 
individuals at younger age groups. 
The current dissertation purports to be a test of the above propositions. First, I 
utilize innovative datasets and a longer-term perspective to test if there is indeed a 
macro-level association between changes in age composition and homicide trends. 
While this test begins as an attempt to explain the International Homicide Decline, it 
develops into a broader explanation of macro-level changes in homicides more 
generally. Second, I explore variations in the relationship between age composition 
and homicides. In particular, I attempt to explain the negative cases: countries where 
changes in age composition have not been reflected in changes in homicides. In doing 
so, I show that the directly observable effect of age composition on homicide trends 
appears to be conditional on the absence of other criminogenic forces driving 
homicides. As one potential explanation for this finding, I propose that demographic 
forces may be constantly pressuring homicide rates, but that the effect of age is 
secondary, and may simply be omitted when other major criminogenic forces are 








Chapter 2: Age and Crime 
The present chapter elaborates on the theoretical mechanisms that would link 
a greater proportion of individuals at a certain age range to higher rates of homicides. 
The chapter begins by providing an overview of the literature linking age with 
changes in the propensity for criminal offending at the individual level. I then revise 
some of the theories that have extrapolated this individual-level relationship to the 
macro level of populations, by predicting an association between a population’s 
proportion of individuals at an age group and homicide rates. The chapter concludes 
with a review and a discussion of recent empirical research testing the association 
between age composition and homicide rates. 
Age and Crime Theory 
Micro-Level 
For centuries, age has been recognized as one of the most robust predictors of 
criminal behavior. Already in the1800s, the French astronomer and statistician 
Adolphe Quetelet documented the way crime in rose with age, peaking around the 
early 20s and declining thereafter. In observing this pattern, Quetelet (1831) wrote: 
“among all the causes which have an influence for developing and halting the 
propensity for crime, the most vigorous is, without contradiction, age.” In the decades 
that have passed since Quetelet’s observation, voluminous literature has documented 
existence of an inverted J-shaped age-crime curve (Farrington, 1986; Hall, 1916; 





The strength and robustness of the relationship between age and criminality is 
such that some scholars have suggested that “the age distribution of crime is invariant 
across social and cultural conditions” (Hirschi & Gottfredson, 1983: p. 554). More 
recent and nuanced research has questioned the robustness of this invariability, 
finding evidence of significant variations in the relationship between age and crime 
both over time within the United States, and across cultural settings, particularly in 
India (Steffensmeier et al., 1989; Steffensmeier et al., 2018). Still, while interesting 
variations exist in the level of concentration, the few studies that have investigated the 
age distribution of violent offending internationally have found that violent 
criminality is always more prevalent amongst the youngest segments of society 
(Epstein, 2007; Goode, 2008; Junger-Tas et al., 2009; Steffensmeier et al., 2017; 
Tittle & Grasmick, 1997). Thus, while the invariance of the age and crime curve has 
been questioned, and is likely an overstatement, the universality of a relationship 
between age and violent offending is much less controversial (Steffensmeier et al., 
2018).6 Figure 2.1 displays the proportion of arrestees for violent crimes by age group 
for every five years between 1995 and 2015 in the United States. Arrest data was 
obtained from the Uniform Crime Reports of the FBI. Though the figure is a measure 
of law enforcement that may not necessarily reflect criminal activity, it illustrates the 






6 It should be noted, however, that this literature is still very restricted, particularly 
due to the lack of data on the age distribution of offenders outside the western world. 
The study of Steffensmeier and colleagues (2018) is an innovation in that direction, 





consistency in the age and crime relationship over the span of 20 years. Generally, 
while variations do exist, those aged 15 to 29 years of age consistently represented 
about 20% of the overall population of the United States, but were responsible for 
between 49.8 and 55.1% of all arrests for violent crimes in the country. 7 
Figure 2.1: Distribution of Violent Crime Arrestees by Age Group and Year – 
United States, 1995-2015 
 
Source: Federal Bureau of Investigation (US) 
 
 
Because of the strength and the consistency of the relationship between age 
and criminal offending, virtually all individualistic theories about crime have an age 
component. Even self-control theory, which explicitly abstains from explaining the 






7 These contextual variations in the age and crime relationship are a rich topic of 
research, which I intend to explore in future studies. Generally, a higher concentration 
of criminal offending at younger age groups is seen in countries where, and at times 
when homicide offending is highest (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 
2013). This relationship suggests that young crime is a driver of variations in 

















age and crime relationship, recognizes the strength of the association, and shapes its 
propositions around it (Gottfredson & Hirschi, 1990). Generally, criminological 
theories agree that younger individuals have greater motivations and/or have more 
opportunities for committing crimes (Phillips, 2006). The following paragraphs 
review some of the most common perspectives that attempt to explain the individual-
level age and crime relationship. 
A strain perspective holds that a disjunction between the desired goals that 
society instill in individuals, and the distribution of the means to achieve such goals, 
is a major motivator of crime (Merton, 1938). According to this perspective, crime is 
often a coping mechanism to a circumstance of adversity, in which individuals feel 
that they are not being provided with the fair means to obtain the material things and 
the social status that is desirable in their culture. On one side, deprived individuals 
should feel more compelled to achieve some of those goas through illegitimate 
means, which should explain a higher propensity for property crimes. In addition, 
deprivation can also lead to feelings of frustration and rebellion, which should explain 
a higher participation in violence (Felson, 1992). Empirically, one of the main causes 
of strain is inequality, which is consistently found by comparative research to be one 
of the main predictors of the differences in violence across places (Kelly, 2000; 
LaFree, 1999; Nivette, 2011; Rennó Santos et al., 2018). 
Some studies have also linked the prevalence of strain to age, and have used 
this concept to explain variations in criminality over life (Greenberg, 1977, 1985). 
Those studies have proposed two parallel mechanisms within a strain perspective. 





emotionally susceptible to pressures for status that motivate crime (Greenberg, 1985). 
At younger age ranges, individuals are most vulnerable to social pressures, 
particularly by peers which may over-emphasize the social and material goals of 
society, coupled with disdain to the legitimate means to achieve these goals. 
Furthermore, as individuals age they become more capable to achieve socially 
desirable goals through legitimate means, particularly because they are likely to 
obtain legal employment, and because their earnings from this work tend to increase 
(Grogger, 1998). As an additional benefit, employment adds a range of pro-social 
peers to individual’s interactions, thus diminishing peer pressures towards illegal 
activities. 
Young men in particular have few available mechanisms to demonstrate their 
masculinity and to obtain respect from their peers besides engaging in illegal acts of 
rebellion, drug abuse, and in the use of violence (Messerschmidt, 1993). This 
depravation in means to obtain social status may be particularly prominent among 
economically disadvantaged youth who, in addition to feeling more strain due to their 
economic deprivation relative to wealthier youth, are not able to obtain prestige by 
displaying economic wealth. Some of these youth may feel they have no alternative to 
obtain status besides engaging in violence, particularly when these individuals 
perceive a threat to their personal honor (Anderson, 1990, 1999). 
A social control perspective shifts the explanation for the causes of crime to 
the causes of the abstinence from crime. Originally, four elements were described as 
prime sources of controls that mitigated crime involvement: attachment to pro-social 





involvement with those activities, and the belief that societal rules are morally correct 
and should be obeyed. Overall, the stronger the bonds to conventional society, the 
less likely an individual is to violate the law (Hirshi, 1969; Nye, 1958; Reckless 1963; 
Reiss 1951). 
Adolescence and young adulthood are naturally times of shifting ties, when 
the control from pro-social institutions such as the family and school may weaken as 
individuals are attempting to exert their own independence and identity (O’Brien & 
Stockard, 2002; Tittle, 1988). Over that life period, lessening controls frees 
individuals to violate norms and to engage in crime, a risk that is particularly high for 
disadvantaged youth who receive the least amount of monitoring and supervision 
(McLanahan, & Sandefur, 1994; O’Brien et al., 1999). Over time, however, as 
individuals’ age increases, so does their involvement in conventionality, and their 
stakes in conformity (Toby, 1957). These changes in social control over life are well 
elaborated within a Life-course perspective, which describes sources of changes in 
social control though life, and how those changes exert key influence in explaining 
both the onset of criminal involvement, and eventually desistance (Sampson & Laub, 
1993; Laub & Sampson, 2003). Generally, as life happens, as families begin, as 
children are born and as individuals become invested in their careers, the control 
generated from each of these sources, and from other pro-social institutions override 
the criminality of even the most hardened criminals. Thus, the involvement with 
crime is often a transitional phase between turning points, when social control is low. 
 Finally, an age and aggression perspective emphasizes the biological and 





involvement. Generally, this perspective holds that as individuals age, they develop 
better emotional regulation and increased maturity that leads them to commit less 
crimes, in particular violent offenses (Lie et al., 2013; Marsh et al., 2013). In part, that 
relationship stems from an improved ability to deal with negative emotions, such as 
strain. By a simple consequence of individuals’ ability to learn, older individuals are 
more likely to have understood that the largest burden of their aggression falls on 
their own shoulders. That realization, coupled with an increase in a longer-term 
perspective of the consequence of one’s actions8, may not necessarily decrease 
aggression, but it changes individual’s reaction to aggression, as they develop other 
coping mechanism to negative emotionality. In addition, older individuals are likely 
to have less problems that would stir aggression to begin with, as they are more likely 
to live surrounded by more socially and economically stable contexts. This progress 
has been called the Dolce vita effect, which is based on the premise that life is 
somewhat harsher during youth than at other ages (Marsh et al., 2013). Generally, 
youth are required to engage in much more competition in society to obtain 
employment or to construct a family. Much like the social control perspective, this 
argument speaks about the impact of the family, employment, and of other social 
institutions. However, it sees the impact of those institutions as a reducer of sources 
of aggression, instead as a source of social control. 
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Arguably, the onset of aggressive behavior actually occurs at a very young 
age, before age 2, and decreases through life, as individuals progressively learn better 
ways to cope with their negative emotions (Tremblay et al., 1999, 2004). This 
perspective is most interesting as it places the emphasis of individual aggression at 
very early ages, when families and the education system are most capable to 
intervene. Furthermore, this perspective instills the argument that it is not aggression 
per se that increases through the early teens. Instead, what increases are teenagers’ 
ability to cause physical harm, due to improvements in their physical conditioning. 
 Another psychological explanation for the age and crime association is found 
in Moffitt’s dual taxonomy model (1993). This perspective describes two qualitative 
distinct types of offenders. The first are the life-course persistent offenders, a small 
minority of the entire population who initiate their involvement with delinquency at a 
very young age, and who do not desist. The second group consists of individuals 
whose involvement with crime is limited to their adolescence years. The latter 
corresponds to the vast majority of the population, and only engages in crime because 
of a maturity gap which occurs at a time when these individuals desire, but are denied 
more freedom to do what they please. According to Moffitt, antisocial behavior is 
simply a coping mechanism to a maturity gap, when the adolescence-limited group 
emulates the anti-social behavior of the life-course persistent offenders, who are 
perceived as more mature. The adolescence-limited group, however, soon desists as 
they are progressively awarded more freedom by society, and as they mature. 
 The single group that never engages in criminality, considered a minority, 





categorized Moffitt’s arguments as a psychological perspective, there is a large 
parallel between her proposition and strain theory, particularly with the proposition 
that violence is a coping mechanism to negative emotionality. 
Together, the multitude of theoretical perspectives reviewed in this chapter 
reach the same conclusion: youth are more likely to be criminal offenders and engage 
in lifestyles that put them disproportional at risk for victimization. These perspectives 
explain why individuals at younger ages are more likely to be involved with crime. 
The following sections review the theories and perspectives that have extrapolated 
that individual-level relationship to explain aggregated crime rates.  
Macro-Level 
Two main theoretical mechanisms predict that a larger proportion of 
individuals at younger ages (i.e. age composition) influence aggregate rates of 
homicides at the macro level. 
 The first is a simple compositional effect, also referred to as a simple 
aggregate effect (Firebaugh, 1978; Hirshi & Gottfredson, 1983; O’Brien et al., 1999). 
Quite simply, this proposition is an extrapolation of the individual-level relationship 
between age and crime to the macro-level. As the strong relationship between age and 
criminal offending is largely consistent across individuals, an increased proportion of 
individuals at younger ages should invariably increase the availability of potential 
offenders from an increase in the population in crime-prone ages. In addition, as the 
lifestyle of the youth places them at greater risk of violent victimization, an increase 
in the young population should also increase the availability of potential victims 





higher levels of violence when a greater proportion of their population is young 
(Cohen & Land, 1987; Fox, 2000). 
 The simple aggregate effect perspective directly infers an aggregated level 
relationship from an individual-level association. Thus, this perspective potentially 
incurs in an atomistic fallacy (Leyland & Groenewegen, 2003). That type of fallacy is 
particularly an issue when this type of inference is made automatically, and without 
consideration to the distribution of a certain behavior or characteristic across 
individuals of a given population. For example, in a study written by colleagues and I 
about the causal relationship between fish consumption and homicide rates, we noted 
that while a relationship between consuming fish and aggression seems to exist at the 
individual level, that consumption varies greatly by level of income within a 
population (Testa et al., 2018). Therefore, a causal relationship between fish 
consumption and aggregated homicide rates cannot be inferred automatically from an 
individual-level association, without first considering how that consumption is 
distributed across the population. For instance, if indeed those at greatest risk of 
criminal involvement are able to afford a diet rich in fish. 
 While an atomistic fallacy is a risk that deserves consideration, the issue is not 
as concerning for the relationship between age and crime. As described by much of 
the criminological literature, a decline in crime with age is characteristic of the vast 
majority of the population (Gottfredson & Hirschi, 1986; Moffitt, 1993). Thus, while 
variations may exist, the distribution of the effect of age across individuals is so 





the expectation of a macro-level relationship, without the risk of an atomistic fallacy 
(Firebaugh, 1978). 
 A second macro-level perspective speaks about the social consequences of a 
disproportionally large cohort of individuals at younger ages relative to the rest of the 
population. This perspective is referred to as relative cohort size, and is based on the 
studies of Easterlin (1978, 1987), an economist and demographer concerned with the 
consequences of the increased fertility following World War II, which was 
experienced by the United States and by several other countries worldwide. 
The original studies by Easterlin (1978, 1987) emphasized the impact of 
cohort size on behavior, and on labor market conditions. Youth who are members of 
relatively large cohorts should face a range of labor market disadvantages because 
they generate an oversupply of labor, which is likely to supersede the number of new 
job openings. Specifically, to absorb a larger cohort of workers, the job market needs 
not only to replace the jobs of individuals retiring from the market, but also to create 
a much larger number of new positions to accommodate the incoming cohort. Hence, 
competition is much greater, increasing the probability of unemployment, and 
reducing opportunities for wage growth. 
 Subsequent research has confirmed that, indeed, members of relatively larger 
cohorts experience lowers wages, but studies also found that these individuals 
experience faster wage growth. The explanation for the latter is that when early 
opportunities for employment mingle, many individuals opt for a greater investment 
in education, which tends to provide good returns over time (Murphy et al., 1988). 





education. In addition, as wage growth takes time, members of larger cohort spend 
much of their youth experiencing tighter labor market conditions, resulting in strain 
and incentivizing crime. 
 In parallel, members of relatively large cohorts may be more likely to offend 
because of a proportional decrease in the number of older adults providing them with 
supervision and support (O'Brien et al., 1999; Steffensmeier et al., 1992). First, a 
smaller adult to child ratio may reduce the amount of monitoring available by parents 
and the community, as less adults will be available to give direct attention to a much 
larger number of youth (Cook & Laub, 2002; O'Brien et al., 1999). Consequently, 
youth will likely spend more time with other individuals of their own age group, often 
without the supervision of an older adult, increasing the influence by peers within 
unstructured socializing settings that may be criminogenic (Osgood & Anderson, 
2004). In addition, schools, churches and other institutions that provide services to the 
youth will be overburdened by a sudden increase in clientele, and will be more likely 
to have their resources overstretched. As a result, youth in larger cohorts may feel 
alienated, harboring feelings of pessimism and skepticism towards other segments of 
society (Kahn & Mason, 1987). Such feelings can have implications for political 
participation and for civil obedience, and may be aggravated by the difficulties in the 
labor market, and by the diminished number of interactions with individuals of other 
age groups. 
 In short, a higher proportion of youth may impact homicides rates either 
because youth are individually more likely to engage in violent offending, within a 





of social disadvantages due to the relative size of their age group. Many other 
propositions for the relationship between age composition and homicide rates can be 
derived from these two larger perspectives. For instance, a more youthful population 
may have less capital available to invest in their communities, or may be themselves 
less invested in their current places of residency, with consequences to the social 
organization of the communities where they reside (Sampson et al., 1997; Bellair & 
Browning, 2010). Moreover, when organized crime and the drug trade is operated by 
a younger population, without the administration of older adults, those illegal 
operations are likely to become much more lethal, as was the case of the crack trade 
in the US during the epidemics (Blumstein, 1995). Both the above circumstances are 
more likely when the population of youth is greater, or when less older adults are 
available. 
Most literature linking, or investigating, the relationship between age 
composition and macro-level crime rates either does not discuss a mechanism more 
directly, or assumes a macro-level association from an individual level relationship, 
in line with a compositional perspective (Rogers and Pridemore, 2017). While 
relative cohort theories were once central in the discussion, they lost appeal, perhaps 
because young cohorts are not as large as they once were during the 1970s. 
Nonetheless, while both theories provide very compelling arguments linking age and 
aggregate crime rates, the perspectives are not mutually exclusive, and their effects 
can coexist without issue. As in past literature, the current study places greater 
emphasis on a compositional effect, under the premise that this perspective is more 





regardless of the size of the young population relative to older age groups. 
Furthermore, this focus enables a direct comparison between findings of the current 
study with the methods and findings of contemporary criminological research, as 
nearly all criminological literature that has explored the effect of age composition on 
homicide trends has done so using the percent of the population within a certain age 
range – usually between 15 to 24, or between 15 to 29 years of age. Finally, a 
compositional effect should be more general than a relative cohort size effect. The 
latter is simply an extrapolation of an individual-level relationship that has been 
largely explored by criminological literature. In contrast, Relative Cohort Size was 
not originally conceived as theory of crime. Even though crime implications have 
been extracted from the original propositions of Easterlin (1978), these extrapolations 
imply a certain relationship between cohorts – that older cohorts supervise and 
support the youth – that may not necessary be applicable to all countries worldwide, 
and which may be much less general than an effect associated with the Simple 
Aggregate Effect perspective. In contrast, an increase in the crime-prone individuals 
with an increase in the percent youth should be more universal. Nonetheless, 
regardless the above arguments the current study also explores measures related to the 
Relative Cohort Size perspective. 
Macro Level Evidence 
All above theories predict that countries with higher proportions of youth 
should have higher levels of crime. Accordingly, many national and international 
studies include the percentage of a country’s population that is young as a variable in 





empirical literature have consistently found either a weak or a null association 
between age-structure and country-level homicide rates (Nivette, 2011; Rogers, 2014, 
Rogers & Pridemore, 2018). 
Using data from the United States from 1992 to 1996, Steffensmeier and 
Harer (1999) found that age composition had only a small contribution to the crime 
drop in the United States. A second study by Levitt (1999) again utilized projected 
data from the United States from 1995 to 2010, finding that while age structure has 
some contribution to aggregate crime trends, that effect is small and inexpressive 
relative to the huge changes in the US homicide rates over the 1990s. A third study by 
Phillips (2006) used county-level data within the United States to explore trends in 
homicide rates from 1970 to 1999, finding that while age composition is indeed 
related to homicide trends in safer years since 1995, that association is non-existence 
during the 1970s and 1980s, when homicides were very high. The author’s 
explanation was that, at times of increased violence, criminogenic pressures such as 
adverse economic conditions pressures all age groups, and not just the younger, to 
criminal offending. Implicitly, Phillips (2006) proposes that adverse macro-level 
conditions can change the age distribution of offending, in particular by reducing the 
concentration of offending among the youth.9 Other studies have also found that the 






9 This proposition directly contradicts Blumstein’s (1995) which directly linked the 
homicide increase during the 1980s to an increase in violence among youth in inner 
cities. Hence, Blumstein proposes that the concentration of violence at younger ages 





impact of age in driving homicide trends in the United States is either non-existent, or 
secondary relative to alternative explanations (Blumstein, 2006; Fox, 2000). 
Studies using comparative data for multiple countries reached very similar 
conclusions. A study by Gartner and Parker (1990) compared the predictive power of 
age composition on aggregate homicide rates for five countries, namely the United 
States, Italy, Scotland, Japan and England. The authors concluded that age 
composition was only able to explain little of the homicide trends of each of those 
countries since World War II. Several studies by Rogers, some coauthored with 
Pridemore (Rogers, 2014; Rogers & Pridemore, 2016, 2017), used recent cross-
national data to demonstrate the weakness of the impact of age composition in 
explaining differences in homicides between countries, going as far as to suggest that 
cross-national investigations should refrain from adding controls for the percent of 
the population at younger age ranges. 
Two systematic reviews of the literature have taken stock of the macro level 
relationship between age composition and homicides. First, a publication by Marvell 
and Moody in 1991 reviewed 90 studies which regressed crime rates on age structure 
dating as far back as the early 1970s, mostly using United States data. Their review 
found conflicting results in the literature, which generally tended to find an 
association between age and the probability of arrest, but which also failed to find an 












association between the proportion of the population at younger ages and crime rates. 
These discrepancies were mostly explained by a range of methodological issues with 
prior literature, including small samples sizes, and its inability to account for 
competing explanation of crime rates. In addition, the authors argued that arrest data 
alone is a measure of enforcement, and not of crime itself, and may reflect the 
inability or lack of resources from younger cohorts to avoid being caught and 
punished for offenses committed. Therefore, based on these findings, the authors 
concluded that the age and crime relationship was actually much weaker than 
suggested by prior criminological literature. Demographic forces, the authors argue, 
are not sufficient neither to explain changes in crime, nor to forecast future trends. 
A second systematic review was a comprehensive evaluation of the 
association between percent young and homicide rates across comparative 
international research, which was published by Rogers and Pridemore in 2017. The 
authors reviewed a total of 32 studies, which together contained 146 models 
regressing homicide rates on the proportion of the population at young ages. Only 19 
of these 146 models (13%) found the expected positive association between age 
composition and homicide rates. From the remaining, 120 models (82%) did not 
result in a significant association, and seven models (5%) actually yielded a negative 
association. Even more consistently than Marvell and Moody (1991), Rogers and 
Pridemore (2017) found that percent young is not a consistent predictor of homicide 
rates, and that the inclusion of the measure in regression models, while supported by 





In the same publication, Rogers and Pridemore (2017) conducted their own 
analyses using a sample of 55 countries from the World Health Organization (WHO) 
between 1999 and 2005. In this analysis, the authors not only found that indeed 
percent young has no association with homicide rates, but also that the inclusion of 
the variable has negative implications for model fit, a problem caused by the strong 
relationship between percent young and poverty rates. Accordingly, the authors 
hypothesized that percent young may have been operating as an alternative measure 
of economic wealth, as economically disadvantaged countries have lower life 
expectations, and consequently display a greater proportion of individuals at younger 
ages. Throughout their study, Rogers and Pridemore made no distinction between 
studies measuring the difference in homicides between countries (cross-sectional), 
from studies measuring changes in homicides over time (longitudinal). 
In addition to the proposition that percent young is a proxy for poverty, two 
other explanations have been proposed in the literature for the lack of an effect 
between age composition and macro level homicide rates. First, Pamper and Gartner 
(1995) have proposed that age and crime might not have the relationship they once 
had due to the development of strong national institutions for social protection which 
may have provided the youth with services that mitigated the association between 
percent young and homicides. In addition, the review by Marvell and Moody (1991) 
argued that the age and crime relationship may partially be driven by the inability of 
younger individuals to avoid arrest, and by the fact that many youths offend in 





youth necessarily cause more crime, but simply that more youth are arrested for the 
crimes they cause. 
All three hypothesis above were offered as concluding remarks. Hence, none 
were directly tested. They were made in the form of broader speculative hypothesis to 
explain the absence of an effect between age composition and crime rates – a finding 
that still lacks theoretical support and elaboration. 
The Contradiction 
A review of the current literature on the age and crime relationship exposes a 
very intriguing contradiction. On one side, robust evidence exists of the individual 
relationship between age and individual criminal offending, at such a high degree, 
that this association is in the fundament of the current theoretical framework of the 
entire field of Criminology. Robust theories exist to explain that individual level 
relationship, including strain, social control, and variation in aggression. 
Furthermore, strong theories exist for why a larger proportion of individuals at 
younger ages would entail higher rates of crime, either from a simple extrapolation of 
the individual level association, as proposed by a simple compositional effect, or from 
the added disadvantages of youth who are members of larger cohorts, as proposed by 
the relative cohort size theories. 
On the other side, the overwhelming majority of the findings from current 
empirical studies has failed to find an association between age composition and rates 
of crime. In fact, that failure is so consistent, and so long-standing, that it has led 
some to question the strength of the age and crime relationship (Marvell & Moody, 





association between age composition and homicide rates (Pamper & Gartner, 1995; 
Rogers & Pridemore, 2017). 
This contradiction has several methodological and theoretical implications, 
which are deserving of a detailed investigation. While automatically inferring an 
aggregate level relationship from an individual association may constitute an 
atomistic fallacy, the strength and generality of the individual relationship between 
age and crime is such that it justifies the expectation of a macro level effect. 
Particularly when changes in age composition are as intense and as broad felt as they 
were over recent decades, these should result in a range of social outcomes that would 
also be consequential for crime. 
The absence of a consequence is surprising, and requires an explanation. If a 
macro level relationship between age composition and homicide rates does not exist, 
while age and individual criminality are so strongly linked, it must be because of the 
influence of something interfering in that transition. Either the strong relationship at 
the individual level is an artifact of our measures, as proposed by Marvell and Moody 
(1991), or youth become less violent when they are more prevalent, directly 
contradicting relative cohort size theories (O’Brien et al., 1999), or through some 
other unknown mechanism. As currently proposed, none of the explanations for the 
null association between age composition and crime are sufficiently convincing or 
empirically supported. 
In the current study, I hypothesize that age composition explains many of the 
changes in homicide rates over the past decades. That hypothesis is based on the 





for homicide trends. Hence, this study contradicts the findings of much of the past 
empirical studies on this association. I argue, however, that findings for a null 
relationship might have been a consequence of shared limitations in macro level 






Chapter 3: Theory and Hypotheses 
I begin Chapter 3 by proposing the empirical reasons I believe past research 
found a null association between age composition and homicide rates, even though 
such relationship may still exist. In addition, this chapter presents the theoretical and 
methodological ways this study advances the current state of the literature. 
Potential Causes for the Contradiction 
There are two possible explanations for the findings of previous literature of 
the absence of an effect between age composition and homicide rates. First, it may be 
that an effect actually does not exist (Marvell & Moody, 1991; Rogers & Pridemore, 
2017). Second, the null findings may be an artifact of methodological limitations of 
previous research. The current section elaborates on potential issues related to the 
research reviewed in Chapter 2, and explains how those limitations may have helped 
shape the current state of the literature on the macro-level relationship between age 
composition and homicide rates. 
First, almost all comparative research on homicide trends utilize data from 
the same sources (LaFree, 1999; Nivette, 2011). As described in Chapter 4, 
international organization, in particular the United Nations and the World Health 
Organization, have been the traditional institutions responsible for collecting and 
curating data on cross-national homicides. Consequently, nearly all studies on the 
topic, particularly in more recent years, have utilized data from the same original 





That homogeneity in source is not in itself a methodological issue. Statistical 
teams at both the UN and the WHO have been making great progress in the collection 
of international data, with developments that have supported much research over 
recent decades (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2017; World Health 
Organization, 2018). However, because of this homogeneity, a meta-analysis of 
research that uses these data, as the one executed by Rogers and Pridemore (2017), is 
not as useful a method for assessing the robustness of a relationship. The consistent 
findings of previous studies may simply be a consequence of the fact that researchers 
are repeatedly executing very similar analyses, using very similar data. An effective 
meta-analysis requires a sample of studies utilizing a range of methodological 
instruments, and varying samples that can speak about the internal and external 
validity of findings (Flather et al., 1997). Because of the homogeneity in the sources 
and methods used by comparative homicide studies, meta-analyses of this literature 
simply access that repetition, and speak very little about the replication of findings 
across diverse research configurations, thus lending little additional support for a 
conclusion. 
A second issue is that comparative cross-national data can be misused. This 
is particularly a problem in cross-national research because derivative versions of the 
data files of the original sources are often republished by other sources, at times 
including imputations or other transformations of the raw homicide counts. These 
transformed data may be unsuitable for certain types of analyses. For instance, in 
addition to the raw original homicide counts, the World Health Organization also 





age distribution when analyzing predictors of the differences in homicides between 
countries (Ahmad et al., 2001).10 In another example, the WHO routinely publishes 
model-based estimates of homicides for countries where data are missing (World 
Health Organization, 2014). As these estimated values are produced using regressions 
models that include many of the predictors employed by comparative research, the 
resulting homicides counts are unsuitable for use in regression analyses. Still, 
researchers have often inadvertently utilized these estimates, particularly because 
these data are often mislabeled. Moreover, as researchers often do not report details 
about their original sources, readers may have difficulty in assessing the adequacy of 
the data used (Kanis et al., 2017). 
 A third issue is that analyses of homicide trends make use of series that may 
be too small to observe the impact of long-term social processes. Almost all studies 
which have found a null relationship between age composition and homicide rates 
have used either a cross-section of countries at a specific year, or a longitudinal 
sample with a relatively small number of years (Rogers and Pridemore, 2017). The 
following graph limits the trends in homicide and age composition for the United 
States to the years between 1999 and 2005 – the same period used by Rogers and 
Pridemore (2017) in their analysis. 






10 Ironically, this transformation assumes a strong and consistent relationship between 
age composition and mortality rates. Age-adjusted homicide rates can be obtained 






Figure 3.1: Homicide Rate and Percent of Population 15 to 29 – United States, 
1999 to 2005 (r = 0.166) 
 
Source: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime / World Population Prospects (UN) 
 
 
Across the seven years between 1999 and 2005, the Pearson correlation 
between the homicide rate series and the percent 15 to 29 series is of 0.166.11 That 
small bivariate association could be understood as an indicator that a relationship 
between age composition and homicides does not exist. However, over that entire 
period, homicide rates remained almost constant at around 5.5 per 100,000 
population. The single outlier is 2001, when terrorists murdered more than three 
thousand people, causing an increase in the homicide rate to 6.7. The same stability is 
observed in the percent of the population between 15 to 29 years, which remained 
almost constant at around 21% between 1999 and 2005.  

















































This absence of change is a serious methodological issue as it can artificially 
lead to null effects not because a relationship does not exist, but because the lack of 
variation inhibits the observation of co-variation (Wooldridge, 2002). Social and 
economic indicators, particularly when evaluated at such a macro level as countries, 
may take decades to change. That is particularly true for demographic shifts, which 
can take generations to unfold (Thornberry, 2005). Therefore, the observation of 
variation in the size of the population at certain age groups, and of its consequences, 
may require the use of data for much longer periods than a decade. 
As shown in Chapter 1, in 1991 the homicide rate of the United States was at 
9.7 per 100,000 individuals, at almost twice the rate of 1999. Similarly, while in 1999 
the percent 15 to 29 was close to 21%, in 1980 that same proportion was peaking at 
27%. A database that encompasses data on homicides and on age composition from 
the 1990s, the 1980s, and from previous decades would include much greater 
variation in both indicators, and would facilitate the test of co-variation 
 A forth issue is that factors that explain the differences in homicide between 
countries may not necessarily be the same as the factors explaining changes in 
violence within countries over time. This point relates very closely to the differences 
between cross-sectional and longitudinal investigations, which has been debated 
extensively in the criminal career research (Blumstein et al., 1988; Gottfredson & 
Hirshi, 1987; Piquero et al., 2008). Individuals may hold differences between each 
other that may explain why some involve themselves in crime when other do not. 
However, factors explaining those cross-sectional differences in involvement are not 





I believe the same argument is applicable to the study of crime trends. 
Countries can hold extreme differences between each other in social indicators, which 
can overshadow the change in these indicators over time. Figure 3.2 illustrates this 
point using the Gini Index, an indicator of income inequality collected from The 
Standardized World Income Inequality Database (Solt, 2016). 
Figure 3.2: Gini Index – Selected Countries, 1990 to 2015 
 
Source: Standardized World Income Inequality Database 
 
 The United States, as several other developed countries, is experiencing an 
increase in its inequality of income, a trend that has been a cause of much concern for 
economists (Piketty, 2015). Still, despite decades of increase, the Gini Index of the 
United States economy remained about half of the index of South Africa, and has 
always been about 30% greater than the index of Germany. While income inequality 
is a major predictor of the difference in homicide rates between countries, it often 
performs very poorly in longitudinal analyses (Pridemore, 2011; Rennó Santos et al., 






















As with income inequality, the relative differences in homicide rates between 
countries tend to be relatively stable over time. Moreover, nearly all existing literature 
focuses on the relationship between age composition and homicide rates is cross-
sectional rather than longitudinal (Rogers & Pridemore, 2017; Rennó Santos et al., 
2018), This is an important caveat, because while age-structure may not explain 
differences in homicide between countries, changing age-structure overtime may 
effectively explain changes in homicide rates within countries overtime. That 
methodological distinction between predictors of differences and predictions of 
change has been absent from crime trends research, and may be key in explaining 
inconsistencies of prior studies (Baumer et al., 2018). 
A last issue is the excessive reliance on average effects, which often ignores 
the possibility of heterogeneity in the effect between two variables. To be sure, there 
has been similar concern by criminological research investigating the impact of 
specific deterrence on individual offending (Loughran et al., 2012), and even macro 
level research has proposed that predictors of homicides can depend on the level of 
violence in countries (Rennó Santos et al., 2018). Nuances can exist in the 
relationship between two variables in such a way that an existing causal relationship 
can be omitted by variations in effect that are conditional to a third factor. For 
instance, it may be that the effect of specific deterrence can depend on how 
punishment is perceived by offenders. This study expands on that literature by 
proposing that the effect of age composition on homicide rates can be muted by the 
influence of other criminogenic forces. Therefore, a direct effect of the percent 15 to 





country. This proposition has several parallels in the crime trends literature 
(Papachristos et al, 2018; Phillips, 2006) and in the risk factor literature (Hannon, 
2003; Kahlmeter et al., 2017), which will be discussed in the subsequent section. 
Variation in the Effect of Age on Homicide Rates 
Literature on the risk factors related to juvenile delinquency and to adult crime 
has consistently found evidence that the absolute impact of each individual risk factor 
for offending becomes much less impactful when individuals concentrate a range of 
other disadvantages (Hannon, 2003; Kahlmeter et al., 2017; Raine, 2002). That 
phenomenon has been labeled “disadvantage saturation”, and is a common 
occurrence because individuals experiencing a single risk factor are much more likely 
to also experience a range of other problematic experiences and behaviors (Biglan, 
2004). 
In addition to an intriguing finding, disadvantage saturation also creates 
methodological issues which are relevant to this project. Of most important, is that it 
generates heterogeneity in the effect of each individual risk factor, conditional on 
presence of other sources of disadvantage (Raine, 2002). For instance, studies using a 
high risk sample of offenders would be more likely to find smaller effects for 
individual risk factors than studies using broader samples drawn from the general 
population, where risk factors are more likely to occur in isolation. 
In this dissertation, I argue that countries too can concentrate disadvantage. A 
country with a low income per capita would be more likely to also have an 
uneducated population, to have worse criminal justice institutions, to have fewer 





economic issues. In contrast, when the economy is well, other aspects of society 
which depend on the availability of financial resources are also likely to improve. In 
fact, macro social and economic indicators tend to be so strongly correlated, that their 
association often creates methodological problems of multicollinearity, which hinders 
the identification of the effect of a single country’s characteristic net of other 
indicators (Pridemore, 2008; Pridemore 2011; Rogers & Pridemore, 2017). 
In a study by colleagues and I (Weiss et al., 2016), we analyzed grouped 
trajectories of homicides for 53 countries between 1990 and 2005, finding evidence 
that the safest countries in the world experienced the strongest declines in homicide 
within that period. However, the decline became progressively weaker, and 
eventually turned to an increase, for countries which already had the highest levels of 
homicide in 1990.  
Four other studies reached similar findings of stronger declines in the safest 
locations. A study by Tuttle and colleagues (2018) executed a replication and 
extension of my previous project (Weiss et al., 2016) using data for 82 countries 
between 1980 and 2010, and reached the same findings. In his 2012 book about 
Chicago, Robert Sampson presented evidence that the safest neighborhoods were the 
ones enjoying the greatest declines in violent crime, while the neighborhoods which 
already concentrated the greatest amount of disadvantage were either not participating 
in the decline, or were experiencing worsening crime rates. Another study by 
Papachristos and colleagues (2017) again reached a very similar conclusion in their 





that the decline occurred at a much greater intensity in neighborhoods that were 
already safer. 
A final study that identified a similar pattern was an investigation by Julie 
Phillips (2006) of homicide trends using county level data for the entire United States 
between 1970 and 1990. Her research is particularly relevant for the current study, 
because the author was also exploring the association between age structure and 
homicide rates in the context of a decline in crime during the 1990s. The author found 
a strong association between the percentage young and homicide rates during the 
mid-to-late 1990s, but no effects during the mid-to late 1980s. Based on these 
findings, Phillips concluded that certain criminogenic forces (e.g. poor social and 
economic conditions) that influence crime trends, and which were very prevalent 
during the 1980s, can interfere with the association between percentage young and 
homicide rates. Her explanation for these findings was that at times when other 
criminogenic forces are most prevalent (as they were during the 1980s) all age groups 
within a population are more likely to be involved in crime, and not just the youth. 
Hence, Phillips implied that the age-concentration of violence amongst the youth is 
less prevalent when criminogenic forces are most prevalent and, consequently, when 
violence levels are highest. 
Considering the individual-level research on disadvantage saturation, and the 
extant literature, I believe another explanation is more plausible to explain Phillips’ 
findings. Her conclusion implies that when other criminogenic forces are stronger, 
violent offending become much less concentrated among the youth, and is much more 





tendency for the opposite – that the youth participation in crime increases where 
crime rates are higher (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2014).  
Figure 3.3 is a scatterplot illustrating the level of involvement of youth on 
homicides across countries. The graph utilizes data on the percent of homicide 
victims who are between the ages of 15 to 29 years. This data was obtained from the 
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, and is available for 72 countries.12 This 
variable was plotted in the x-axis, against the natural log of the total homicide rate of 
that same country in the y-axis of the figure.13 The purpose of this descriptive 
analysis is to compare the homicide rate of countries with the relative participation of 
youth in the homicides of a country. Ideally, this analysis should be executed using 
offender’s, and not victim’s, data by age group. Unfortunately, quality data about 
offenders is largely unavailable for the majority of the world’s countries (United 
Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2014). That may be particularly an issue because 
of the very low clearance rates of the homicides of several countries, where most 
homicide perpetrators are never known to the police or the criminal justice system. 
Though countries in Western Europe can have clearance rates close to 98%, such as 
in Finland (Liem et al., 2018), that rate for high violence countries may be much 






12 Values correspond to a cross-section of the latest year with available data at or 
around 2015. The earlier year used for the graph was 2011. 
13 The natural log minimizes the influence of extreme values of homicides, which can 






lower - though data and research on this topic is still largely unavailable. Instead, I 
draw on the overlap between the characteristics of offenders and victims– a well-
known phenomenon in Criminology (Berg et al., 2012; Jennings et al., 2010; 
Maldonado-Molina et al., 2010) – to assume that the age composition of homicide 
victims may serve as a proxy for the age composition of homicide offenders. 
Figure 3.3: Scatterplot of the Natural Log of the Homicide Rate and of the 
Percent of Victims between 15 to 29 years of age – Latest Year (between 2011 
and 2016) 
 
Source: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 
 
Figure 3.3 clearly shows that the percent of victims between the ages of 15 to 
29 years is, on average, much greater for countries experiencing high levels of 























































































between the ages of 15 to 29 years of age is associated with an increase of 7.6%14 in 
the homicide rate of countries. The Pearson correlation between both variables equals 
0.774, which is a high value. Latin American countries with very high homicide rates 
generally have a very high participation of youth among victims (e.g. Venezuela, El 
Salvador, Honduras, Brazil), while lower homicide countries such as Bulgaria, 
Norway, Japan and Spain all have relative low participation of youth in their 
homicides, all bellow or around 10%.15 
Hence, in contrast to a decline in the participation of youth on homicides 
where homicide rates are highest, the above figure suggests the exact opposite trend – 
that the concentration of offending in the youth ages increases in high-violence 
locations. Blumstein (1995; 1997) implied the exact same increased involvement 
when explaining the 1980s crime increase of the United States, which the author 
argue was largely driven by an increase in the participation of youth in the drug trade, 
who acted as precipitators for the increased violence related to the crack epidemics. 
The following figure compares the homicide rate of the United States with the percent 






14 This value equals to the exponential of the coefficient for the percent of victims 
between 15 to 29 years of age in a bivariate Ordinary Least Squares regression 
predicting the natural logarithm of homicide rates. The p-value related to that 
estimate is smaller than 0.001, as the 95% confidence interval is between 6.1% and 
9.13%. 
15 This preliminary analysis may have several implications for the study of crime 
trends. In particular, it adds support for the conclusion that youth is the age segment 
driving the homicide rates of the most violent countries. These implications are 





of victims who were between the ages of 15 to 29 years.16 Long-term data on victims 
by age group was obtained from the Mortality Database of the World Health 
Organization. 
Figure 3.4: Homicide Rate and Percent of Victims 15 to 29 – United States, 1950 
to 2015 (r = 0.861) 
 
Source: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime / World Health Organization 
 
 The graph suggests a positive and strong bivariate association between youth 
involvement with homicides and the homicide rate, expressed by a Pearson 
correlation of 0.861. During 1950s the proportion of victims between the ages of 15 
to 29 was around 16%. Subsequently, that proportion had two major increases, both 
which happened concurrently to increases in the homicide rate. The first occurred 
during the 1960s, when that percentage increased sharply from 16.5%, to around 






16 Arrest data by age group in the United States is only available from the Federal 


















































25%. The second increase occurred during the late 1980s and early 1990s, when the 
proportion of victims ages 15 to 29 increased to 32.6%. Since then, the proportion has 
been declining gradually, up until the value of 26.2% in 2015. 
Both Figures 3.3 and 3.4 provide evidence for a positive correlation between 
the homicide rate, and youth participation in homicides. Therefore, it is unlikely that a 
reduction in the effect of age composition where (and when) homicide rates are 
highest is a consequence of an increase in offending for other age groups, as proposed 
by Phillips (2006). In fact, it appears that high levels of violence are often supported 
by an increased in involvement of youth on homicides. 
One alternative explanation for the findings of Phillips (2006) is not that the 
effect of age recedes, but simply that the effect of other criminogenic forces can 
suspend the influence of age in dictating homicide trends. Therefore, at times or 
places where other criminogenic forces are most pronounced, the impact of age may 
not be directly observable because the high concentration of other disadvantages 
which are dictating the homicide trend, and which can overshadow any effect of age 
composition. In contrast, in countries where (and at times when) other drivers of 
homicide trends are absent, demographic forces may be most notable in determining 
changes in homicide rates over time. 
This proposition would explain why crime rates in the United States increased 
with the crack epidemic (itself a very strong criminogenic force), when the percent 
young was already declining. It would also explain why the most violent countries are 





influence of the concentration of other criminogenic forces is interfering with the 
pacifying influence of the aging of the population of those places. 
Therefore, the level of concentrated disadvantage of a country may be a key 
source of heterogeneity in the effect of age composition on homicide rates. Moreover, 
this heterogeneity may be one possible explanation for null findings of previous 
literature, as the directly observable effect of percent youth on homicide trends may 
be conditional on a third factor which has been unaccounted for in past comparative 
literature – namely the absence of competing criminogenic forces driving the 
homicide trend. 
Proposed Solutions 
In this section, I present the ways in which the current project seeks to 
innovate from prior research, and how I believe those innovations may address the 
issues presented in the previous section. 
The main solution is the use of a novel dataset on homicides that extends 
beyond the traditional sources of comparative data by used by extant research. That 
extension should be, to amount possible, in two directions. First, it should attempt to 
include a broader sample of countries, in particular countries with higher levels of 
concentrated disadvantage. Such sample would enable the identification of sources of 
heterogeneity in the effect of age composition on homicide rates by comparing the 
effect of age across countries with varying levels of disadvantage. Moreover, a 
broader sample would increase the external validity of estimates, thus making 
findings more applicable to explaining trends in crime which are being felt on a 





Second, data should extend for as many years as possible, preferably 
encompassing a period which has experienced enough variation in age composition, 
and co-variation in homicide rates. As changes in age composition may take decades 
to unfold, such period should extend for several decades. Moreover, the series should 
cover periods when changes occurred in demographic composition. 
As shown in Chapter 1, many countries experienced changes in their percent 
youth following World War II, for multiple reasons. Thus, ideally, a study that seeks 
to measure the impact of these changes in homicides should make use of data since 
the 1950s and 1960s, until the present. 
As described in Chapter 4, colleagues from the United Nations Office on 
Drugs and Crime and I have worked in assembling a database on homicides with a 
much increased coverage of countries than existing sources. Moreover, for a smaller 
set of countries with available data, I used data from the World Health Organization 
to generate a combined homicide series spanning from 1950 to 2016. Such data 
allows the observation of the full impact of the aging of baby-boomers, and of the 
Demographic Transitions on age composition, and its corresponding impact on rates 
of homicides. 
That dataset enables the assessment of the average impact of age composition 
on homicide rates, while also containing the coverage and the diversity to enable a 
broader exploration of variations in the effect of age composition on homicide rates. 
Moreover, a long series enables the investigation of factors related to change in 





Table 3.1 summarizes the potential causes of the contradiction between the 
theorized and the observed effect of age composition on homicide rates. In addition, 
the table includes the ways in which the current research seeks to advance this 
investigation by addressing each of the limitations listed in this section. 
 
Table 3.1: Potential Limitations of Previous Research and Proposed Solutions 
Potential Causes for the Contradiction Proposed Solutions 
1.  Almost all comparative research on 
homicide trends utilize data from the same 
sources  
As its main data source, this study utilizes a 
novel database on homicide rates that has 
better coverage in terms of countries and years 
than previous available sources. 
2.  Comparative cross-national data can be 
misused 
All data for the current study was collected 
directly from their original sources, with 
assurance that data only included actual 
counts, as opposed to estimates or any value 
that has undergone transformation. 
3.  Series that may be too small to observe the 
impact of long-term social processes 
The current study utilizes data from 1990 to 
2015 (26 years) for most of the world’s 
countries, and data from 1960 to 2015 (56 
years) for a subsample of 26 countries. Both of 
these samples cover a much greater number of 
years than most extant research investigating 
the impact of age composition on homicide 
trends. 
4.  Factors that explain the differences in 
homicide between countries may not 
necessarily be the same as the factors 
explaining changes in violence within countries 
over time 
By emphasizing longitudinal predictors of 
homicide trends, the current study focuses on 
the exploration of the correlates of change, as 
opposed to the predictors of level, an 
investigation which is in line with the 
exploration of an International Homicide 
Decline. 
5.  Excessive reliance on average effects The current study utilizes methods and model 
specifications that seek to identify sources of 
heterogeneity in the relationship between age 
composition and homicide trends. 
 
Research Questions & Hypotheses 
The current study seeks to identify the impact of changes in age composition 





proportion of young individuals within a population. That broader research topic has 
four related question, which were defined by the current state of literature, and by the 
context of the international homicide decline. 
First, this study explores if an average relationship exists between age 
composition and homicides. If, on average, a country that is experiencing an increase 
or decrease in its youth relative to other age groups should expect a change in 
homicide rates, net of other social indicators. Despite the wealth of evidence to the 
contrary (Rogers & Pridemore, 2017), the current study builds from an assessment of 
theoretical and methodological weaknesses of prior research to propose that an 
increase in the proportion of youth should have repercussions for homicide trends. 
Given all theory and evidence presented above, it may be possible to extrapolate a 
macro level relationship from the micro level association between age and criminal 
involvement. Moreover, demographic shifts constitute an immensely powerful social 
force, with a wide range of social and economic consequences (Kinsella & Phillips, 
2005). It would be surprising if such consequences did not include homicide trends. 
Therefore, the hypothesis related to this first research question is that the average 
effect of percent youth is positive and above zero. 
 A second assessment concerns the exploration of variations in the effect of 
age composition across regions. In the current study, variations in effect were 
explored in relation to several country-level characteristics. That investigation has 
two purposes. First, it seeks to generate further evidence that certain regions of the 
world are not participating in the international homicide decline (Weiss et al., 2016; 





declines in their young population, without a corresponding decline in their homicide 
rates. For the variations in effect by region, I hypothesize that the average effect of 
percent youth is positive and above zero for countries which experienced sizable 
declines in their homicide rates. 
 The current study makes two additional explorations which could add nuance 
to the average relationship between age composition and homicide rates. These 
investigations aim to investigate inconsistencies of prior literature (Phillips, 2006; 
Rogers & Pridemore, 2017), and why the most violent countries are not participating 
in the International Homicide Decline (LaFree et al., 2015; Weiss et al., 2016). First, I 
explore whether the effect of age composition on homicide trends is conditional on 
the level of stability of countries. In particular, I explore whether the directly 
observable effect of percent youth on homicide rates is greater for countries where, 
and at time when countries are most stable, and if that effect decreases as instability 
increases. 
 Finally, another research question explores if the directly observable effect of 
age composition on homicide trends is conditional on the level of homicide of 
countries. The rationale in support of this question is the same as the previous one. 
Generally, it seeks to explore if the observation of an effect of demographic forces 
can depend on the presence or absence of the other criminogenic forces that dictate 
the homicide trend in lieu of demographic shifts. Hence, in countries where homicide 
rates are highest (itself a consequence of the influence of other criminogenic forces), 
the effect of age may not be as apparent. In contrast, in the safest countries, where 





greatest impact in dictating the homicide trend. Hence, the presence of other 
criminogenic forces may itself be a source of heterogeneity in the effect of age 
composition. 
The underlying premise of the latter two research questions and hypotheses is 
that the directly observable effect of age composition may be conditional on the 
absence of competing drivers of homicides.17 This proposition is inspired by several 
empirical and theoretical developments of prior literature. First, by findings of the 
risk factor literature that the directly observable impact of an individual risk factor is 
contingent on the level of other risk factors competing for effect (Hannon, 2003; 
Kahlmeter et al., 2017; Raine, 2002). Second, by the absence of an observable 
relationship between age composition and homicide trends during the specific period 
of the crack epidemics in the United States – a relationship that become very apparent 
as soon as the epidemic receded. Finally, this proposition may serve as a potential 
explanation for why several of the most violent countries in the world are not 
participating in the International Homicide Decline. 
 Table 3.2 summarizes all above research questions and related hypotheses. 
These questions are unified by their focus of exploring the effect of population age on 






17 To be clear, the level of stability and the level of homicide are only two of many 
other plausible indicators for concentrated disadvantage at the country level. 
Theoretically, this same investigation could be conducted using other measure of 
disadvantage, assuming only that such measure would be particularly impactful for 






homicide trends more generally, and specifically to test their explanatory power of 
the international homicide decline. Subsequent chapters define how these questions 
were operationalized in measures and methods, the corresponding results and 
conclusions. 
 
Table 3.2: Research Questions and Hypotheses 
Research Question Hypothesis 
1.  Is there an average effect of 
percent youth on homicide trends? 
The average effect of percent youth on homicide rate 
is positive and above zero. 
2.  Are there variations in the 
impact of percent youth across 
regions? 
The average effect of percent youth on homicide rate 
varies by region. Moreover, that effect is positive and 
above zero for the regions which experienced 
homicide declines. 
3.  Is the effect of percent youth on 
homicide trends conditional on the 
level of state fragility of countries? 
The effect of age composition on homicide trends is 
conditional on the level of state fragility of countries. 
In particular, the effect of age is stronger for countries 
with lower levels of instability, and weakens 
gradually as country instability increases.  
4.  Is the effect of percent youth on 
homicide trends conditional on the 
level of homicide of countries? 
The effect of age composition on homicide trends is 
conditional on the level of homicide of countries. In 
particular, the effect of age is stronger for countries 
with lower levels of homicide, and weakens gradually 
as homicide rates increase. 
 
Through this research, I expect to directly address the contradiction between 
the theatrically expected effect of population age on homicide trends, with the effects 
actually observed by the empirical literature. While engaging in this debate, I also 
investigate the causes of the international homicide decline, and the reasons why only 
the safer countries in the world may be enjoying the pacifying influence of an aging 






Chapter 4: Data and Methods 
Level of Analysis 
The test of the relationship between age composition and homicide rates is a 
macro-level research question. It refers to the identification of trends and patterns in 
relation to an indicator that is observed at the level of populations, as opposed to 
individuals. Macro-level studies have a long tradition in Criminology, often as 
ecological perspectives that attempt to explain the behavior of individuals by their 
location, or the causes of the differences in the prevalence of crime across places 
(Pratt & Cullen, 2005). A few examples include the Chicago school and Social 
Disorganization Theory (Shaw & McKay, 1942), Strain and other theories of 
deprivation (Merton, 1938), Routine Activities Theory (Cohen & Felson, 1979), and 
Intuitional Anomie Theory (Messner & Rosenfeld, 1993). 
A common challenge to macro-level research is the appropriateness of its 
level of analysis. Distinct from individual-level studies, macro-level research can 
utilize varying kinds of observations, ranging from the very distal level of countries 
and worldwide regions to more proximate units such as neighborhoods and street 
segments. Most often researchers attempt to match the level of analysis with what is 
most appropriate to address their research question. For instance, studies in policing 
in the United States often benefit most from investigations at the local level, which 
suited to identify local hot spots of crime and to guide the deployment of officers 
(Sherman et al., 1989). Moreover, a common restriction in research is the availability 
of data for certain levels. As mapping and telecommunication technology improved, 





precision - a trend that has fueled new developments in ecological studies of crime 
and criminal justice (Short, 1998; Weisburd, 2015). 
The level of countries is one of the highest levels of aggregation found in 
criminological research. As such, it is inappropriate for the investigation of several 
research questions in criminology, particularly those pertaining to individual choice, 
and local level policies. Instead, most cross-national studies focus on identifying and 
understanding the relationship between macro-level social and economic indicators 
on crime rates, such as inequality, economic development, urbanization, 
unemployment, divorce rates, population density, and demographic composition 
(Koeppel et al., 2015; LaFree, 1999; Nivette, 2011; Trent & Pridemore, 2012). 
The current study utilizes countries as its main unit of analysis. This choice is 
primarily justified by the fact that the current study seeks to explore changes in 
homicides rates that are being felt across countries internationally. As country level 
patterns, homicide trends are likely associated with factors within the same level of 
analysis. Moreover, if understood as an international phenomenon, the homicide 
decline may be a consequence of drivers with enough strength and scope to be 
observed and measured cross-nationally.  
However, it should be clear that nothing about the relationship between 
demographic composition and homicides restricts its study to a specific level of 
analysis. Prior research has successfully analyzed data of the population by each age 
group for countries, states, cities, and even for lower levels of aggregation (LaFree, 
1999; Phillips, 2006). Moreover, none of the theories that predict a relationship 





extrapolation of the individual association between age and criminality to greater 
levels of analysis, as posited within a Simple Aggregation perspective, is potentially 
applicable to any level. In addition, while the mechanisms of the control perspectives 
(e.g., Relative Cohort Size) speak about interactions between individuals, their 
macro-level implications should be felt very broadly, whenever variations exist in the 
demographic composition of a population. 
Therefore, the country-level scope of the current study is motivated by the 
present research questions, in particular, the goal to investigate the drivers of the 
international homicide decline, and changes in the homicide rates of countries more 
broadly. Future studies should investigate if the relationships found in this research 
are also observable at lower levels of analysis. Moreover, if variations in effect exist 
across levels of analysis, empirical and theoretical developments should attempt at 
identifying, and explaining them. 
Data Overview 
The test of the hypotheses described in chapter 3 require data on homicide 
rates, population by age group, and on relevant control variables. Additionally, as the 
research questions seek to explore change, and to infer causality about trends over 
time, it is crucial that all data are available longitudinally, for as long a series as 
possible. 
For that end, this study utilizes a combination of available sources with data at 
the country level. Traditionally, the collection and processing of country data at an 
international level have been carried out by international organizations, which are the 





1999). Furthermore, there are several cases of successful international data collection 
projects by independent academic researchers. Examples related to crime and 
criminal justice include the project “Violence and Crime in Cross-National 
Perspective, 1900-1974”, which collected data for 110 countries for a series of 75 
years (Archer & Gartner, 1987). A second study by Bennett (2009) compiled and 
curated data from several sources into a centralized database with information about 
52 countries for the years between 1960 and 1984. These projects provided 
substantial contributions to comparative criminological research, but they are no 
longer active. Outside of criminology, however, many academic projects still exist for 
collecting data at the cross-national level, particularly for indicators related to 
political matters, the environment, or the economy.  
In some cases, these academic sources are more suitable for longitudinal 
research than alternative efforts by international organizations. Two of those data 
sources are used in this project for obtaining important control variables. The first is 
the Standardized World Income Inequality Database (SWIID), a project from the 
University of Iowa which contains what I consider the best currently available data on 
income inequality since 1960 (Solt, 2016).  The second source is the Center of 
Systemic Peace, an organization that develops and publishes several indicators about 
politics, democracy, and peace for countries worldwide. Among these indicators is 
the State Fragility Index, which constitutes one of the few indicators on state stability 
and efficacy which is available for a longer time series, since 1995 (Marshall & Cole, 





Specifically for indicators on crime and criminal justice, international 
organizations remain the institutions responsible for the most advanced projects for 
the collection and processing of data. In the past, the International Criminal Police 
Organization (INTERPOL) was the main source of cross-national data on crime and 
criminal justice, which was collected primarily through a survey of authorities of each 
member country (LaFree, 1999). While INTERPOL’s data was one of the main 
sources used by comparative criminological research during many decades, this data 
collection project has been interrupted, and the data are no longer published by the 
organization (International Criminal Police Organization, 2018). At present, two other 
projects persist: the United Nations Survey on Crime Trends and the Operations of 
the Criminal Justice System (UN-CTS), which is the basis for the United Nations 
Homicide Data, and the World Health Organization Mortality Database.  
Sources of Homicide Data 
United Nations Homicide Data 
 The United Nations Homicide data are the consolidation of decades of efforts 
by the United Nations in collecting internationally standardized data on crime and 
criminal justice for each of the world’s countries (United Nations Office on Drugs and 
Crime, 2014). Overall, the database corresponds to the systematic consolidation of data 
which is obtained independently from thousands of national and international sources, 
including the United Nations own archives, other international organizations, national 
statistical agencies, national police offices and national health agencies. All data 
collected is compiled into a larger dataset, where each data point is considered in 





Classification of Crime for Statistical Purposes (ICCS). The ICCS is methodological 
instrument first developed by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime in 2015, 
presenting governments and other organizations with a set of coherent standards for 
defining and measuring crime and criminal justice outcomes.18 A few examples include 
homicides, robberies, assaults, arrests, prosecutions, convictions and incarcerations. As 
a goal, the ICCS sought to detail strictly methodological definitions of several crime 
and criminal justice outcomes that are independent of the legal definitions of each 
particular country, providing the conceptual integrity necessary for the production 
statistics on crime and criminal justice indicators that are internationally comparable 
(United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2015). 
While the United Nations Homicide Data contains records from thousands of 
sources, most data are collected directly by the United Nations, through the Survey on 
Crime Trends and the Operations of Criminal Justice Systems (UN-CTS). The CTS is 
a yearly data collection effort, in which UN staff directly contacts officials from 
member countries requesting answers to a detailed survey with questions about crime 
and criminal justice statistics, in addition to information about the composition and the 
quality of each of those measures (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2017).  






18 In the United States, a committee of the National Academy of Science endorsed the 
ICCS as the model for the modernizing of national crime statistics (The National 





The UN-CTS is an ongoing data collection effort with origins in the 1970s. 
Since then, UNODC staff have continuously engaged in efforts to improve the quality 
and the comparability of the data, mostly by defining standard methodological 
instruments (e.g. the ICCS), improving the strategy for data collection, establishing 
partnerships with local governments and authorities, and, in some cases, by directly 
helping countries build statistical capacity (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 
2017).  
Between June of 2017 and July of 2018 I was a research consultant for the 
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, in Austria, where I was part of the team 
working on an update of the United Nations Homicide Data. That update was purported 
to support the 2019 edition of the Global Study on Homicides. In addition to organizing 
all CTS data within a coherent framework, we engaged in a comprehensive effort to 
find, collect and document historical data on homicides from external sources available 
globally. Subsequently, we utilized each of these sources to validate one-another, 
verifying if a same count of homicides was confirmed across multiple sources, and over 
time. In the case of homicides, this work is facilitated by the fact that each homicide 
death presumably generates two official records: once as a crime count in the criminal 
justice system, and a second time as a cause of death registered by the health system. 
As these are usually relatively independent systems, each with its efforts for identifying 
and classifying deaths, homicide statistics produced from criminal justice records can 
be used to validate counts obtained from the health system, and vice-versa. 
The data validation process was a comprehensive effort to leverage all data 





globally, while ensuring the comparability of these statistics. For countries and years 
where no quality data were available, none was selected and values were simply left 
missing. For all other observations and sources, the UNODC team maintained the 
following considerations with regards to data quality (United Nations Office on Drugs 
and Crime, 2017): 
1. The consistency of the data with a standardized definition of homicides, 
as mentioned in the ICCS. 
2. The presence of a clear documentation detailing the source and the 
methodology associated with collecting the data; 
3. The presence of more data observations, and the coherence of each of 
those observations with each other. Longer series of data from the same 
source which were robust, and without any artificial breaks were 
generally considered better then single data points. In addition, sources 
with data on victims by sex, by age group and on other disaggregation 
which were consistent with the total homicide count were an indicator 
for quality. 
4. If there was a clear indication that homicide data covered information 
about all homicides in the country. For instance, if data exclude a 
particular geographical territory, or records from a particular police 
organization. 
5. The specific counting rule used in collecting the data, if homicides 






6. If the primary source of data constituted an official governmental 
institution, or an otherwise credible source of country-level data. 
7. Each country’s government is given the opportunity to revise homicide 
statistics prior to publication, when they are requested to correct any 
inaccuracies, or to clarify any remaining issues. Any new data submitted 
by countries at this stage goes through all the same validation steps as 
mentioned above, and may still be excluded from publication, if they 
are not deemed valid. 
 
The expertise of UN’s staff, and the relationships between the UN and member 
countries were invaluable at considering specificities of each country, and at clarifying 
particularities that invalidate some of the homicide data we collected. An interesting 
example is the case of India, a country where homicide statistics were excellent, but 
incompatible with the ICCS definition of homicides without the inclusion of dowry-
related deaths, a category of killings that increases the homicide rate of India by almost 
25%. 
Our primary goals in this version of the United Nations Homicide Data were 
two-fold. First, we sought to achieve global coverage of the total count of homicides. 
Ultimately, we were able to obtain at least one year of data for 197 countries globally, 
encompassing 92.5% of the World’s population in 2015. Second, we aimed at 
constructing a robust longitudinal dataset ranging from 1990 to 2016. Though the 
availability of longitudinal data varied greatly by country, we were able to construct a 





comprehensive dataset on homicides available to date, with data on victims by sex, by 
age, by the mechanism of killing, by situational context, among other indicators related 
to homicide victims and perpetrators. 
Figure 4.1 presents the proportion of the population of each region and of the 
world with data on total homicides since 1990. The single region where data are still 
missing for most of the population in Africa, where issues related to data quality are 
prevalent. Around 74% of the World’s population is covered in the data in 2016, 
including some of the world’s most populous countries in Asia. Data availability 
peaked at 88% in 2009. The decline thereof is explained by the time lag in reporting 
for some countries, some of which spend years to produce and to publish statistics on 
homicides. The regions of Northern America, Western Europe, and Eastern Europe are 
not visible in the graph for some years, simply because their coverage is capped at 
100% of the population. Eastern Europe has a single gap in coverage around 2011, 
which is explained by the lack of data for Russia around that time. Finally, there is a 






Figure 4.1: Percent of Population Living in Countries with Available Data per 
Region and Year 
 
Source: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 
 
World Health Organization Mortality Database 
The Mortality Database of the World Health Organization (WHO) is a 
systematic compilation of medically certified deaths of countries worldwide. As part 
of a yearly data collection, the WHO contacts authorities of member countries 
requesting mortality data. In turn, countries routinely submit their data through 
established methodological instruments and channels of communication (World Health 
Organization, 2018). 
 The WHO Mortality database is a very traditional source of medical data, 
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Over this time, the Mortality Database has become an invaluable source for the study 
of trends and country-level predictors of mortality across fields. 
Mortality records submitted to the Mortality Database are aggregated according 
to their medically registered cause, which is classified according to a globally 
standardized International Classification of Diseases (ICD). The ICD itself has a very 
long history, with origins in the late 19th century as an international list for classifying 
causes of death (World Health Organization, 2014). Since that time, the ICD has had 
multiple version and revisions (World Health Organization, 2018). Data currently in 
the mortality database includes records reported using versions 7 through 10 of the 
ICD. 
The ICD and the Mortality Database include a very specific categorization for 
deaths caused by homicides. For that reason, the WHO is a well-established source of 
homicide data for comparative criminological research, which has relied on the 
database for the calculation of homicide rates that are comparable cross-nationally, and 
that are reliable over time (Koeppel et al., 2015). There are, of course, a range of issues 
and challenged related to the quality of homicide data in the Mortality Database. In 
particular, past research has raised concerns related to the underreporting of deaths, 
caused either by the lack of coverage of national health systems, or by the inability of 
some governments to consolidate data about these deaths (Andersson & Kazemian, 
2018; Bennett & Lynch, 1990), sometimes intentionally (Lysova, 2012). While I 
believe the impact of those issues are often exaggerated, in actuality the exact precision 
of the homicide statistics of the WHO is difficult to access and to audit. Still, despite 





reliability of reported data through several of the same methods as the UNODC in 
regards to their homicide data. These efforts include direct partnerships and field work, 
focused at building capacity for the record of vital statistics, the comparison between 
reported counts with other reliable sources of data, the comparison with values from 
other countries with similar characteristics, and the longitudinal robustness of reported 
counts (World Health Organization, 2013). While there is never a way to be certain of 
the quality of WHO homicide counts, there are several indicators for quality. First, in 
terms of substantive validity, there are no surprises in the data. Countries which are 
known for their high levels of violence in Latin America and Africa do display higher 
rates of homicides, while countries are known for their safety in Eastern Europe, 
Oceania and Southeast Asia are also the ones with the lowest levels of homicides in 
published data (World Health Organization, 2013). Second, while the reporting of data 
are done independently, neighboring countries are very likely to have similar rates of 
homicides. Finally, longitudinal trends for a number of countries are robust for a very 
long series of more than half a century, particularly for a smaller sample of developed 
democracies. For some of these reasons, WHO data are often regarded as the best cross-
national source of data on homicides, particularly for longer-term longitudinal analyses 
(Andersson & Kazemian, 2018; LaFree, 1999). 
In parallel to the Mortality Database, the WHO also elaborates and publishes 
estimated homicide counts for countries without actual observable data on homicides. 
These estimates are generated using a regression model, which takes advantage of the 
association between homicides and other social indicators to estimate homicide counts 





countries’ infant mortality rate, Gini index, the size of the urban population, HIV 
prevalence, alcohol drinking prevalence, among other indicators (World Health 
Organization, 2014).  
As these estimates are produced using common predictors of homicides, they 
are inadequate for the identification of the associations between homicide rates and 
macro-level indicators. In the past, several cross-national studies, possibly 
inadvertently, utilized versions of the WHO Homicide data that included model-based 
estimates, an issue that was noted by recent literature (Kanis et al., 2017). The current 
study draws its homicide statistics directly from the WHO Mortality Database, which 
does not include model-based estimates, or any other transformed data besides the raw 
counts submitted by member countries. 
Measures 
Homicide Rate 
The availability of comparable, high quality and longitudinal data on homicides 
is the main challenge for the execution of this project. Previous research has often 
contrasted the UN Homicide Statistics with the WHO Mortality Database (Kalish, 
1988; LaFree & Drass, 2002; Tuttle, 2018). Generally, WHO data has been considered 
a superior source, an assessment justified by the fact that medical records constitute 
actual counts of diseased persons, which are not as subject to the subjectivity of the 
recording person, to the personal bias of criminal justice employees, or to the legal 
definitions of individual countries. Moreover, as WHO statistics are based on the ICD, 





greater level of conceptual validity to WHO statistics than to other sources (LaFree et 
al., 2015; Rogers & Pridemore, 2013). 
Most claims on the superiority of the WHO homicide statistics over other 
sources rely on the fact that extant research has shown the same preference. Therefore, 
it has somewhat became agreed upon that WHO homicide values are better, even 
though very little research has actually put this convention to test (Rennó Santos & 
Testa, 2018). The first study by Bennett and Lynch, published in 1990, compared 
homicide data of 31 countries collected from United Nations, the World Health 
Organization and Interpol. The authors concluded that while some differences in the 
values existed across sources, analysis using each of them yielded largely similar 
results. More recently, a second study by Andersson and Kazemian (2017) again 
compared UN and WHO homicide statistics using data from 1998 to 2010, finding that 
both provided reliable measures of homicides, and produced very similar results in 
statistical analyses of predictors of homicides. Finally, the authors concluded that while 
the United Nations Homicide Statistics contained a more robust cross-sectional 
measure of homicides, the WHO data was more suitable for longitudinal analyses over 
longer series. 
While some of the past research has compared and contrasted the WHO and 
the UN in search of the “best” international data on homicides, I propose instead that 
both sources, as they currently stand, may be best used in combination. To be clear, I 
do not believe this combination was possible in the past. Indeed, while the WHO have 
always relied on the International Classification of Diseases (ICD) to provide 





UNODC developed and introduced the International Classification of Crimes for 
Statistical Purposes (ICCS; United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2015).  
Unsurprisingly, the definition on homicide in the ICD and in the ICCS are 
largely consistent. According to the ICD-10, a homicide is defined as any death 
directly resulting from an injury inflicted by a second person, who had the intent to 
injure or the kill the victim. That definition explicitly excludes suicides, as another 
person must have caused the death. In addition, deaths caused by legal intervention, 
or as a consequence of an operation of war between two states, are not included in 
this classification. Codes X85 to Y09 of the ICD-10 detail multiple mechanism and 
contexts of the homicide killing, such as killings committed by firearms, or deaths 
resulting from neglect, or some form of maltreatment from parents or partners (World 
Health Organization, 2010). Though many countries are unable to provide that level 
of detail regarding their deaths, particularly the countries unable to clarify the specific 
circumstance surrounding each homicide, the categories are present, and do provide 
interesting data for future analyses. In addition, code Y87.1 includes deaths caused by 
sequelae of assault, which were included in the homicide counts of the current study. 
According to the International Classification of Crime for Statistical Purposes, 
a homicide is any death that is unlawfully inflicted to a person, by a person who had 
the intent to cause death or serious injury. This definition includes three main criteria 
for classifying a killing as a homicide. First, the objective criterion holds that a person 
needs to have caused the death of another person. Second, the subjective criterion 
holds that the killing needs to be intentional, which excludes manslaughter and any 





unlawful, which excludes deaths from legal interventions of law enforcement, or from 
legitimate operations of war (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2015). 
The definition of homicides from the ICD and the ICCS are not only 
compatible, they are virtually the same. The similarity is likely intentional, as it 
ensures that counts obtained from one organization are useful to the other. A 
distinction exists, however, on the primary source of each database. While the WHO 
generally focused their data collection efforts on the health system of member 
countries, the UNODC prefers instead records obtained and classified by law 
enforcement authorities. The argument behind this methodological decision by the 
UNODC is that, ideally, the investigation effort by criminal justice authorities would 
best clarify the compatibility of each death with the three criteria listed in the ICCS. 
The rationale is that police officers would be much more effective at defining the 
legality and the intentionality of a killing than medical professionals who have little 
contact with offenders (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2014). It is true 
that WHO homicide counts have a tendency to be slightly greater then UN homicide 
counts, sometimes because of the counting of killings that produce a body, but that 
are neither intentional nor illegal (World Health Organization, 2014). However, the 
reality is that most killings worldwide are not the subject of enough investigative 
work to define their intentionality or legality with some amount of certainty. 
Moreover, many of recent developments in international data collection and 
validation have rendered the comparison between the Mortality Database and the UN 
Homicide Statistics much less relevant than it once was. Both the UN and the WHO 





gaps in their own series (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2013; World 
Health Organization, 2014). While each organization generally prefer their own 
primary data to external sources, they also recognize the value, and leverage the 
complementarity of each other’s statistics. I argue that academic researchers should 
do the same. 
The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime has continuously developed 
and introduced new standards of data collection, quality assessment and verification 
in more recent versions of their data, overcoming many of the concerns raised in past 
research (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2017). In addition, because of 
the greater focus on homicides specifically, in contrast to a larger concern over 
several causes of mortality, the UNODC is able to specialize, and to dedicate a much 
greater amount of resources to clarify each data point, and to fill existing gaps in data 
through external searchers. Partially for that reason, the 2018 edition of the United 
Nations Homicide Statistics currently contain the best international data on homicides 
from 1990 to 2016. That assessment is supported by all methodological developments 
the UNODC has carried out in their homicide statistics in recent decade, a result of 
decades of consistent data collection (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 
2018). That type of stability is ideal to support the collection of high-quality data 
longitudinally. More importantly, however, is the fact that UNODC staff collected 
and considered each of the homicide counts in the WHO Mortality Database while 
developing their own official series for each country. Any data point from the WHO 





considered inferior to the count of another source, or was notably found to be 
inaccurate. 
 Figure 4.2 is a world map illustrating the latest available homicide rate of each 
country or territory with available data. From 234 countries listed in the United 
Nations Homicide Statistics, data are available for at least one year for 197 countries. 
Together, these countries hosted 92.5% of the World’s population in 2015. Overall, 
data are available for virtually the entire world, with the single exception of parts of 
Africa, where issues of data availability remain. 
Figure 4.2: World Map of Homicide Rates 
 
Note: The map is an illustration and makes no political statement. Some countries or entities are too 
small to be visible in the map. The source for the data is the United Nations Office on Drugs and 
Crime. 
  
The map also displays some interesting geographical patterns in homicide 
rates. Generally, countries are very likely to display similar homicide rates as their 
neighbors. Homicide rates are the highest in Latin America, sub-Saharan Africa, and 





33.9 in South Africa, and at 10.8 in Russia. Europe tends to display progressively 
lower homicide rates from East to West, where countries such as Portugal and Spain 
have a homicide rate of around 0.65 per 100,000 individuals -- some of the lowest of 
the World. Similar rates are found in Southeast Asia and Oceania, where South Korea 
had a homicide rate of 0.7, and Australia had a rate of 0.94. As these statistics 
illustrate, there are immense disparities in homicide rates across the World. While in 
2015 the homicide rate of Singapore was of 0.25 per 100,000 population and the rate 
of Japan was of 0.28, in Honduras that same rate was more than 200 times greater, at 
57.5, and more than 370 times greater in El Salvador, where the rate was at 105.4. 
Combined Homicide Series 
Currently, the UN Homicide Statistics provide the best data on homicides 
from 1990 to 2016, at least in terms of coverage. Although that period corresponds to 
a rather long series of 27 years, that time-frame fails to capture much of the variance 
in age composition which was experienced by many countries over the second half of 
the 20th century. That is particularly the case for the aging of baby-boomers, as 
someone born immediately after World War would already be 44 years old by 1990. 
For a selected sample of countries, the WHO Mortality Database contains 
robust data on homicides for a very long series, at times since 1960 or 1950. 
Moreover, a sub-sample of these countries display largely consistent trends in 
homicide rates between the WHO and the UN statistics. Taking advantage of this 
consistency, for the cases where I found both series to be complementary, I extended 






That operation was performed only for the countries that met the following 
specific set of hard criteria, which considered the degree of similarity between the 
homicide series in the WHO and in the UN homicide data. 
1. If, on average, the homicide rate of the WHO was between 0.7 and 1.3 
times the UN homicide rate between 1990 and 1993; 
2. If the Pearson correlation between the UN and the WHO series across 
overlapping years was above 0.6; 
3. If there was a direct continuation between WHO data in the late 1980s and 
UN data in the early 1990s, without a gap with missing data in that period. 
4. If the country had more than 1,000,000 inhabitants in 2016. 
 
For countries that met those restrictions, I produced a series of homicide 
which included UN data since 1990, combined with available WHO data from 1950 
to 1989. In addition, for each country, WHO data were adjusted by the average ratio 
between the WHO and the UN series between 1990 and 1993. The following figure 
illustrates the resulting combined series in comparison to the original UN and WHO 
rates using data for the United States. For this country, the WHO homicide rate is 5% 
greater than the UN homicide rate, a difference that is more or less consistent over all 
overlapping years between both series. Moreover, both the WHO and the UN 
homicide rates have the same trends over time, which is reflected in a Pearson 
correlation of 0.997 between both series. The dotted red line corresponds to the final 





the WHO rate from 1950 to 1989 adjusted by 5%. This adjustment ensured a smooth 
continuation in the combined series, which runs for 67 years between 1950 and 2016. 
Figure 4.3: United States Combined Homicide Rate Series  
 
Source: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime / World Health Organization 
 
The same operation was performed for the other 30 countries which met the 
above restrictions, in addition to the United States. Appendix A contains the figures 
with the combined series for each of those 30 countries. Those figures were used to 
visually inspect the adequacy of the method and of the criteria described above for 
each individual country.  
Among all 31 countries for which combined series were produced, the 
Pearson correlation between the UN and WHO rates in overlapping years between 
1990 and 2015 is 0.986. Such a high correlation illustrates the strong compatibility 























the WHO homicide rate in lieu of the combined homicide series yield very similar 
results. These additional analyses were performed to test the sensitivity of results to 
the use of long-term data from the WHO, instead of the combined series, and are 
presented in Chapter 5. 
Samples 
The United Nations Homicide statistics list a total of 234 countries and 
entities, which together host the world’s entire population. At least one year of 
homicide data are available for 197 countries. Of those, 59 are smaller states with less 
than 1 million inhabitants, which are primarily territories of other countries. Because 
of their size, these entities are usually inadequate for cross-national statistical 
analyses, as they often do not have enough homicides to support a trend above zero, 
and as any existing trends are too volatile over time. In addition, taken together these 
entities had only 17,037,097 residents in 2016, which corresponds to 0.23% of the 
world population in that same year. 
Excluding smaller states, the remaining analytical sample has 138 countries. 
The UN data for that sample contains a total of 2,558 counts of homicide. This 
constitutes the first analytical sample of the current study, which is designated the 
“High Coverage Sample.” This sample covers all years from 1990 to 2016, and only 
utilizes UN data. This sample is characterized by its reliability and coverage, as all 
data are originated from the same source, and as they include a very diverse sample of 
countries across regions worldwide. To be clear, such a coverage is unprecedented in 
other cross-national studies without the use of artificial model-based data (Kanis et 





A second sample, designated as the “Long Series Sample”, utilizes the series 
produced using combined WHO and UN data. From the 31 countries for which 
combined data was produced, 26 had homicide data stating from 1960. Those 26 
countries were selected as components of the Long Series Sample. The year of 1960 
was selected as the starting year of that sample because it corresponded to the earlier 
year for which a sizable sample of countries with homicide data was available. In 
contrast, only 7 countries have homicide records since 1950. In addition, several 
control variables used in this study are only available since 1960. Although this 
sample does have countries from almost all regions in the world, the sample is 
composed primarily of higher-income and stable democracies. Therefore, while this 
sample includes most of the countries that are typically included in extant cross-
national literature (Trent & Pridemore, 2012), it does not correspond to a general 
picture of the globe. Instead, the purpose of this sample is to observe variations in 
effect across a very long time series, which encompasses a period when these 
countries experienced extensive variation in their demographic compositions and in 
their homicide rates. 
Countries included in each of the two analytical sample (Long Series, and 
High Coverage) are listed in Appendix B. Appendix C lists countries that were 
excluded from the samples because of their size, and because they did not contain 
available data on homicides. The appendices also include summary statistics of data 
availability by country, including the number of years with available data, the earlier 
year available, the later year available, in addition to the average, the standard 





Percent aged 15 to 29 
Quality data on population counts serve two purposes in this project. First, 
data on total population is the denominator in the formula used for calculating 
homicide rates. Second, disaggregated population counts by age group are necessary 
for the description of the age composition of each country over time. 
Almost all data on population counts used in this project is sourced from the 2017 
Revision of the World Population Prospects (WPP), a longstanding project of the 
Population Division of the United Nations (United Nations Population Division, 
2018). Similar to the UN Homicide Statistics, the WPP is a multisource project in 
which a team collects data from a number of country-level sources, which are curated 
and processed into counts for each country-year. Most WPP data are sourced directly 
from member countries’ official records, which are derived primarily from population 
census conducted periodically be governments worldwide. When such quality data 
are unavailable, the UN Population Division relies on alternative sources of data and 
on estimates (United Nations Population Division, 2018). 
 Data on total population is available for almost all countries globally, for 
between the years of 1950 to 2015. The single exception is Kosovo, a country that 
declared its independence from Serbia relatively recently, in 2008. Population data 
for Kosovo was collected directly from the UN Homicide Statistics. Data on 
population by sex and by age group is only missing for Kosovo and 32 other entities, 
which are mostly Island States or otherwise small nations in the Pacific Ocean and in 





only two countries with more than 1,000,000 residents that had available data on total 
population, but no data on population by sex or age group.19 
Another notable omission is the year of 2016, for which there is available data 
on homicides, but no data on population by age group, for any countries. Because of 
that omission, data for the year of 2016 is not included in many of the subsequent 
analyses. 
The main independent variable of the current study is the percent of the total 
population of each country-year which is between 15 and 29 years of age. That 
measure was calculated by dividing the population between 15 and 29 years, over the 
sum of the population recorded in all age ranges. The resulting proportion was 
multiplied by 100. In this current study, this measure is referred to as the percent 15 
to 29, the percent young, or the percent youth. The variable serves as a measure of the 
proportion of a population that is close to the peak age of involvement with violent 
offending. 
In the current study I utilize the percent of the population aged 15 to 29 as a 
measure of the percent of the population that is young. Several reasons motivated the 






19 Countries without data on population by age group include: American Samoa, 
Andorra, Anguilla, Bermuda, Bonaire, Sint Eustatius and Saba, British Virgin Islands, 
Cayman Islands, Cook Islands, Dominica, Falkland Islands (Malvinas), Faroe Islands, 
Gibraltar, Greenland, Holy See, Isle of Man, Kosovo, Liechtenstein, Marshall Islands, 
Monaco, Montserrat, Nauru, Niue, Northern Mariana Islands, Palau, Saint Helena, 
Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Pierre and Miquelon, San Marino, Sint Maarten (Dutch 





use of that particular age-range. Several studies in the criminological literature have 
also used the percent of the population aged 15 to 24 years of age (Rogers & 
Pridemore, 2015). For the current study, the selection a broader age range was 
preferred over more restricted age ranges, as it may accommodate variations in peak 
age of criminal involvement across countries. While it is not the focus of this study to 
explore such differences, recent research has found interesting differences in the age 
and crime curve of countries (Steffensmeier et al., 2018), particularly in lower-
violence countries in Asia with collectivist cultural settings, which tend to display a 
peak of violent involvement at a higher age than in the United States. A broader age-
range that covers later years should be more adequate to accommodate these types of 
variations, which may be frequent in comparative research.  
Furthermore, any age-range selected should yield percentages that would be 
very highly correlated with the percentages of almost any other age-range in close 
proximity. Countries with a very high proportion of their populations between 15 to 
24 years are very likely to be the same countries with a very high proportion of their 
population between 15 to 29 years of age. Therefore, results from analyses using any 
of these measures should likely produce similar results. 
In order to investigate this proposition, I also collected data on the population 
between 15 and 24 years of age, and on the population who is male and between 15 to 
29 years of age. Both measures were obtained from the United Nations World 
Population Prospects. Both measures were divided by the total population size, in 
order to obtain the proportion of individuals in each country and year who are 





time, males and between 15 to 29 years of age. To facilitate the interpretation, all 
measures of proportion were multiplied by 100, and represent the percent of the 
population at a certain age range. 
Across the entire sample of countries and years, the Pearson correlation 
between the percent of the population between 15 and 24 years of age, and the 
percent of the population between 15 and 29 years of age was of 0.924, and between 
the percent of the population who is male and between 15 to 29 years, with the 
percent of the population between 15 to 29 years is of 0.906. Both are very high 
correlations. Additional analyses were conducted to test the sensitivity of findings to 
the choice between each of these measures of percent youth on homicide trends. 
Finally, two additional measure of age composition were based on the 
Relative Cohort Size literature. The first measure corresponds to the ratio between the 
populations between the ages of 15 to 29 years, over the population between 30 to 59 
years of age. The second measure is the ratio between the population ages 15 to 24, 
over the population ages 25 to 59.20 To facility the interpretation of coefficients, both 
ratios were multiplied by 100. Analyses were also replicated using each of these 
measures of population age, in order to test their efficacy in predicting homicide 
trends. 






20 Models were also produced using the ratio of individuals between 15 to 29 years of 
age over all age groups above 30, and using the number of individuals between 15 to 





The Pearson correlation between the original percent of the (total) population 
between 15 to 29 years of age and the first measure described equals 0.738, and with 
second measure it equals 0.669. Both correlations are high, but not nearly as high as 
the correlation between all three percentages which were calculated relative to the 
total population. Nonetheless, the correlations are indicative that the measures are not 
as distinct conceptually. The percent of the population between ages 15 to 29 over the 
total population is also a relative measure of cohort size, with the single difference 
that its denominator corresponds to the entire population, instead of a second specific 
age group. 
To be clear, there are innumerous ways how Relative Cohort Size studies were 
operationalized and tested, each in line with the inquires and propositions of specific 
research questions and objectives. The current study draws from the original 
measures proposed by Easterlin (1978) and others (Macunovich, 2000; Pampel, 1993) 
by comparing the size of the youth age group over the size of older cohorts until age 
60.21 
Control Variables 
The selection of control variables in the current study was largely restricted by 
a trade-off related to data availability. To be sure, that is a common issue for extant 






21 Originally, Easterlin (1978) defined relative cohort size as the ratio between 






comparative research, or for studies that deal with missing data more generally 
(Allison, 2002; LaFree, 1999; Nivette, 2011). On one side, there is the need to include 
relevant macro-level control variables in order to minimize the risk of omitted 
variable bias in regression analyses. In the other side, because of missing data, the 
addition of more control variables invariably reduces the number of available 
countries and years, often biasing the sample toward higher income and more stable 
countries which usually have better data. That issue is aggravated in the present study 
because of the use of a very long series of data, including years which may not 
contain data on a range of relevant macro-level indicators. In reality, measures for 
many of the theories hypothesized to have caused the 1990’s homicide decline 
(Tcherni-Buzzeo, 2019) are simply not available for a broader set of countries beyond 
the United States and Western Europe. While there is indeed a risk of omitted 
variable bias in the results, the current study’s goal of producing estimates that are 
applicable globally and longitudinally, in addition to the focus on the effect of age 
composition (and not on other proposed explanations) directs the present 
investigation to the use of a smaller set of controls with increased data quality. 
Moreover, some relief comes from the fact that cross-national predictors of homicides 
have a tendency to be very highly related with one-another, to the extent that studies 
can efficiently combine multiple measures of development, broadly defined both 
socially and economically, into a single variable (Pridemore, 2008, 2011; Testa et al., 
2018). Therefore, several omitted controls may be closely related with observed 





minimize the risk of omitted variable bias, and sensitivity analyses were performed to 
access the potential impact of omitted variables on the results. 
Until very recently, country-level data on economic and social indicators were 
scattered across sources internationally, were often very difficult to collect, and were 
not necessarily comparable. The World Bank Open Data (formerly named the World 
Development Indicators), sought to address that problem by assembling a central 
repository which has establish itself as the main source of high-quality data for 
thousands of indicators. The repository is essentially a compilation of data sources 
from national statistical agencies, international organizations, and other institutions, 
which are curated by the World Bank’s staff (World Bank, 2018). 
As a priority, the present study focused on obtaining data on indicators that 
had a high sample available for many years. Two indicators were collected from the 
World Bank Open data. The first is the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita, 
which corresponds to the aggregated value of all goods and services produced, 
divided by the population of a country in a given year. That indicator often serves as a 
measure of a country’s wealth and aggregated economic well-being (Nivette, 2011; 
Trent and Pridemore, 2012). Most research hypothesizes a negative relation between 
GDP and homicides, often linking increases in wealth with a decrease in the harmful 
consequences of deprivation, and with an increase in the resources available for 
public institutions to address social problems (Fajnzylber et al., 2002; LaFree, 1998; 
Messner and Rosenfeld, 1997; Nivette and Eisner, 2013, Rogers and Pridemore, 
2013, 2017). To account for differences in the pricing of the same goods (e.g. 





purchasing power in dollars in 2010. Therefore, all GDP counts correspond to their 
value as 2010 US dollars. Finally, to facilitate the reading of coefficients, values were 
transformed from a scale of $1 to a scale of $1,000.  
The second indicator collected from the World Data is the urban population, 
measured as a percentage relative to the total resident population in each country. One 
interesting particularity of the percent urban is the almost liner increasing trend in that 
proportion, which rarely never declines over time in any country (World Bank, 2018). 
While that increase reflects improvements in productivity and other technological 
advancements, urbanization may also be a source of social disorganization and of 
other forms of social disruption, such as changes in routine activities and reductions 
in social control which may be criminogenic (Cohen & Felson, 1979; Lodhi & Tilly, 
1973; Nivette, 2011). As the GDP per capita, the percent urban is also one of the most 
commonly used measures in cross-national analyses (Nivette, 2011; Trent & 
Pridemore, 2012). 
Another commonly used indicator in cross-national analyses, and one of the 
strongest predictors of the difference in homicides between countries, is income 
inequality (Nivette, 2011). Income inequality is often understood as a cause of 
relative deprivation, which refers to the frustration steaming from the lack of 
legitimate means to obtain, or to achieve something that is available to others in the 
same society, and that is highly valued by its members (LaFree, 1999; Merton, 1938). 
Faced with this source of stain, some individuals may choose crime and violence as 
an illegitimate strategy for achieving success, or as a copying mechanism against a 





their best interest (Cloward & Ohlin, 1960; Wilkinson, 2004). While there are several 
available measures of income inequality, the Gini Index is one of the most popular 
and more easily available (Nivette, 2011). The indicator is a statistical measure of 
distribution, ranging from a hypothetical zero where there is perfect equality in the 
income of a population, to maximum value of 1 where there is perfect inequality. The 
World Bank contains data for the Gini index, but data on this indicator is largely 
missing for many countries and years. Fortunately, an alternative source is maintained 
by Dr. Frederick Solt, from the University of Iowa, entitled the The Standardized 
World Income Inequality Database (SWIID). That databased contains quality data on 
the Gini for at least one year for 189 countries. Though the longitudinal availability of 
these data varies, 22 countries have Gini data available for more than 50 years since 
1960. 
 The percent of the population that is male was collected from the United 
Nations World Population Prospects. Similar to the percent young, the percent male is 
hypothesized to result in an increase in homicides though an increase in the 
availability of motivated offenders. While the percent male is a common measure 
included in cross-national analyses of homicides, estimated effects vary in strength 
and even in direction (LaFree, 1999; Trent & Pridemore, 2012). There is some debate 
on the cause of such inconsistency (Lim et al., 2005; Pridemore, 2011), and one 
potential explanation is reciprocal causality, as an imbalance in the proportion of the 
population in each sex may itself be a consequence of high levels of mortality due to 
external causes, including homicides (Hesketh, 2006). Future research can explore 





 A last measure used in the current study is the State Fragility Index developed 
and published by the Center for Systemic Peace (2018). This indicator is a composite 
index which summarizes several measures of state effectiveness and legitimacy 
within the realms of security22, politics, the economy, and social well-being. Each of 
the index’s components are ranked to reflect the level of fragility associated with that 
particular area, ranging from a score of 0, for no fragility, to a score of 4 for extreme 
fragility. The resulting scores are then added together to produce the total State 
Fragility Index, which varies from 0 to 25. Ultimately, the score seeks to provide a 
summary measure of a state’s ability to address crises, conflicts and social problems 
by effectively intervening where necessary (through policy and service), and by 
maintaining systemic peace and stability towards development. 
While there are other indicators on country-level stability that are publically 
available, the State Fragility Index is the only variable found that is of good quality, 
and which is available for a longer longitudinal series. In total, this State Fragility 
Index is available for 167 countries for all years between 1995 to 2017. Since the 
indicator is not available for before 1990, this variable was only analyzed using the 
High Coverage sample. 






22 The security component refers to a country’s involvement in wars and to the degree 
of repression which is employed by a state toward its residents. The component does 
not summarize any indicators of crime or violence that would make it an inadequate 






A total of 160 countries worldwide had populations greater than 1,000,000 
individuals in 2015. Considering all years from 1950 to 2016, that would result in a 
maximum hypothetical sample of 10,720 country/years (160 times 67). As indicated 
by Table 4.1, data for population by age group and for the population by sex is 
available for nearly that entire sample. Other indicators, however, are much less 
available. The homicide rate is the variable with the least amount of observations, 
which is particularly the case due to the lack of observations before 1990 for nearly 
all countries, besides the sub-sample that met the restriction criteria for the 
combination between the WHO and the UNODC homicide rates. All economic 
indicators are only available since 1960, and the State Fragility Index is only 
available since 1995. Most indicators are only available until 2015.  
 On average, countries of the world have a homicide rate of 7 per 100,000 
inhabitants, have 25.6% of the population between 15 to 29 years of age, have 49.8% 
of their population who are male, have a Gini index of 38, a GDP per capita (in 2010 
US$) of $9,580,00, 48% of their population living in urban settings, and a State 
Fragility Index of 9.3. Moreover, there is immense disparity in each of the above 
indicators, particularly in the Homicide Rate, and in the GDP per capita. Ireland had 
the world lowest rate in the data, at just 0.07 per 100,000 individuals, while the 
highest homicide rate was recorded in El Salvador, in 1996, at 142.16. The world’s 
lowest GDP per capita between 1960 and 2015 was recorded in Liberia in 1995, at 
just $120 dollars per person over that entire year. In contrast, the United Arab 





Table 4.1: Data Availability by Indicator 
Statistic N Mean SD Min Pctl(25) Pctl(75) Max Earliest Latest 
Homicide Rate 3,671 7.00 11.86 0.07 1.15 7.75 142.16 1950 2016 
Percent 15 to 29 10,362 25.62 3.01 14.68 23.91 27.50 38.15 1950 2015 
% 15-24 10,362 17.95 2.54 9.34 16.41 19.64 26.21 1950 2015 
% Male 15-29 10,362 12.98 1.84 7.46 11.93 13.89 29.10 1950 2015 
% 15-29 / 30-59 10,362 90.03 24.66 31.93 67.64 108.80 154.74 1950 2015 
% 15-24 / 25-59 10,362 49.77 13.64 13.78 37.56 60.26 80.89 1950 2015 
Percent Male 10,520 49.80 2.49 42.65 48.90 50.28 76.07 1950 2015 
Gini Index 4,728 38.02 8.70 18.10 31.50 43.90 63.30 1960 2015 
GDP per Cap 
(USD 1k) 
7,148 9.58 14.54 0.12 0.96 11.69 113.68 1960 2015 
Percent Urban 8,938 48.05 24.62 2.08 27.69 67.76 100.00 1960 2015 
State Fragility 
Index 




Very often, studies rely heavily on elaborate modeling strategies, at times 
ignoring the assumptions that support these models (Bushway et al., 2007). A single 
coefficient is just an average, and can hide interesting and important variation that 
occurs across observations. For that reason, this study relies extensively on the use of 
descriptive statistics and data visualization to explore co-occurring trends in homicide 
rates, age composition, and in other control variables. 
Using data for the population of countries worldwide, rather than a sample, 
favors a descriptive approach, as the observed differences between observations can 
be taken at face value, without the need for inferential statistics. Also, using data for 
up to seven decades allows for the visualization of variations of variables over a long 
time. Finally, countries are very specific units of analysis, in the sense that most have 





individualized treatment of each country, prior to the calculation of aggregate 
statistics, allows the current study to understand the impact of each of these events, 
and to account for that impact. 
Regional Trends 
One of the main descriptive analyses used in the current study is the 
elaboration of trends of some indicators by Region, which are the aggregation of the 
trends of multiple individual countries. A major methodological challenge of 
producing such trends is caused by missing data. As some countries contain gaps in 
data for some years, the sample of countries with available data varies over time. 
Consequently, a regional trend that does not account for this issue will result in trends 
that are biased by the differences in the countries with missing data across years. 
 One solution for this issue is to equalize the sample of countries with 
homicide data available for each year. For that end, and exclusively for the purposes 
of calculating regional trends, missing years of each country were estimated using an 
Exponentially Weighted Moving average. For each individual country, the 
homicide rate of missing years was replaced by the average homicide rate of other 
years in that countries’ series. In addition, the impact of each year on the average was 
exponentially weighted23 by the time-difference between that year, and the year being 






23 Meaning that the weight of each year on the imputed average declined by half with 





estimated. Figure 4.4 is an example of this methodology applied to homicide data for 
Myanmar from 1990 and 2016.24 
Figure 4.4: Moving Average Estimate of the Homicide Trend – Myanmar, 1990 
to 2016 
  
The moving average takes advantage of all available data in order to produce 
regional trends that are informative of the trends of indicators for each region. 
However, this methodology relies on the availability of data for a sizable proportion 
of a region’s population over time. In the specific case of homicides, globally 
representative data are only available from the UN Homicide Statistics since 1990. In 
addition, as data coverage for Africa is relatively low, and as data are missing for 






24 The resulting homicide trends are very similar to those obtained using a simple 
linear interpolation between the observed values nearest to the missing year. Both 
methods are also equality simple and parsimonious. However, because the moving 
average is influenced by all values in a countries’ series, it is less sensitive to extreme 
homicides which may be specific to a single year (e.g. the US terrorist attacks of 






















many of the most populous countries in the region, trends produced for Africa were 
mostly driven by the trend of South Africa – one of the few larger African countries 
with available data longitudinally. For that reason, trends for Africa were omitted 
from some analyses. 
All other countries were grouped according to the regional groups of the 
United Nations geoscheme, which is based on the Standard Country or Area Codes 
for Statistical Use (also referred to as M49). This scheme is maintained by the United 
Nations Statistical Division, and is broadly used by other United Nations entities in 
their data analyses, reporting, and operations (United Nations Statistical Division, 
2017).25 The standard groups world countries according to their geographical 
continents, namely Africa, Americas, Asia, Europe, and Oceania.26 Moreover, the 
M49 also classifies countries according to their subregion, which also reflect 
commonly used geographic designations. Appendix D contains the homicide trends 
of all 22 individual World’s subregions, grouped by their corresponding regions 
according to the M49. Because homicide rates for Northern America were notably 
different from the remaining of the Americas (both in terms of level, and change), 
analyses were executed separately for Northern America and Latin America. 
Similarly, distinct trends were observed between Eastern Europe and the remaining of 






25 Details about the scheme, and related tables can all be found at the website 
www.unstats.un.org/unsd/methodology/m49/ 





the European continent, as trends for the latter were largely affected by the 
dissolution of the Soviet Union, which ended in December of 1991 (Chervyakov et 
al., 2002). These differences justified the separation of analyses for Europe between 
Eastern Europe, and Western Europe.27 
The resulting regional groupings used in this study are Asia, Eastern Europe, 
Latin America, Northern America, Oceania, Western Europe, and the World’s total. 
Average Effect of Age 
The research questions of the current study have a longitudinal emphasis. 
They all pertain to drivers of homicide trends over-time, focusing on within-country 
variations in rates, rather than the explanations for the differences between countries. 
Accordingly, the current study used a fixed-effects liner regression, a specification 
that controls for the level of homicide of each country, thus providing the effect of 
each predictor in the change of homicides rates. In addition, a fixed-effects model 
takes advantage of the availability of repeated time-measures for each observation to 
control for the influence of all time invariant factors that could confound the 
relationship between each independent variable with changes in the dependent 
variable, even if those factors are not explicitly controlled for in the model. The 
following model specification is used. 
 











𝐿𝑛(𝐻𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑖𝑡) =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡 15 𝑡𝑜 29𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽j𝑋𝑖𝑡 +  𝛼𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
 
Where the left-hand side of the equation contains the natural log of the 
homicide rate of each country i at time t. The betas correspond to the coefficient 
sizes, and 𝜀𝑖𝑡 is the error term of each individual data point. The notation 𝑋𝑖𝑡 
corresponds to a vector of all time-varying control variables included in the model, 
and  𝛼𝑖 refers to the country fixed effects, which account for country-level 
characteristics that are constant across time t. Additionally, standard errors were 
clustered to account for the dependence of year-observations within each country. 
Clustered standard errors were calculated using the White method for panel models 
(Allison, 2009; White, 1980; Wooldridge, 2002) 
The fixed effects model, in addition to the inclusion of time-varying controls 
traditionally used in cross-national homicide research greatly minimize the risk of 
confoundedness from omitted variables. Other macro-level criminological research 
has used fixed effects successfully (Ousey & Kubrin, 2009; Phillips, 2006). 
Variations in Effect 
The current study also hypothesizes that null findings of previous research 
about the effect of percent young on homicide rates are partially a consequence of the 
emphasis on average association. More specifically, this study suggests that a direct 
relationship between percent young and changes in homicide rates may be more 
clearly identifiable in the most stable countries which faces the lowest levels of other 





the lowest in the countries with the highest homicide rates, where the impact of age 
on homicide trends is secondary to the influence of all other criminogenic forces. 
Two parallel strategies were used to explore variations in the effect of percent 
young on homicide rates. The first is the inclusion of interaction terms between the 
percent young and other regressors in the fixed effects regression model. This 
inclusion enables the evaluation of variations in the size of the coefficient for age 
across the distribution of another independent variable (Aiken et al., 1991). More 
specifically, if the impact of age declines when other criminogenic forces are more 
prevalent, particularly the State Fragility Index. 
𝐿𝑛(𝐻𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑖𝑡)
=  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡 15 𝑡𝑜 29𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝐹𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽3(𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡 15 𝑡𝑜 29 ∗ 𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝐹𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥)𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽j𝑋𝑖𝑡 +  𝛼𝑖
+ 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
 
A major shortcoming for evaluating variations in the effect of age 
composition is the lack of available data on criminogenic forces more generally. 
Many of the factors commonly linked to changes in homicides among the most 
violent countries, such as operations by organized crime organizations, do not have 
available measures. Other forces which are measured, such as high levels of 
inequality, may be better explanations for differences in homicides between places, 
than for changes in homicides over time. Finally, even if appropriate measures are 
available, such as the State Fragility Index, they may be only available for a shorter 
series. 
In the current study, I propose the use of quantile regression (with fixed 





the lowest levels of homicides, to those with the highest levels. This analytical 
strategy purports to evaluate variations in the effect of age composition across 
countries experiencing differences in the prevalence of other criminogenic forces. 
 In a traditional Ordinary Least Square regression, each estimated coefficient 
correspond to the change in the conditional mean of a dependent variable given a one-
unit change on an independent variable, while holding all other controls constant. 
Instead, by using a quantile regression researchers are able to estimate coefficients of 
independent variables at any given part of the distribution of the dependent variable, 
and not just at its average (Koenker & Bassett, 1978). Moreover, researchers can use 
a quantile regression to compare the strength of predictors across the distribution of a 
dependent variable. Most often researchers evaluate effects at the quantiles and the 
median of a dependent variable, but coefficients can be calculated for any given part 
of a distribution. This part is commonly designated by its corresponding percentile 
(tau; τ), which varies from 0 to 1 (Beyerlein, 2014; Britt, 2009; Hao & Naiman, 
2007). 
The main advantage of using a quantile regression is that it overcomes 
limitations in the availability of data on other criminogenic pressures by directly 
using homicide rates themselves, the presumed outcome of those forces, as an 
instrument for evaluating variations on the impact of age composition. Moreover, the 
quantile regression enables that evaluation across all years and countries with 
available data in the dependent variable, thus overcoming the limited availability of 





I propose that the use of a quantile regression with fixed-effects is an efficient 
and parsimonious approach for evaluating the differences in effects hypothesized in 
the current study. By enabling the evaluation of differences in the effect of age 
composition across the distribution of homicide rates, a quantile regression enables 
the test of the propositions of the current study. Specifically, that the impact of the 
percent young on homicide rates becomes progressively more visible - and age is 
increasingly more relevant driver of change in homicide rates relative to alternative 
causes - as that relationship is evaluated in the absence of competing criminogenic 
pressures driving homicides. 
Methods Summary and Research Questions 
 This sub-section summarizes the analytical strategies, specifying how each of 
the research questions outlined in Chapter 3 were operationalized and addressed. 
 The first research question seeks to estimate the average effect of percent 
youth on homicide rates. That relationship was estimated using a fixed-effects model 
to regress the natural log of the homicide rate on the percent of the population 
between 15 to 29 years of age. Parallel models were executed using the High 
Coverage Sample, and the Long Series Sample.  
 The second research question asks about differences in the effect of percent 
youth across world’s regions. Analyses related to this question are in two directions. 
The first is an exploratory description of the trends in homicide rates and in age 
composition from 1990 to 2015, which seeks to explore the bivariate relationship 





consist in a fixed-effects regression model which includes an interaction term 
between the percent youth and each region. 
 The third research question explores if the effect of percent youth is 
conditional on the level of stability of countries. This question was addressed by 
including an interaction term between the percent youth and the State Fragility Index, 
which corresponds to a measure of the social and political stability of countries. The 
hypothesis of the current study tests if the coefficient size of the interaction term is 
negative and different than zero, which indicates that the effect of percent youth on 
homicide trends reduces as state fragility increases. Moreover, support for the 
hypothesis would require that the main effect of percent youth on homicides be 
positive, indicating that percent youth have a positive effect on homicide trends in 
countries with the lowest levels of instability (where the State Fragility Index equals 
zero). Because data on the State Fragility Index is only available since 1995, this 
analysis was only performed using the High Coverage Sample. 
 The forth research question asks if an observable effect of age composition on 
homicide trends is conditional on the level of homicide of countries. To answer this 
question, this study uses a quantile regression (with fixed-effects) to estimate the 
effect of percent youth on homicide trends at several percentiles of the homicide rate 
distribution. 
 Table 4.2 summarizes each research question, hypothesis, and the 
corresponding research methods related to each question. This table will be revisited 






Table 4.2: Summary of Research Questions, Hypotheses and Methods 
Research Question Hypothesis Methods 
1.  Is there an average 
effect of percent youth on 
homicide trends? 
The average effect of percent 
youth on homicide rate is positive 
and above zero. 
Fixed-effects model regressing 
the natural log of homicide rate 
on the percent of the population 
between 15 to 29 years of age. 
2..  Are there variations in 
the impact of percent youth 
across regions? 
The average effect of percent 
youth on homicide rate varies by 
region. Moreover, that effect is 
positive and above zero for the 
regions which experienced 
homicide declines. 
Fixed-effects model including 
an interaction term between a 
flag for each of the world's 
regions, and the percent of the 
population between 15 to 29 
years of age. 
3..  Is the effect of percent 
youth on homicide trends 
conditional on the level of 
stability of countries? 
The effect of age composition on 
homicide trends is conditional on 
the level of state fragility of 
countries. In particular, the effect 
of age is stronger for countries 
with lower levels of instability, 
and weakens gradually as country 
instability increases.  
Fixed-effects model including 
an interaction term between the 
State Fragility Index and the 
percent of the population 
between 15 to 29 years of age. 
4..  Is the effect of percent 
youth on homicide trends 
conditional on the level of 
homicide of countries? 
The effect of age composition on 
homicide trends is conditional on 
the level of homicide of countries. 
In particular, the effect of age is 
stronger for countries with lower 
levels of homicide, and weakens 
gradually as homicide rates 
increase. 
Quantile regression (with 
country fixed-effects) 
estimating the effect of percent 
of the population between 15 to 
29 years of age on the natural 
log of homicide rates at several 
percentiles of the homicide rate 
distribution. 
 
Several additional analyses were performed in order to place findings obtained 
to the context the International Homicide Decline, and to test the sensitivity of 
findings to some of the specific methodological decisions of this study. Thus, 







Chapter 5: Results 
This chapter presents results from the analysis described in Chapter 4 and 
seeks to provide substantiated responses to the research questions presented in 
Chapter 3. Generally, the following analyses are an investigation of the association 
between the percent youth and homicide rates, and of the nuances in this relationship. 
This chapter begins with descriptive statistics of measures used in the study, followed 
by a measure of the average association between age composition and homicide rates. 
I then investigate the empirical plausibility of age composition as an explanatory 
factor for international homicide decline by contextualizing the estimated effect in 
terms of size and generalizability. That later assessment is further supported by the 
presentation of regional trends in homicide rates and in age composition for the 
world, and for each of the world’s regions. Next, I investigate variations in the effect 
of age composition by the world’s regions, across levels of state fragility, and among 
the distribution of homicide rates. I then present analyses assessing the sensitivity of 
results to some of the methodological choices and limitations of the current study. 
Finally, I provide a summary of findings directly relating the results of this chapter to 
the research questions outlined in Chapter 3. 
Descriptive Statistics 
The High Coverage Sample (from 1990 to 2015) and the Long Series Sample 
(from 1960 to 2015) are very distinct in their component countries. While all 26 
countries in the Long Series Sample are also contained in the High Coverage Sample, 





social and economic indicators. As presented on Table 5.1, on average, the homicide 
rate of the high coverage sample is 53% greater than the homicide rate of the Long 
Series Sample. The GDP per capita of the Long Series is almost two and a half times 
that of the High Coverage Sample, which also has a higher inequality of income, with 
a Gini index 4.6 points greater than the Long Series Sample. The demographic 
indicators are somewhat comparable, with the exception that the Long Series Sample 
is generally more urbanized (69.4% against 54%).  
Table 5.1: Descriptive Statistics by Sample 
Statistic N Mean SD Min Pctl(25) Pctl(75) Max Earliest Latest 
High Coverage Sample (Since 1990) 
Homicide Rate 2,567 8.00 13.06 0.13 1.36 8.53 142.16 1990 2015 
Percent 15 to 29 4,082 25.72 3.66 14.68 23.18 28.21 36.03 1990 2015 
% 15-24 4,082 17.78 3.11 9.34 15.33 20.01 26.21 1990 2015 
% Male 15-29 4,082 13.08 2.08 7.46 11.63 14.23 26.04 1990 2015 
% 15-29 / 30-59 4,082 86.17 29.29 31.93 57.81 111.70 154.74 1990 2015 
% 15-24 / 25-59 4,082 47.11 16.00 13.78 31.80 61.41 80.89 1990 2015 
Percent Male 4,160 49.93 2.84 45.79 48.97 50.16 76.07 1990 2015 
Gini Index 3,303 38.44 8.41 18.10 32.50 43.80 63.30 1990 2015 
GDP per Cap (USD 1k) 3,915 11.12 16.18 0.12 1.03 13.19 91.41 1990 2015 
Percent Urban 4,101 54.01 23.49 5.42 35.17 73.43 100.00 1990 2015 
State Fragility Index 3,249 9.36 6.69 0.00 3.00 15.00 25.00 1995 2016 
Long Series Sample (Since 1960) 
Homicide Rate 1,621 5.23 10.00 0.07 0.89 3.65 81.41 1960 2015 
Percent 15 to 29 1,716 23.49 3.38 14.68 20.99 25.90 33.46 1960 2015 
% 15-24 1,716 16.01 2.82 9.34 13.91 18.25 23.62 1960 2015 
% Male 15-29 1,716 11.89 1.69 7.46 10.67 13.08 17.98 1960 2015 
% 15-29 / 30-59 1,716 68.59 21.44 31.93 53.11 80.02 129.58 1960 2015 
% 15-24 / 25-59 1,716 38.33 11.96 18.14 29.59 45.18 70.92 1960 2015 
Percent Male 1,716 49.38 0.87 46.22 48.82 49.87 52.19 1960 2015 
Gini Index 1,190 33.82 8.55 20.20 26.90 40.60 53.00 1960 2015 
GDP per Cap (USD 1k) 1,337 25.47 18.15 0.57 10.48 35.95 91.41 1960 2015 









Table 5.2 is a correlation matrix of the variables in each analytical sample. 
Several of the indicators have moderate to strong correlations with each other, which 
confirms findings of extant research (Pridemore, 2011), and supports the premise that 
social and economic disadvantages at the macro-level have a tendency to co-exist. 
Additionally, the table contains the variance inflation factors (VIFs) of each variable 
in a model using all other variables to predict the homicide rate, with fixed-effects. 
The VIFs in both samples remain below 3.5 suggesting no substantial problem with 
multicollinearity (Fox, 1991). 
Table 5.2: Correlation Matrix per Sample with Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) 
High Coverage Sample (Since 1990) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) VIF 
(1) Homicide Rate 1.00        
(2) Percent 15 to 29 0.34 1.00      3.10 
(3) Percent Male -0.08 0.32 1.00     1.46 
(4) Gini Index 0.53 0.64 0.13 1.00    1.73 
(5) GDP per Cap (USD 1k) -0.28 -0.65 0.14 -0.50 1.00   2.73 
(6) Percent Urban -0.06 -0.50 0.01 -0.31 0.61 1.00  1.65 
(7) State Fragility Index 0.19 0.59 0.01 0.45 -0.64 -0.67 1.00 2.88 
Long Series Sample (Since 1960) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)   VIF 
(1) Homicide Rate 1.00        
(2) Percent 15 to 29 0.46 1.00      2.27 
(3) Percent Male 0.10 0.43 1.00     1.26 
(4) Gini Index 0.65 0.53 0.19 1.00    1.70 
(5) GDP per Cap (USD 1k) -0.41 -0.67 -0.17 -0.62 1.00   2.50 
(6) Percent Urban -0.06 -0.32 -0.11 -0.22 0.43 1.00   1.25 
Note: The Variance Inflation Factors (VIFs) are based on a fixed effects model for the (Ln) Homicide 
Rate, controlling for all other variables in the matrix, for each sample. 
 
The Average Relationship between Age Composition and Homicide Trends 
Table 5.3 provides the results of the fixed effects linear regression using both 
the High Coverage and the Long Series Samples. The first model displays the 
bivariate association between the percent youth and changes in the homicide rate in 
the High Coverage Sample, which starts in 1990. The coefficient in this model 





an average increase of 3.8% in the homicide rate. However, after the inclusion of the 
control variables for demographic and economic indicators, the relationship is 
substantially attenuated to a value much closer to zero. 
The two subsequent models estimate the relationship between percent youth 
and homicide rate using the 26 countries of the Long Series Sample. In the bivariate 
model, the results demonstrate that a one percentage point increase in the percent 
young increases the homicide rate by 5.1%. Moreover, with the inclusion of controls 
for demographic and economic factors, the effect increases to 5.4% for each one 
percentage point increase in the percent youth.  
There are two possible explanations for the differences in effect between the 
Long Series Sample and the High Coverage Sample. First, differences could be due to 
the differences in the number of years, and in the timeframe encompassed by each 
sample. For instance, as suggested by Phillips (2006), it could be that the effect of age 
composition is time-dependent, and therefore contingent on other societal 
characteristics of a given period. A second explanation for the differences in effect 
would be the composition of countries in each sample. As demonstrated in Table 5.1, 
the Long Series sample has, on average, a much higher level of wealth, and much 
lower levels of homicide. 
In order to determine whether the difference in the results between the Long 
Series and the High Coverage samples are driven by differences in the countries of 
each sample or by differences in the time frame between the two samples, the final 
two columns of Table 5.3 restrict the fixed effect regression of the Long Series 





obtained using the original Long Series Sample since 1960, this analysis suggests that 
the differences in results between the Long Series and High Coverage sample are a 
consequence of the differences in the composition of countries included in each 
sample, rather than the changes to the time frame. Generally, the Long Series Sample 
is comprised of countries which are more economically developed and have lower 
levels of homicide than the High Coverage Sample (see Table 5.1). This result 
suggests there may be a difference in the effect of percent young across countries 
with different levels of homicides and with different concentrations of disadvantages 
more generally. 
Table 5.3: Fixed Effects Models for the Average Effect of Percent 15 to 29 on 
Homicide Rates 















Percent 15 to 
29 
1.038** 1.018  1.051*** 1.054*** 1.073*** 1.058** 
(0.013) (0.015)  (0.014) (0.014) (0.015) (0.021) 
Percent Male  1.032   1.125  1.135 
 (0.053)   (0.075)  (0.078) 
Gini Index  0.989   0.967  0.961 
 (0.016)   (0.019)  (0.035) 
GDP per Cap 
(1k) 
 0.969**   0.997  0.987 
 (0.010)   (0.006)  (0.010) 
Percent Urban  1.008   1.022*  1.015 
  (0.009)     (0.009)   (0.016) 
Observations 2,558 2,283  1,621 1,136 670 662 
Countries 135 126  26 26 26 26 
R2 0.032 0.125  0.080 0.259 0.207 0.282 
F Statistic 80.688*** 61.538***   139.432*** 77.294*** 167.543*** 
49.458*
** 
Note: *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001. Coefficients are exponentiated, and correspond to the average 
proportional change in the geometric mean of homicide rate from a one-unit increase in an independent 
variable, relative to the previous unit. 
 
Figure 5.1 displays the predicted change in homicide rate for each unit change 
in the percent 15 to 29. Predicted values were calculated using the coefficient 





since 1980 the world experienced a decline of 2.5 percentage points in its population 
between 15 to 29 years. All regions, besides Africa, contributed to this decline. 
Northern America and Europe each experienced declines in their percent youth of 
more than 6 percentage points since 1980. Assuming that each percentage point 
change in the percent youth corresponds to a 5.4% increase in the homicide rate, a 
country which experienced a decline of 6.4 percentage points in the proportion of its 
population between 15 and 29 years (as did the United States between 1980 and 
2010), would experience a predicted reduction of 40% in its homicide rate. The actual 
decline in the United States’ homicide rate over that period was 48.4%. 
Figure 5.1: Predicted Change in Homicide Rate from Unit-Increases in the 
Percent 15 to 29 
 
Note: Confidence intervals correspond to an alpha level of 0.95. 
 
This result suggests that an average effect of age composition on homicide 
trends at around 5% would be strong and sizable enough to explain large changes in 
homicide (e.g. the international homicide decline), and to contribute much to changes 



































Cross-Sectional Evaluation of the Effect of Percent Youth on Homicide Rates 
 As discussed in Chapter 3, several of the studies which have investigated the 
relationship between demographic composition and homicide rates which were 
included in the systematic review conducted by Rogers and Pridemore (2016)28 
utilized a cross-section, as opposed to longitudinal data on homicide rates. Table 5.5 
contains Ordinary Least Squares regression models using a cross-section of the High 
Coverage Sample for individual years in five-year increments between 1990 and 
2015. The first column includes only a cross-section of data for 1990, the second 
model uses only data from 1995, and so forth. The dependent variable is the natural 
log of the homicide rate. To facilitate the interpretation, coefficients were transformed 
using their exponential, and correspond to the proportional increase in the homicide 
rate resulting from a one-unit increase in the independent variable. 
  






28 A complete list and summary statistics of all studies can be obtained at the 








Table 5.4: Cross-Sectional Models (Ordinary Least Squares) for the Average 
Effect of Percent 15 to 29 on Homicide Rates Across Years 
  Cross-Section of Years (OLS Models) 
  1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 
Percent 15 to 29 
1.013 1.035 1.022 1.066 1.100** 1.233*** 
(0.069) (0.059) (0.041) (0.040) (0.029) (0.033) 
Percent Male 
0.729** 0.610*** 0.808*** 0.859** 0.873*** 0.714* 
(0.116) (0.110) (0.036) (0.047) (0.026) (0.143) 
Gini Index 
1.078*** 1.091*** 1.085*** 1.074*** 1.060*** 1.035* 
(0.015) (0.013) (0.012) (0.014) (0.013) (0.016) 
GDP per Cap (1k) 
0.983** 0.984* 0.985* 0.993 0.988* 0.992 
(0.006) (0.008) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) 
Percent Urban 
1.004 0.998 1.005 1.009 1.013* 1.015** 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) 
Constant 
13.816** 22.130*** 8.297*** 4.014  2.713** 10.822  
(4.609) (4.517) (1.709) (2.193) (0.953) (6.322) 
Countries 65 75 88 103 112 65 
R2 0.498 0.721 0.667 0.475 0.517 0.685 
F Statistic 11.687*** 35.601*** 32.838*** 17.551*** 22.700*** 25.642*** 
Note: *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001. Coefficients are exponentiated (except for the constant), and 
correspond to the average proportional increase in the geometric mean of homicide rate from a one-
unit increase in an independent variable, relative to the previous unit. 
 
 It is crucial to note that while several of the estimates obtained for the effect 
of percent 15 to 29 on homicide rates have similar magnitudes to the ones obtained 
using the fixed-effects models, the coefficient sizes are not directly comparable. The 
main reason for this limitation is that the fixed-effects model controls for all time-
stable characteristics of each country, even if these are not directly included in the 
models as controls (Allison, 2009). Nonetheless, the models serve to illustrate 
differences in the predictors of homicide rates across modeling strategies. 
 The first notable characteristic across models is the very high value of the 
coefficients of determination, all close or above 0.5. Similar values are typical to 





1997; Nivette, 2011; Trent & Pridemore, 2012). In fact, most coefficient sizes are in 
line with findings from extant literature. Percent male has a notable negative effect on 
homicide rates, a finding which has been interpreted as indicative that a gender 
imbalance within a population may be a consequence of the prevalence of conflict or 
some other sources of social disruption which are highly associated with homicides 
(Hesketh & Xing, 2006; Pridemore, 2008; Trent & Pridemore, 2012). Also consistent 
with extant literature, the Gini index is found to have a positive, strong and consistent 
association with homicide rates, regardless of the year in which it is being evaluated 
(LaFree, 1999, Nivette, 2011). In contrast, the effect of aggregated economic wealth, 
as measured by the GDP per capita, is much less notable and consistent (Pridemore, 
2011). Therefore, the models below constitute a general representation of other 
models produced by extant research.  
 Generally, effect sizes from the cross-sectional regressions are different from 
results obtained in the fixed-effects models. While percent male has a very clear 
negative impact in the cross-sectional models, in the fixed-effects regression that 
effect is largely mitigated (β = 1.032; p > 0.05). The same is observed for the 
coefficient related to the Gini index, which does not seem to have a clear longitudinal 
effect on homicide trends (β = 0.989; p > 0.05) regardless of a very strong cross-
sectional association. One interpretation for this finding is that, while income 
inequality may help explain the differences in homicides between countries, it may be 
unable to explain the changes in homicide rates over time. This lack of a longitudinal 
association may be a consequence of the relative constancy of within-country levels 





not have a consistent nor robust effect on homicide rates cross-sectionally, but the 
variable is a consistently strong predictor of homicide rates in the fixed-effects model 
(β = 0.969; p < 0.001), suggesting that economic wealth may perform much better in 
explaining changes in homicide rates over time29, than in explaining the differences in 
the level of homicides between countries. 
Much like what was identified by Rogers and Pridemore (2016) in their 
systematic review, a directly observed effect of age composition is not found across 
the regression models using data for most years, with the exception of the most recent 
years in the sample. While differences in the effect sizes across year-samples may be 
a consequence of variations in the country-composition of each year-sample, these 
results also suggest that cross-sectional analyses may be sensitive to the exact year of 
data under examination, which constitute an additional concern for macro-level 
researchers. 
Figure 5.2 shows the effect size of the coefficient of the percent 15 to 29 in 
linear regressions predicting the homicide rate at each individual year with available 
data in the High Coverage Sample. The black line illustrates coefficient sizes, while 
the blue line represents the number of countries included in the sample for each year. 
As the figure suggests, the coefficient of percent youth is not significantly different 






29 One potentially interesting theoretical explanation for this effect is relative 
deprivation, as individuals may feel a reduction in strain from an improvement in 
their own economic condition, relative to themselves in the past. I intend to explore 





from zero between 1990 and 2006, when the coefficient turns significantly positive 
until 2015. Generally, the figure corroborates the conclusion by Rogers and 
Pridemore (2016) that a directly observable relationship between age composition and 
homicide rates does not exist, particularly when that relationship is evaluated cross-
sectionally. Most importantly, however, these findings suggest that the particular 
finding of an effect for age is highly dependent on the specific year in which that 
association is being evaluated. 
Figure 5.2: Coefficient of the Percent 15 to 29 in OLS Cross-Sectional 
Regression Models by Year 
 
Note: Confidence intervals correspond to an alpha level of 0.95. Coefficients were extracted from 
models which include all control variables included in the main fixed-effects model, with robust 
standard errors. 
Differences in the Effect of Age Across Series Specifications 
One of the key differences between the current study and past research is the 
use of a broader sample of countries, which also covers a much larger number of 









































of age composition on homicide trends. Other studies on the homicide decline in the 
United States, and on the effect of percent youth on homicide trends more generally, 
most often use data which includes a much smaller number of years than the current 
study. For example, a study of the United States homicide decline by Phillips (2006) 
contained a short-term evaluation of the effect of age composition on crime trends 
using data between 1995 and 1999 - in which the author found a null effect of percent 
youth on homicide trends. In the systematic review conducted by Rogers and 
Pridemore (2016) of the cross-national literature on the effect of age composition on 
homicide trends, the authors also conducted their own analyses using data from 1999 
to 2005. In the latter study, the authors used the null findings of their own analysis to 
add support for their conclusion that age composition is not a predictor of homicide 
rates. The current section directly explores the sensitivity of results to the use of the 
year ranges employed by that literature. 
 Table 5.6 compares coefficient sizes for the main fixed-effects model across 
multiple specifications of the series of data used. The difference between models is in 
the range of years included in the analysis. All comparisons were executed using the 
High Coverage Sample. In particular, the table compares effect sizes across samples 
using the years between 1990 and 2015, between 1995 and 1999, and between 1999 
and 2005. 
 Results are relatively similar regardless the range of years selected. For the 
range between 1995 and 1999, coefficient sizes are both small and not significant 
both in the bivariate model specification and in the fully controlled model. For the 





range of years, the effect of age composition on homicide rates is negative, but not 
distinguishable from zero. 
Table 5.5: Fixed Effects Models for the Average Effect of Percent 15 to 29 on 
Homicide Rates Across Series’ Specifications 
  High Coverage Sample 
  1990 to 2015 1995 to 1999 1999 to 2005 
Percent 15 to 29 
1.038** 1.018 1.017 0.993 0.986 0.974 
(0.013) (0.015) (0.022) (0.023) (0.024) (0.027) 
Percent Male 
 1.032  1.325*  1.147* 
 (0.053)  (0.121)  (0.066) 
Gini Index 
 0.989  0.016  0.997 
 (0.016)  (0.023)  (0.025) 
GDP per Cap (1k) 
 0.969**  0.962***  0.971* 
 (0.010)  (0.010)  (0.012) 
Percent Urban 
 1.008  1.026  1.002 
 (0.009)  (0.022)  (0.014) 
Observations 2,558 2,283 416 396 714 664 
Countries 135 126 94 87 122 113 
R2 0.032 0.125 0.002 0.069 0.002 0.034 
F Statistic 80.688*** 61.538*** 0.765 4.394*** 0.920 3.834** 
Note: *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001. Coefficients are exponentiated, and correspond to the average 
proportional change in the geometric mean of homicide rate from a one-unit increase in an independent 
variable, relative to the previous unit. 
 
It is important to note that there are differences in the sample of countries with 
data at each range. The fully-controlled model between 1995 and 1999 contains data 
from 87 countries, while the model between 1999 and 2005 contains data for 113 
countries. Those counts are substantially smaller than the 126 countries included in 
the sample from 1990 to 2015. Table 5.7 presents an additional analysis to consider 
whether effects would be different if all samples included the same number of years 
(between 1990 to 2015), and if their only difference related to the countries included 
in each sample. Each model of the table includes all years of data available in the 
High Coverage Sample (from 1990 to 2015), but for each model the data was 





presented in Table 5.6. Thus, the table only reduces the number of countries included 
in each sample, while keeping the number of years constant across models. The 
purpose of these models is to explore if the differences in effect between the series’ 
specifications is due to the period of time used, or to the country-composition of the 
samples. 
As demonstrated in the table, results from all bivariate associations become 
significant – a direct consequence of the increase in sample size – although the 
coefficient size for the countries with data between 1999 and 2005 is now negative. 
Most importantly, the coefficient of percent youth in the fully-controlled models, 
regardless of the sample of countries, is small and not significant. Generally, results 
across all fully-controlled models are very similar in Table 5.10, with coefficient sizes 
that are very small and not significant. 
Table 5.6: Fixed Effects Models for the Average Effect of Percent 15 to 29 on 
Homicide Rates Across Series’ Specifications 
  High Coverage Sample 
  1990 to 2015 Countries 1995 to 1999 Countries 1999 to 2005 Countries 
Percent 15 to 
29 
1.038** 1.018 1.041*** 1.016 0.986** 0.974 
(0.013) (0.015) (0.014) (0.017) (0.024) (0.027) 
Percent Male 
 1.032  1.142  1.147 
 (0.053)  (0.068)  (0.066) 
Gini Index 
 0.989  0.981  0.997 
 (0.016)  (0.017)  (0.025) 
GDP per Cap 
(1k) 
 0.969**  0.970**  0.971** 
 (0.010)  (0.010)  (0.012) 
Percent Urban 
 1.008  1.010  1.002 
 (0.009)  (0.010)  (0.014) 
Observations 2,558 2,283 2,146 1,937 2,350 2,218 
Countries 135 126 94 87 122 113 
R2 0.032 0.125 0.039 0.151 0.033 0.126 
F Statistic 80.688*** 61.538*** 83.088*** 65.642*** 76.860*** 60.528*** 
Note: *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001. Coefficients are exponentiated, and correspond to the average 
proportional change in the geometric mean of homicide rate from a one-unit increase in an independent 






Results presented until now suggest that differences in the findings between 
the current study and past research are not as influenced by the use of a longer series 
of years. Like previous research, the main model utilizing the High Coverage Sample 
(since 1990) also did not yield a directly observed average effect of percent youth on 
homicide trends (presented in Table 5.3). Instead, an effect was only identified when 
using the Long Series Sample (since 1960), not because it included a larger number 
of years, but because that sample is restricted to countries which are generally more 
politically stable, wealthier, and safer than the world average. 
Hence, the main limitation of previous research that explains differences with 
the current research appears to be the excessive reliance on average effects, which 
may have hidden the nuances of the relationship between age composition and 
homicide trends. In the present study, I am able to take advantage of a broad database 
on homicides containing a diverse sample of countries to adequately explore 
heterogeneity in the effect of age composition across the world’s regions, across 
degrees of state fragility, and across level of homicide. 
Regional Trends 
This section presents a descriptive analysis of trends in homicide and in age 
composition across the world’s regions. The purpose of this analysis is not to provide 
conclusive statements, but instead to enrich this study by illustrating the bivariate 
association between age composition and homicide trends, including an observation 
of the times and locations where such relationship is non-existent. Hence this 
visualization exercise seeks to provide meaning to the heterogeneity in effects 





Figure 5.3 presents trends in homicide and in the percent youth aggregated for 
the entire world, and for each of the world’s regions, between 1990 and 2015. Over 
that period, the global homicide rate went through a gradual, yet sharp decline of 
19.7%, when it declined from 6.1 to 4.9 homicides per 100,000 individuals. This 
global decline is reflective of declines throughout almost all of the world’s regions, 
with declines of over 40% occurring in homicide rates of Western Europe and 
Northern America, 37.5% in Asia, and with both Oceania and Eastern Europe 
experiencing declines in homicide rates of nearly 20%. 
 These regions, and the world as an aggregate, also experienced strong declines 
in the relative size of their youth population since 1990. In the world, the proportional 
participation of youth declined from 27.2% to 24.2% of the entire population. Certain 
regions had even greater declines in that proportion. For instance, in Asia, the percent 
youth declined from 28.6% to 24.9% of the total population, and Northern America 
experienced a decline from 23.4% to 20.7%. All regions of the world besides Africa 
experienced similar declines, with the extreme being Western Europe, where the 
relative size of the youth population dropped by more than 25%, from 23.1% to 
17.2% of the total population. 
 In regions where the youth population and homicides declined concurrently, a 
very strong bivariate relationship exists between the two series, as expressed by the 
Pearson correlation included in each graph. For the entire world, that correlation is at 
0.81, which is a very high value. In specific regions such as Northern America (0.82), 
Asia (0.92), and Western Europe (0.95) that correlation is even stronger, and very 





addition to a generally strong association between homicide trends and demographic 
composition for the entire world and across individual regions, there exists a pattern 
of particularly strong correlations in the regions which, already in 1990, had the 
lowest levels of homicides, and which experienced the strongest declines in homicide. 
 There are two exceptions to the above patterns which are most relevant for the 
current study. First, is the case of Eastern Europe during the 1990s, when the 
homicide rate of the region increased sharply from a rate of 8.6, to 17.4, followed by 
a decline to 13.5. This immense volatility can be largely attributed to the dissolution 
of the Soviet Union, which concluded in 1991 (Chervyakov et al., 2002). Somewhat 
similar to the crack epidemics, the end of the Soviet Union was a particularly 
criminogenic period effect, which might have generated discontinuity in the 
association between percent young and homicide rates over that specific time. 
 The second exception is Latin America, which already in 1990 had, by far, the 
world’s highest homicide rate, at 20.6 per 100,000 individuals. While the region also 
experienced a decline in their youth population, which occurred at an increasing rate, 
the bivariate correlation between age composition and the homicide rate of the region 
is actually negative. More importantly, homicide rates appear largely irresponsive to 
demographic shifts, a pattern that contrasts with the relationships observed in other 
regions. The current study does not seek to provide an explanation for the heightened 
levels of violence in Latin America, but many countries in the region experience high 
levels of inequality, a strong influence of organized crime, have suffered sharpened 
events of economic downturn, in addition to several other sources of social and 





likely constitute a range of criminogenic forces which not only drive homicide rates 
to a level well beyond that of other regions, but which may also support those rates at 
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The Effect of Age Composition on Homicide Trends by Region 
Consistent with aggregated trends by region presented in Figure 5.3, there is 
substantial variation in the effect of percent 15 to 29 across regions of the world. The 
first two models in Table 5.8 present a copy of the fully controlled models using the 
High Coverage Sample (since 1990), and the Long Series Sample (since 1960). The 
third and fourth models include an interaction term with the coefficient sizes of 
percent 15 to 29 for each of the world’s regions. The region of Africa is the reference 
category.30 The effect sizes of all interactions refer to the difference in effect of the 
percent 15 to 29 on homicide rates between each region and Africa. 
 
  






30 Regions were categorized alphabetically. Coincidentally, Africa also has the 





Table 5.7: Fixed Effects Models for the Interaction between Percent 15 to 29 and 
Region 
    Interaction Models 
  Since 1990 Since 1960 Since 1990 Since 1960 
Percent 15 to 29 1.018 1.054*** 0.984 0.941*** 
(0.015) (0.014) (0.036) (0.006) 
Regions Interactions (Africa = 0) - -   
    
Percent 15 to 29*Asia - - 1.020 1.162*** 
  (0.046) (0.023) 
Percent 15 to 29*Eastern Europe - - 1.096* 1.214*** 
  (0.041) (0.021) 
Percent 15 to 29*Latin America - - 0.987 1.030 
  (0.064) (0.040) 
Percent 15 to 29*Northern America - - 1.059 1.127*** 
  (0.062) (0.012) 
Percent 15 to 29*Oceania - - 1.008 1.077*** 
  (0.046) (0.019) 
Percent 15 to 29*Western Europe - - 1.043 1.120*** 
  (0.040) (0.014) 
Percent Male 1.032 1.125 1.050 1.074 
(0.053) (0.075) (0.061) (0.088) 
Gini Index 0.989 0.967 0.990 0.960* 
(0.016) (0.019) (0.016) (0.017) 
GDP per Cap (1k) 0.969** 0.997 0.970** 0.997 
(0.010) (0.006) (0.011) (0.005) 
Percent Urban 1.008 1.022* 1.007 1.022** 
(0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.008) 
Observations 2,283 1,136 2,283 1,136 
R2 0.125 0.259 0.141 0.332 
F Statistic 61.538*** 77.294*** 31.930*** 49.686*** 
Note: *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001. Coefficients are exponentiated, and correspond to the average 
proportional change in the geometric mean of homicide rate from a one-unit increase in an independent 
variable, relative to the previous unit. 
 
 
Consistent with the average effect shown in Table 5.3, in the interaction 
model applied to the High Coverage Sample, almost all coefficients are not 
significantly different than zero. The single exception is Eastern Europe, where an 





of 7.9% in the homicide rate.31 The effect sizes using the Long Series Sample (since 
1960) are generally in the same direction as those observed in the High Coverage 
Sample, with the key difference being that those effects tend to be much more 
pronounced. 
Figure 5.3 illustrates the effect sizes for each region in the interaction model 
using the Long Series Sample. As it demonstrates, the effect of percent 15 to 29 is 
significant and very pronounced across all regions of the world, with the exception of 
Latin America, Africa, and Oceania. In Asia, for instance, each increase of one 
percentage point in the youth population corresponds to an increase of 9.4% in the 
homicide rate, an association which is substantially stronger than the average effect of 
5.4%. In Latin America, the effect size is small, and very close to zero. In Africa the 
coefficient actually turns negative, although effect sizes should be interpreted with 
reservation, as the single African country in the Long Series Sample is Mauritius. 
 
  






31 The value of 7.9% was obtained by adding the untransformed coefficient for the 
reference category (-0.016) from the untransformed coefficient of the interaction with 
Eastern Europe (0.092). The exponential of the value equals 1.079, or a percent 






Figure 5.4: Coefficient Size of Percent 15 to 29 on Homicide Rate by Region – 
Sample Since 1960 
 
Note: Confidence intervals correspond to an alpha level of 0.95. All effect sizes were obtained by 
expoentiating the addition of the untransformed coefficient of the reference category, with the 
untransformed coefficient of the interaction relative to each region. 
 
The analysis by region support several insights about the relationship between 
age composition and homicide trends. First, it demonstrates the strength and 
generality of the intentional homicide decline, and of the global aging of populations. 
Second, they illustrate the strength and generality of the association between 
homicide trends and the percent youth. Finally, they suggest a source of heterogeneity 
in the effect of age composition and homicides. In particular, the effect of population 
age on homicides is conditional on the absence of other criminogenic forces 
pressuring homicide rates higher, such as the ones experienced by Latin America, and 
by Eastern Europe during the 1990s. It is possible that these forces are preventing 
Latin America or the most violent countries in the world from enjoying the pacifying 





























Sources of Variation in the Impact of Age 
The current study also seeks to explore variation in the effect of the percent 
youth on homicide trends across levels of state fragility, and across levels of 
homicide. Both measures are used as strategies to explore the influence of alternative 
criminogenic forces on the effect of age composition on homicide trends. In 
particular, the following analyses seek to explore if the directly observable effect of 
age composition on homicide trends is contingent on the absence of other 
criminogenic forces influencing homicide rates. 
State Fragility 
As a test of whether the impact of percent youth on homicide rates is 
mitigated by country instability, this study includes a moderation analysis using the 
State Fragility Index (SFI). The index is a summary measure of a state’s ability to 
address crises, conflicts, and social problems by effectively intervening when 
necessary, and by maintaining systemic peace and stability towards development. 
Because the index is only available from 1995 to 2017, analyses using the SFI are 
restricted to the High Coverage Sample.  
 To test whether SFI mitigates the observable impact of age composition on 
homicides, I incorporated an interaction term between SFI and percent young in the 
fixed effects model of the High Coverage Sample. As presented in Table 5.9, both 
percent young and State Fragility are positively associated with homicide rates. 
However, the coefficient for the interaction between SFI and percent young is 
negative, indicating that Percent 15 to 29 has the strongest effect on changes in 





of age on homicide becomes progressively smaller as the State Fragility Index 
increases.  
Table 5.8: Fixed Effects Models for the Interaction between Percent 15 to 29 and 
the State Fragility Index 
  Since 1990 Since 1990 Since 1990 Since 1990 
Percent 15 to 29 1.038** 1.031** 1.019 1.044** 
(0.013) (0.011) (0.014) (0.014) 
Percent Male   0.975 0.978 
  (0.022) (0.023) 
Gini Index   0.985 0.987 
  (0.015) (0.014) 
GDP per Cap (1k)   0.964*** 0.969*** 
  (0.008) (0.008) 
Percent Urban   1.009 1.007 
  (0.009) (0.009) 
State Fragility Index (SFI)  1.061*** 1.065*** 1.210*** 
 (0.013) (0.013) (0.050) 
Percent 15 to 29 * SFI    0.995** 
   (0.002) 
Observations 2,558 2,109 1,895 1,895 
R2 0.032 0.105 0.227 0.245 
F Statistic 80.688*** 116.460*** 86.633*** 82.028*** 
Note: *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001. Coefficients are exponentiated, and correspond to the average 
proportional change in the geometric mean of homicide rate from a one-unit increase in an independent 
variable, relative to the previous unit. 
 
Figure 5.5 illustrates this interactive effect by displaying the predicted 
homicide rate by the percent 15 to 29 for countries at four levels of state fragility. 
This figure illustrates that the percent 15 to 29 has a strong effect on homicide rates 
when the SFI equals zero, however, that effect becomes progressively smaller, and 
eventually disappears, when evaluated at higher levels of state fragility. These results 
provide support for the conclusion that age composition has a strong impact on 
homicides trends, although this effect is only observable in the absence of other 
sources of social disruption, when countries are most stable. As levels of instability 
increase, the effect of age composition becomes undistinguishable from zero, when 





driving rates of homicides to the concentration of other disadvantages afflicting a 
given country. 
Figure 5.5: Predicted Homicide Rate by Percent 15 to 29 and Level in the State 
Fragility Index 
 
Level of Homicide 
A quantile regression with fixed effects was used as an analytical strategy to 
evaluate the relationship between percent youth and homicide rates conditional on the 
level of homicide of countries. This analysis sought to explore if the effect of age 
composition on homicides is conditional on the prevalence of other criminogenic 
pressures by directly using the level of homicide, the presumed outcome of these 
criminogenic forces, as an analytical strategy for evaluating variations on the impact 
of demographic forces. 
Tables 5.10 display the coefficients and standard errors from the models 
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the average homicide rate, which is a copy of the fixed-effects model originally 
presented in Table 5.3. In this model, the percent 15 to 29 has only a small effect on 
homicide trends. Values in all subsequent columns refer to the first and last deciles of 
the homicide rate distribution (τ = .1; and τ = .9), in addition to the first, second, and 
third quartiles (τ = .25; τ = .50; and τ = .75). The coefficient for the percent 15 to 29 is 
largest in the lower portions of the homicide rate distribution, and becomes 
progressively smaller at the higher ends of the homicide rate distribution. For 
countries at the first percentile of the homicide rate distribution, an addition of one 
unit in the percent 15 to 29 corresponds to an increase of 4.6% in the homicide rate. 
The effect at the mean of the homicide rate distribution is much smaller, and very 
similar to the effect at the average (a reflection of the normality of the distribution of 
the logged homicide rate). For countries which have the highest homicide rates, the 
coefficient size is very close to one, which corresponds to a null effect. 
Table 5.9: Quantile Regression with Fixed Effects for the Effect of Percent 15 to 
29 on (Ln) Homicide Rates – Since 1990 Sample 
  Fixed Effects 
Quantile Fixed Effects Models 
τ = 0.1 τ = 0.25 τ = 0.5 τ = 0.75 τ = 0.9 
Percent 15 to 29 1.018 1.046*** 1.039*** 1.015 1.011 1.006 
 (0.015) (0.008) (0.007) (0.010) (0.008) (0.008) 
Percent Male 1.032 1.017 1.053 1.087 1.059 1.037 
 (0.053) (0.052) (0.050) (0.054) (0.056) (0.045) 
Gini Index 0.989 1.009 1.002 0.975** 0.971*** 0.970*** 
 (0.016) (0.010) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.006) 
GDP per Cap (1k) 0.969** 0.970*** 0.970*** 0.965*** 0.962*** 0.964*** 
(0.010) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) 
Percent Urban 1.008 1.009* 1.006 1.008 1.008 1.007 
 (0.009) (0.004) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Observations 2,283 2,283 2,283 2,283 2,283 2,283 
Note: *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001. Coefficients are exponentiated, and correspond to the average 
proportional change in the geometric mean of homicide rate from a one-unit increase in an independent 






Table 5.11 presents the exact same model as Table 5.10 but applied to the 
Long Series Sample. Already in the original fixed effect model (which is a copy from 
Table 5.3) the association between percent youth and homicide rates was already 
large and substantial. That coefficient becomes even greater when evaluated at the 
first decile of the distribution of homicide rates, at 8.5% more homicides for each 
additional unit in the percent 15 to 29. Moreover, following a similar pattern to the 
High Coverage Sample, effect sizes become progressively smaller when evaluated at 
higher levels of the homicide rate distribution. Generally, the magnitude of the 
coefficient of percent young is larger in the Long Series Sample, which is comprised 
of countries with lower homicide rates than countries in the High Coverage Sample.   
Table 5.10: Quantile Regression with Fixed Effects for the Effect of Percent 15 to 
29 on (Ln) Homicide Rates – Since 1960 Sample 
  Fixed Effects 
Quantile Fixed Effects Models 
τ = 0.1 τ = 0.25 τ = 0.5 τ = 0.75 τ = 0.9 
Percent 15 to 29 1.054*** 1.085*** 1.071*** 1.054*** 1.050*** 1.050*** 
 (0.014) (0.005) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.010) 
Percent Male 1.125 1.025 1.079 1.095* 1.045 0.988 
 (0.075) (0.042) (0.045) (0.045) (0.060) (0.088) 
Gini Index 0.967 0.954*** 0.959*** 0.960*** 0.966** 0.988 
 (0.019) (0.005) (0.006) (0.007) (0.011) (0.013) 
GDP per Cap (1k) 0.997 1.002 1.000 0.996 0.993* 0.995 
(0.006) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.005) 
Percent Urban 1.022* 1.021*** 1.023*** 1.026*** 1.028*** 1.026*** 
 (0.009) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.004) 
Observations 1,136 1,136 1,136 1,136 1,136 1,136 
Note: *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001. Coefficients are exponentiated, and correspond to the average 
proportional change in the geometric mean of homicide rate from a one-unit increase in an independent 
variable, relative to the previous unit. 
 
 
Figure 5.6 summarizes and adds detail to tables 5.10 and 5.10. The figures 





the percent 15 to 29 at each individual percentile of the homicide rate distribution 
(Tau). One series, in orange, illustrates effects at the High Coverage Sample (since 
1990), and another series, in blue, represent effects at the Long Series Sample (since 
1960). The figure reflects the same findings as the tables. The effect of percent 15 to 
29 on homicide rates is very high when evaluated in the lowest levels of homicides in 
both samples. For instance, country/years in the first percentile of the homicide rate 
distribution of the High Coverage Sample are expected to experience a 4.6% increase 
in their homicide rates for each addition of one unit in their percent youth. In the 
Long Series Sample, that same coefficient is at 8%. In both samples, the effect of 
percent youth becomes progressively smaller as that relationship is evaluated at 
higher levels of the homicide rate distribution. These results are evidence that age 
composition is a strong predictor of homicide rates, but that this effect became 
gradually less apparent when evaluated at higher levels of homicide. In the current 
study, that variation in effect is interpreted as evidence that composition may be key 
in explaining changes in homicides over time, but that the effect of demographic 
forces becomes indistinguishable from other criminogenic forces when extant risk 






Figure 5.6: Coefficient of the Percent 15 to 29 in Quantile Regression (with fixed 
effects) by (Ln) Homicide Rate Percentile and by Sample 
 
Note: Confidence intervals correspond to an alpha level of 0.95. 
 
Sensitivity Analyses 
This section evaluates the sensitivity of this study’s findings to some 
methodological decisions. First, the section includes an investigation of the use of a 
combination between the UNODC and WHO homicide statistics as the dependent 
variable for the Long Series Sample, but comparing results obtained using this 
combined dependent variable with analyses performed using only the WHO original 
data for the 26 countries in the Long Series Sample. A second analysis explores the 
sensitivity of findings to the operationalization of percent youth by replicating the 
models using percent of the population between 15 to 24 years of age, and the percent 
of the population who are males and between 15 to 29 years of age, as opposed to the 






























variations in effect between multiple measures of youth cohort size relative to older 
age groups, which was used as a preliminary investigation and discussion about the 
underlying theoretical mechanisms driving the effect of age composition. One final 
sensitivity analysis investigates the impact of missing data in the control variables on 
the results obtained in the main regression models used in this research. 
Generally, results from all sensitivity analyses suggest that findings of this 
dissertation are not sensitive to any of the methodological choices outlined above. 
Following are details about each of these investigations. The subsequent section 
(Summary of Findings and Research Questions) summarizes all findings of Chapter 
5, and directly relates those findings to the research questions of the current study. 
Comparison between Combined Homicide Series and WHO Original Data 
A potential criticism to current findings could relate to the perceived 
incompatibility between the UNODC and the WHO homicide statistics. In the current 
study, adjusted WHO data until 1989 were combined with UNODC data since 1990 
to extend the series of 26 countries included in the Long Series Sample. The main 
assumption underlying this combination is that, for those 26 countries, homicide data 
from both sources are largely compatible. 
That compatibility is visually demonstrated in Appendix A, which includes 
graphs of the homicide trends of the countries which had their data combined. Two 
additional analyses support the use of the combined series. First, the Pearson 
correlation between the overlapping years of the UNODC homicide rate and the 
WHO homicide rate, for countries which had their data combined is above 0.99. In 





26 countries in the Long Series Sample. The first two models use the combined 
homicide series as the dependent variable. For contrast, the third and fourth models 
use only WHO data for the same sample of 26 countries. The models yield very 
similar results both in the bivariate, and in the fully controlled models. These results 
reflect the high compatibility between the UNODC and the WHO data. 
Table 5.11: Sensitive Analysis Comparing Results of the Long Series Sample 
Using the Combined UN & WHO Series, Against the WHO Series Alone 
  Combined Series WHO Only 
  Since 1960 Since 1960 Since 1960 Since 1960 
Percent 15 to 29 1.051*** 1.054*** 1.059*** 1.053* 
(0.013) (0.015) (0.014) (0.021) 
Percent Male  1.125*  1.117 
 (0.053)  (0.078) 
Gini Index  0.967*  0.965 
 (0.016)  (0.035) 
GDP per Cap (1k)  0.997  0.993 
 (0.010)  (0.010) 
Percent Urban  1.022*  1.021 
 (0.009)  (0.016) 
Observations 1,621 1,136 1,612 1,127 
R2 0.08 0.259 0.105 0.276 
F Statistic 139.432*** 77.294*** 185.285*** 83.606*** 
Note: *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001. Coefficients are exponentiated, and correspond to the average 
proportional change in the geometric mean of homicide rate from a one-unit increase in an independent 
variable, relative to the previous unit. 
Alternative Measures of Demographic Composition 
Another potential issue of this study refers to the sensitivity of results to the 
operationalization of the main independent variable, specifically the age range used as 
a measure of the higher prevalence of individuals at young ages. As an additional 
analysis, I collected and processed two additional age indicators from the UN World 
Population Prospects. The first indicator measures the proportion of individuals 
between 15 to 24 years of age, as opposed to the broader age range between 15 to 29 





29 years of age, and between 15 to 24 years of age is of 0.924, which is very high and 
which is a consequence of the strong overlap between both measures. The second 
measure is the percent of the total population who are males and between ages 15 to 
29, relative to the entire population of each country and year. The Pearson correlation 
between the percent males between 15 to 29 years of age, with the percentage of 
individuals of both sexes between 15 and 29 years of age is of 0.906. 
Table 5.13 presents a replication of the fixed-effects regression models 
presented in Table 5.3, but replaces the percent 15 to 29 with the percent of the 
population between 15 to 24 years of age. 
Table 5.12: Fixed Effects Models for the Average Effect of Percent 15 to 24 on 
Homicide Rates 















Percent 15 to 
24 
1.050** 1.030  1.040* 1.063*** 1.084*** 1.057* 
(0.015) (0.018)  (0.020) (0.017) (0.023) (0.026) 
Percent Male 
 1.036   1.113  1.153 
 (0.050)   (0.080)  (0.074) 
Gini Index 
 0.987   0.961*  0.959 
 (0.016)   (0.019)  (0.039) 
GDP per Cap 
(1k) 
 0.970**   0.996  0.984 
 (0.010)   (0.006)  (0.010) 
Percent Urban 
 1.009   1.024*  1.011 
  (0.009)     (0.009)   (0.017) 
Observations 2,558 2,283  1,621 1,136 670 662 
Countries 135 126  26 26 26 26 
R2 0.035 0.129  0.033 0.242 0.149 0.252 
F Statistic  87.617*** 63.913***   54.639*** 70.405*** 112.507*** 42.528*** 
Note: *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001. Coefficients are exponentiated, and correspond to the average 
proportional change in the geometric mean of homicide rate from a one-unit increase in an independent 
variable, relative to the previous unit. 
 
 Similar to the effect identified using the percent 15 to 29, the coefficient for 
the association between percent 15 to 24 and homicide rates is positive, and is much 





accounting for all other control variables. As in the main analytical model, the effect 
size of percent youth on homicide rates in the fully controlled model of the High 
Coverage Sample is not significantly different than zero. Finally, the effect identified 
in the Long Series Sample when using data since 1960 and data since 1990 is very 
similar, at about a 6% increase in homicide rate for each percentage point increase in 
the percent 15 to 24. Again, findings suggest that the differences between the Long 
Series and the High Coverage samples are related to the composition of the samples, 
instead of the number of years used. 
 Figure 5.7 replicates Figure 5.6, but replaces the percent of the population 
between 15 to 29 years of age with the percent of the population between 15 to 24 
years of age. Coefficient sizes using the percent of the population between 15 and 24 
years of age are generally higher across most of the distribution of homicide rates. 
These differences in effect, however, can be a consequence of differences in the 
effective range and in the distribution of both measures of age composition, an issue 
which will be explored later in this section. 
Generally, effect sizes are relatively similar to those obtained using the 
percentage 15 to 29 in direction, size, and magnitude. Finally, similarly to previous 
analyses, there remains a trend of a decrease in effect size of percent young as the 







Figure 5.7: Coefficient of the Percent 15 to 24 in Quantile Regression (with fixed 
effects) by (Ln) Homicide Rate Percentile and by Sample 
 
Note: Confidence intervals correspond to an alpha level of 0.95. 
 
 
Table 5.14 presents the same results as in Table 5.3, but replacing the measure 
of percent youth from the percent of individuals between 15 to 29 years of age, to the 
proportion of individuals who are males and between the ages of 15 and 29 years of 
age. Generally, the direction and significance of effects are very similar across 
measures of percent youth. The coefficient for percent male 15 to 29 in the High 
Coverage Sample decreases substantially with the inclusion of control variables. 
Furthermore, effect sizes in the Long Series Sample are much more pronounced and 
clear than the coefficients in the High Coverage Sample. Finally, when the Long 
Series Sample is restricted to only data since 1990, coefficients remain very similar as 
when data extends to 1960, again suggesting that the variation in effect between the 

































composition of the Long Series Sample, as opposed to the use of a longer series of 
years. 
Table 5.13: Fixed Effects Models for the Average Effect of Percent Male 15 to 29 
on Homicide Rates32 
  High Coverage Sample 
a 














Percent Male 15 
to 29 
1.049 1.026  1.108*** 1.108*** 1.146*** 1.111** 
(0.026) (0.028)  (0.026) (0.026) (0.030) (0.041) 
Percent Male 
 1.027   1.105  1.130 
 (0.060)   (0.074)  (0.078) 
Gini Index 
 0.989   0.967*  0.962 
 (0.016)   (0.018)  (0.036) 
GDP per Cap 
(1k) 
 0.968**   0.997  0.986 
 (0.010)   0.000   (0.010) 
Percent Urban 
 1.007   1.021*  1.014 
  (0.009)     (0.009)   (0.016) 
Observations 2,559 2,283  1,621 1,136 670 662 
Countries 135 126  26 26 26 26 
R2 0.018 0.123  0.088 0.259 0.203 0.277 
F Statistic  43.474*** 60.307***   153.727*** 77.331*** 164.105*** 48.321*** 
Note: *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001. Coefficients are exponentiated, and correspond to the average 
proportional change in the geometric mean of homicide rate from a one-unit increase in an independent 
variable, relative to the previous unit. 
 
 Figure 5.8 illustrates variations in the effect of percent males between 15 to 29 
years of age across homicide levels by utilizing the same quantile regression as 
employed with the other two measures of percent youth. Results indicate the same 
pattern of an increased effect for countries and years at the lowest distribution of 






32 Models were also executed by removing the Percent Male as a control variable, and 
results did not vary substantially. Results presented kept the percent male to maintain 
comparability with the models using the other measurements of age composition, and 





homicide rates, coupled with a decrease in the coefficient size as the association is 
evaluated at higher levels of the distribution of homicide rates. One particularity of 
the percent males 15 to 29 is the differences between the effect sizes obtained using 
the High Coverage Sample and the Long Series Sample, as the differentiation is more 
clearly delimited across the entire distribution of homicide rates. Moreover, as with 
the percent 15 to 29, the effects at the High Coverage Sample are only clearly 
distinguishable from zero at lower levels of the homicide rate distribution. At the first 
decile (tau = 0.1) each additional unit increase in the percent of males between 15 to 
29 years of age corresponds to an increase of 7.3% in the homicide rate. However, at 
the 9th decile that coefficient is almost 10 times smaller, at approximately 0.75%. 
These differences in effect mirror those identified using the other measures of percent 
youth. 
Figure 5.8: Coefficient of the Percent Males between 15 to 29 in Quantile 
Regression (with fixed effects) by (Ln) Homicide Rate Percentile and by Sample 
 









































Generally, the effect sizes of the percent of males between 15 to 29 years of 
age are much stronger than the same effects identified using other measures of 
percent youth. For instance, while the coefficient for the percent male 15 to 29 in the 
fully controlled model using the Long Series Sample is of 1.108 (10.8%), the same 
coefficient using the percent 15 to 24 years is of 1.063 (6.3%), and using the percent 
15 to 29 only is of 1.054 (5.4%). 
While these differences could be interpreted as an indication that sex-specific 
age composition has a more notable impact on homicide trends than age composition 
alone, the differences in coefficient sizes across the three measures of percent youth 
can also be a consequence of differences in the effective range and in the distribution 
of each one of these variables. Hence, the direct comparison between effect sizes 
requires the calculation of standardized coefficients. As opposed to all previous 
models, in the present analysis all variables were standardized in a z-score scale (with 
a mean of zero, and with each unit corresponding to one standard deviation) prior to 
their inclusion in the model. Hence, coefficient sizes are in a standardized scale, and 
are directly comparable. 
Table 5.15 directly compares the coefficient sizes across the three different 
measures of percent youth explored in the current study. The first three models were 
executed using the High Coverage Sample (since 1990), while the latter three models 
were executed using the Long Series Sample (since 1960).  
As results show, coefficient sizes are higher for all three measures in the Long 
Series Sample than in the High Coverage Sample. However, most relevant for this 





youth. All coefficients in the High Coverage Sample are not significantly different 
from zero, and from each other. According to the results using the Long Series 
Sample, an increase of one standard deviation in the percent 15 to 29 is related to an 
average increase of 13.4% in the standard deviation of the homicide rate. That 
estimate has a 95% confidence interval between 6.1% and 21.2%. That same 
coefficient equals 13.0% (with a 95% confidence interval between 5.9% and 20.6%) 
for the percent 15 to 24 years of age, and is somewhat higher for the percent of males 
between 15 to 29 years, at 16.1% (with a 95% confidence interval between 7.8% and 
25.1%). None of the coefficients are clearly distinguishable from the others in size 
nor in dispersion. 
Table 5.14: Fixed Effects Models Comparing the Average Effect of Percent 
Youth on Homicide Rates by Measures of Demographic Composition – 
Standardized Coefficients 
  High Coverage Sample 
a 














Percent 15 to 29 
1.044    1.134***   
(0.037)    (0.034)   
Percent 15 to 24 
 1.061    1.130***  
 (0.035)    (0.033)  
Percent Male 15 
to 29 
  1.038    1.161*** 
  (0.041)    (0.038) 
Percent Male 
1.065 1.072 1.053  1.262 1.236 1.218 
(0.104) (0.098) (0.118)  (0.149) (0.157) (0.146) 
Gini Index 
0.925 0.913 0.924  0.794 0.762* 0.792 
(0.113) (0.114) (0.113)  (0.129) (0.134) (0.127) 
GDP per Cap (1k) 
0.698** 0.703** 0.689**  0.961 0.956 0.964 
(0.116) (0.111) (0.116)  (0.065) (0.068) (0.065) 
Percent Urban 
1.170 1.191 1.154  1.539* 1.592* 1.515* 
(0.180) (0.182) (0.180)  (0.181) (0.183) (0.181) 
Observations 2,558 2,283 2,283   1,136 1,136 1,136 
Countries 126 126 126  26 26 26 
R2 0.125 0.129 0.123 
a 
0.259 0.242 0.259 
F Statistic 61.538*** 63.913*** 60.307*** 77.294*** 70.405*** 77.331*** 
Note: *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001. Coefficients are exponentiated, and correspond to the average 
proportional change in the geometric mean of homicide rate from a one-unit increase in an independent 





 In conclusion, while there are conceptual and empirical implications in the 
choice of a measure of demographic composition, the directly observable impact of 
various measurement choices are similar enough to support the conclusion that 
findings are not sensitive to the choice of one particular independent variable over the 
others. Nonetheless, differences across these, and other potential indicators for 
demographic composition should be explored by extant research, in particular by 
investigating the role of gender, and its interaction with age in dictating homicide 
trends. 
Youth Cohort Size Relative to Older Age Groups 
At the macro level, there are two main theories which predict an effect of age 
composition on homicide rates. In addition to a Simple Aggregate Effect, other 
theoretical propositions have argued that crime trends may be impacted by the size of 
the youth cohort relative to older age groups. These propositions are part of a broader 
Relative Cohort Size perspective, which generally posits that members of larger 
cohorts, particularly when they are young, suffer a range of disadvantages and 
increased competition which impact the quality of the public services provided to 
them, restrict their labor market opportunities, and decrease the amount of 
supervision provided to them by older age groups (Cook & Laub, 2002; Easterlin, 
1978, 1987; O'Brien et al., 1999; Steffensmeier et al., 1992). 
The current analysis replaces the percent 15 to 29 with measures of the size of 
the youth cohort group over the ages above that age group. Table 5.16 contains the 
results of this analyses divided in eight models. The first four correspond to the effect 





population between 30 to 59 years on homicide rate. The second four models utilized 
instead the ratio between the population ages 15 to 24 years, over the population 
between 25 to 59 years. On average, controlling for all other country level 
characteristics, each increase of one percentage point in the ratio of the population 
between 15 to 29 years of age over the population between 30 to 59 years of age is 
associated with an increase of 0.4% in the homicide rate of countries in the High 
Coverage Sample, and of 0.7% in the homicide rate of countries in the Long Series 
Sample. For the ratio between the ages 15 to 24, over the ages between 25 to 59, each 
increase of one percentage point corresponds to an increase of 0.9% in the homicide 
rate of countries in the High Coverage Sample, and of 1.1% in the homicide rate of 
countries in the Long Series Sample. 
Generally, results indicate very small and indistinguishable effects of each 
measure of relative cohort size on homicide trends, regardless of the exact age groups 






Table 5.15: Fixed Effects for the Average Effect of Relative Cohort Size on 
Homicide Rates 
  Ages 15 to 29 Over 30 to 59   Ages 15 to 24 Over 25 to 59 
 High Coverage Sample Long Series Sample 
a 


















Ages 15 to 29 / 
30 to 59 
1.008** 1.004 1.002 1.007      
(0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005)      
Ages 15 to 24 / 
25 to 59 
     1.014** 1.009 0.999 1.011 
     (0.004) (0.005) (0.008) (0.009) 
Percent Male 
 1.037  1.113   1.037  1.117 
 (0.050)  (0.082)   (0.048)  (0.080) 
Gini Index 
 0.987  0.960*   0.985  0.957* 
 (0.016)  (0.020)   (0.016)  (0.019) 
GDP per Cap 
(1k) 
 0.968***  0.991   0.969***  0.991 
 (0.010)  (0.007)   (0.009)  (0.007) 
Percent Urban 
 1.011  1.028***   1.012  1.027*** 
 (0.010)  (0.008)   (0.010)  (0.008) 
Observations 2,558 2,283 1,621 1,136   2,558 2,283 1,621 1,136 
Countries 135 126 26 26  135 126 26 26 
R2 0.029 0.124 0.002 0.206 
a 
0.030 0.128 0.0001 0.201 
F Statistic 71.942*** 60.716*** 3.583 57.338*** 75.029*** 63.085*** 0.146 55.596*** 
Note: *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001. Coefficients are exponentiated, and correspond to the average 
proportional change in the geometric mean of homicide rate from a one-unit increase in an independent 
variable, relative to the previous unit. 
 
Table 5.17 uses standardized coefficients to enable the direct comparison 
between coefficient sizes of each of the above measures of relative cohort sizes, and 
of the original measure of age composition used in this study – the percent of the 
population aged 15 to 29 years over the entire population size. Specifically, the 
standardization is necessary because each of the original measures of age composition 
do not have the same effective range and distributions. Thus, the effect of a change of 
one-unit in any of the three measures is not directly comparable to each other without 
the use of standardization.  
Results from these analyses confirm the lack of an effect of both measures of 





both when using the High Coverage Sample and the Long Series Sample. However, 
results from the long series sample indicate that the absence of effect in that sample is 
not a consequence of a small average association, but is instead caused by an increase 
in the variability of the coefficients when compared to the standard error of the 
original age composition measure. 
Regardless, while findings indicate similarity in the average relationship 
across all measures in the Long Series Sample, differences in variability suggest that 
the percent of the population between 15 to 29 years of age is more appropriate for 
identifying the effect of age composition on homicide trends than alternatives 
indicators of relative cohort size. 
Table 5.16: Fixed Effects for the Average Effect of Relative Cohort Size on 
Homicide Rates – Standardized Coefficients 
  High Coverage Sample 
a 














Ages 15-29 over 
Total 
1.044    1.134***   
(0.037)    (0.034)   
Ages 15-29 over 
30-59 
 1.075    1.138  
 (0.066)    (0.100)  
Ages 15-24 over 
25-59 
  1.105    1.121 
  (0.057)    (0.093) 
Percent Male 
1.065 1.074 1.075  1.262 1.236 1.245 
(0.104) (0.098) (0.094)  (0.149) (0.162) (0.159) 
Gini Index 
0.925 0.913 0.901  0.794 0.753* 0.737* 
(0.113) (0.113) (0.113)  (0.129) (0.136) (0.133) 
GDP per Cap (1k) 
0.698** 0.689*** 0.695***  0.961 0.904 0.903 
(0.116) (0.112) (0.109)  (0.065) (0.083) (0.083) 
Percent Urban 
1.170 1.228 1.261  1.539* 1.703*** 1.693*** 
(0.180) (0.190) (0.194)  (0.181) (0.157) (0.159) 
Observations 2,283 2,283 2,283   1,136 1,136 1,136 
Countries 126 126 126  26 26 26 
R2 0.125 0.124 0.128 
a 
0.259 0.206 0.201 
F Statistic 61.538*** 60.716*** 63.085*** 77.294*** 57.338*** 55.596*** 
Note: *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001. Coefficients are exponentiated, and correspond to the average 
proportional change in the geometric mean of homicide rate from a one-unit increase in an independent 






In my interpretation, findings of these analyses should not be understood as an 
indicator that perspectives related to a Simple Aggregate Effect are superior to 
Relative Cohort Size theories in explaining the relationship between age composition 
and homicide trends. Instead, I argue that the underlying mechanism described by 
each of the theories likely operate in combination in determining the impact of age, 
and in explaining effects obtained for all age measures used in the current study. A 
higher proportion of individuals at younger ages can impact crime simply by 
generating an increase in the proportion of individuals at crime-prone ages. In 
addition, an added consequence of this high proportion of youth is an increase in 
competition for resources, an increase in political alienation from the rest of society, a 
reduction in the quality of services received, and in the supervision provided by older 
age groups. Hence, the underlying mechanisms proposed by both theories can clearly 
operate in combination to explain an age effect. Clearly distinguishing the impact of 
each of these mechanisms would require high-quality data on the quality of public 
services, labor market conditions, the degree of alienation of a population (by age 
group), or at least data on the amount of supervision provided by the older cohorts to 
younger cohorts. Furthermore, such data would need to available at a global scale and 
longitudinally. Such data is simply unavailable, and while proxies may exist, their use 
must be subject to extensive discussion and empirical test. 
Given the characteristics of the current research, there seems to be no 
compelling reason for contrasting these two theories against one another. In fact, I 
believe this exercise may result in a false dichotomy, in which theories are put to 





when they are trying to explain the same phenomenon, but under a different 
perspective (Bernard & Snipes, 1995). Hence, theory competition is not always useful 
for the development of a scientific understanding of social forces, in particular when 
these theories’ propositions and assumptions must not necessarily contradict each 
other – as is the case of the current analysis (Elliot et al., 1985; Messner et al., 
1989).33 
Nonetheless, future research should continue to seek better data, and to parse 
out the components of the effect of age composition on homicide trends. I believe 
both the Simple Aggregate Effect and the Relative Cohort Size theories offer useful 
insight in guiding this work. While the current research simply argues that age 
matters (and explores the circumstances when and where it matters), future studies 
can make meaningful developments by exploring why exactly age matters. The result 
of this research may lend support for either of the two theories described in this study, 
a combination of them, or to novel propositions. 
Missing Data 
Another potential issue related to the models used in the current study is the 
presence of missing data on the indicators used in the analyses. This is a serious 
methodological issue that was approached through several different strategies. First, 
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results should not be automatically extrapolated to countries and years not included in 
each of the analytical samples (listed in Appendix C). While the high coverage of the 
analytical sample of the current study supports the external validity of the findings, 
the systematic aspect of the missing data, and the differences in the probability of 
certain years and countries of being absent from the sample may introduce bias to the 
estimates. 
A second strategy was the execution of a range of analyses which show the 
resilience of effects to variations in the specifications of the regression models used in 
the current study. A first evidence for robustness is the fact that the same pattern in 
the relationship between age composition and homicide rates was observed both in 
the High Coverage and in the Long Series sample, each with very distinct 
composition in terms of the countries and in the years included. A second evidence 
for robustness is the fact that coefficient sizes are quite similar between the bivariate, 
and the fully controlled models using the Long Series Sample, despite the decline in 
sample size due to the inclusion of more covariates. 
As an additional sensitivity analyses to assess whether results were influenced 
by missing data on the control variables, I estimated two additional models evaluating 
the bivariate relationship between percent 15 to 29 on homicide rates, but restricting 
the sample only to the observations with available data on all covariates. That 
restriction reduced the sample size from 2,558 observations in the High Coverage 






The results presented in Table 5.18 demonstrate that the coefficient sizes of 
the percent young using the restricted samples are substantively similar to those 
reported in the main bivariate analysis. In the High Coverage sample, the coefficient 
size increases from 1.038 to 1.050. In the Long Series Sample, the coefficients are 
virtually the same, with an increase from 1.051 to 1.053. This analysis provides 
additional support that the core findings are not substantively affected by changes in 
the sample composition due to missing data on controls. 
Table 5.17: Sensitive Analysis Restricting the Bivariate Models to the Fully 
Controlled Sample of Observations  















Percent 15 to 29 1.038** 1.018 1.050***  1.051*** 1.054*** 1.053*** 
(0.013) (0.015) (0.014)  (0.014) (0.014) (0.011) 
Percent Male  1.032    1.125  
 (0.053)    (0.075)  
Gini Index  0.989    0.967  
 (0.016)    (0.019)  
GDP per Cap (1k)  0.969**    0.997  
 (0.010)    (0.006)  
Percent Urban  1.008    1.022*  
 (0.009)     (0.009)  
Observations 2,558 2,283 2,283  1,621 1,136 1,136 
Countries 135 126 126  26 26 26 
R2 0.032 0.125 0.052  0.08 0.259 0.132 
F Statistic 80.688*** 61.538*** 117.915***   139.432*** 77.294*** 168.597*** 
Note: *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001. Coefficients are exponentiated, and correspond to the average 
proportional change in the geometric mean of homicide rate from a one-unit increase in an independent 
variable, relative to the previous unit. 
 
Summary of Findings and Research Questions 
This section explicitly links results from the analysis of the present chapter to 
the research questions and hypotheses outlined in Chapter 3. 
The first research question was an inquiry about the existence of an average 





this question generally did not find a clear association between percent youth and 
homicide rates using the High Coverage Sample. In contrast, an effect was both 
notable and clear in the models that utilized the Long Series Sample. Additional 
analyses indicated that differences in effect between the samples were related to the 
composition of each sample in terms of countries included, instead of the size of the 
series of each sample – a finding which was considered indicative of the existence of 
heterogeneity in the effect of percent youth across country-level characteristics (see 
Table 5.3). In conclusion, results provide only mixed support for the hypothesis that 
the directly observable effect of percent youth on homicide rate is positive and above 
zero. Instead, findings indicate that the effect of age composition on homicide trends 
is nuanced, and may not be effectively summarized by a single average estimate. 
Additional analyses also sought to contextualize estimates in the relationship 
to the International Homicide Decline. As presented in several of the above analyses, 
coefficient sizes were often estimated at around 5% more homicides for each increase 
of one point in the percent of the population between 15 to 29 years of age.34 As 
several countries and regions are experiencing declines of their percent young of 
several percentage points, the aging of populations globally seems to be strong 
enough to support an international homicide decline. Moreover, an association 
between age composition and homicide rates is apparent across most regions of the 






34 The quantile regression models using the High Coverage Sample yielded effects 





world, with the exception of the region where homicide rates is highest, and which is 
not participating in the International Homicide Decline. Generally, findings suggest 
that the effect of age composition may be broad enough, and strong enough to explain 
an international decline in homicides. 
The second research question evaluated the presence of variation in the impact 
of age composition across regions. Once again, findings provided only mixed support 
for the hypothesis that effect sizes vary across regions. When using the fixed-effects 
regression models with an interaction term for each region, no differences in effect 
were identified while using the High Coverage Sample, but notable differences were 
observed when models used the Long Series Sample. In the latter, findings indicated 
sizable effects of percent youth on homicide rates in Eastern Europe, Asia, Northern 
America and Western Europe. Of the remaining three regions (Oceania, Latin 
America, and Africa), two contain several of the countries with the highest rates of 
homicide in the world. 
 The third research question explored variations in the effect of percent youth 
across the level of social and political stability of countries. Analyses using the State 
Fragility Index (Table 5.9 and Figure 5.5) with the High Coverage Sample show a 
positive effect of percent youth on homicide rates at the lowest levels of State 
Fragility, and a gradual decline in effect at higher levels of State Fragility. Hence, 
findings provide support for the hypothesis that the effect of age is stronger for 






 Finally, a fourth research question investigated variations in the effect of 
percent youth across levels of homicides, under the hypothesis that the effect of age is 
stronger for countries with lower levels of homicide, and weakens gradually as 
homicide rates increase. Findings were supportive of this hypothesis, as results show 
that the effect of age composition is progressively stronger as it is evaluated for the 
countries with the lowest levels of homicides in the world. In contrast, as homicide 
rates increase, the effect of age composition becomes progressively weaker. 
Declining effects across the homicide distribution were observed both in the High 
Coverage Sample and in the Long Series Sample. Moreover, in the High Coverage 
Sample, the effect of percent youth actually approximates zero at around the median 
of the homicide rate distribution. 
As a summary, the following table contains a description of the research 
questions of this study, of the hypothesis proposed for each research question, and of 






Table 5.18: Summary of Research Questions, Hypotheses and Results 
Research Question Hypothesis Results 
1.  Is there an average 
effect of percent youth on 
homicide trends? 
The average effect of percent 
youth on homicide rate is positive 
and above zero. 
Mixed Support. An average 
effect of percent youth was 
found in the Long Series 
Sample, but not in the High 
Coverage Sample. Results 
suggested that the effect of 
age composition is 
conditional on sample 
composition and on other 
country-level 
characteristics. 
2.  Are there variations in 
the impact of percent youth 
across regions? 
The average effect of percent 
youth on homicide rate varies by 
region. Moreover, that effect is 
positive and above zero for the 
regions which experienced 
homicide declines. 
Mixed Support. There are 
clear variations in the 
bivariate correlations 
between the trends of 
percent youth and homicide 
trends. Differences in effect 
were identified in the Long 
Series Sample, but not as 
clearly in the High 
Coverage Sample. 
3.  Is the effect of percent 
youth on homicide trends 
conditional on the level of 
state fragility of countries? 
The effect of age composition on 
homicide trends is conditional on 
the level of state fragility of 
countries. In particular, the effect 
of age is stronger for countries 
with lower levels of instability, 
and weakens gradually as country 
instability increases.  
Positive Support. The effect 
of percent youth on 
homicide percent youth is 
positive for countries with a 
State Fragility Index of 
zero. Moreover, the effect 
of age reduces as country 
instability increases. 
4.  Is the effect of percent 
youth on homicide trends 
conditional on the level of 
homicide of countries? 
The effect of age composition on 
homicide trends is conditional on 
the level of homicide of countries. 
In particular, the effect of age is 
stronger for countries with lower 
levels of homicide, and weakens 
gradually as homicide rates 
increase. 
Positive Support. The effect 
of percent youth on 
homicide percent youth is 
positive for countries at the 
lowest percentiles of the 
homicide rate distribution 
Moreover, the effect of age 
reduces as homicide rate 
level increases. 
 
Generally, findings provide support for the conclusion that an effect exists 





this relationship is much more nuanced than previously thought. In particular, the 
presence of a directly observable effect of age composition on homicide trends is 
conditional on the absence of instability and on the level of homicide of countries. 
Specifically, differences in the effect of age composition were shown across regions, 
by level of state fragility, and by level of homicides. While each of these sources of 
heterogeneity correspond to a distinct country-level factor, I argue that they may 
share a common explanation, as each may be an expression of the concentration of 
disadvantages experienced by countries. Generally, these findings are indicative that 
the presence of a directly observable effect of age composition on homicide rate is 
conditional on the absence of competing criminogenic forces driving the homicide 
trend. 
There are several ways to interpret this particular finding. I extrapolate from 
my empirical findings to propose that it is not the effect of age composition which 
disappears. Instead, it may simply be that this effect is no longer distinguishable from 
other criminogenic forces driving homicide rates higher.35 That argument entails that 
as the level of violence increases, the impact of age becomes secondary to all other 
drivers of violence. That was the case during the crack epidemic in the United States, 
as it was the case during the social and political chaos which followed the dissolution 
of the Soviet Union. Moreover, that is very likely the case of present day Latin 






35 The effect of age, I argue, may be similar to gravity. Its influence may be always 





America - the stage of numerous social, political and economic crises. Whenever 
these crises recede, and as they lose grip on dictating homicide trends, the influence 






Chapter 6: Conclusions 
Overview of Findings 
Considerable scientific effort has been devoted to understanding crime trends 
in both the United States and abroad. Still, scientific knowledge lacks a coherent 
explanation for changes in homicide rates overtime. In the current study, I attempted 
to shift the search of the causes of homicide trends away from an exclusive focus on 
domestic policies and events of individual countries, to broader global phenomena. 
By definition, homicides involve intentionality – they consist of one 
individual’s decision to kill another. However, despite the nuances and details of 
individual crimes that are seemingly unrelated, ultimately homicides are influenced 
and supported by macro-level forces which exist beyond the will of individuals 
(Durkheim, 1952). These forces can have strong influences on the prevalence of 
violent crimes across societies. At times, they may even have the strength to be felt 
globally. For instance, some have argued for a global political shift to the right 
(Cusset, 2018). National elections in western democracies that are seemly unrelated 
to each other (e.g. United States, Brazil, Austria, France, Germany, Hungary), are 
repeatedly showing an increased strength of political movements associated with 
right-wing views, some of which were marginalized just a decade ago.36 Other 






36 Interestingly, elections could also have been influenced by worldwide shifts in age 
composition, as older individuals are generally more likely to hold conservative 





authors have pointed out to a global increase in inequality, driven by international 
economic forces, including the decrease in the value of labor, and a reduction in the 
risks associated with capital ownership (Dicken, 1998). Every day, global markets 
impact each other in such a way that a citizen of the United States has a material 
economic stake in the prosperity of the citizens of China, and vice-versa. In the 
current study, I presented several international demographic trends that are resulting 
in an aging of global populations. In such an interconnected world, it is plausible to 
consider that social variables can have international causes. Crime is no exception. 
 In reality, the influence of macro-level phenomena on homicide trends is very 
often ignored. As in the United States, authorities from countries worldwide claimed 
ownership for their own homicide trends, often linking the decline to domestic causes 
or to policies of their own making (Bratton & Kelling, 2015). In this study, I argue 
that while such policies can indeed have a meaningful impact on the rates of 
homicides and violence, estimates of these impacts must account for the influence of 
major macro-level forces which are influencing populations globally. A failure to take 
this approach may erroneously attribute a change in crime to policies that are costly, 
but ineffective. 
Starting from international demographic research on the changing age-
structure of the global population and criminological research linking age as a 
primary correlate of criminal activity, this study proposes that changes in country-
level age structure may explain cross-national homicide trends, including the 
international homicide decline. Generally, the wealth of evidence presented by the 





15 to 29 is a robust predictor of global homicide trends since the 1960s. Furthermore, 
the estimated effect is strong enough to justify the declines in homicides which were 
felt internationally. Finally, an effect of age composition is observed across the 
countries and regions that have participated in the international homicide decline, 
with enough generality to justify the commonality of their trends. 
Therefore, the wealth of evidence in the current study strongly supports the 
conclusion that the aging of populations globally has been a major cause of the 
international homicide decline. As populations continue to grow older, as implied by 
current demographic trends, there are likely to be even greater declines in homicide 
rates internationally. 
Hence, there seems to exist a pacifying process as a direct consequence of an 
aging population. However, this study also presents evidence that this effect is not 
universal. To the contrary, the effect of demographic forces can be suppressed by the 
influence of other criminogenic forces exerting much greater influence on homicide 
trends in a particular place, or at a particular time. Specifically, the current study 
explored variations in the association between age composition and homicide rates 
across levels of State Fragility and across levels of homicide. Both variables were 
used as measures of the confluence of extant criminogenic forces. Their 
corresponding analyses generated evidence that as other risk factors for violence gain 
strength, the direct impact of age gradually diminishes. Thus, this study demonstrates 
that the influence of age on homicide trends is more apparent in countries with the 
lowest levels of homicide and with higher levels of social and political stability. In 





I argue that the absence of a directly observable relationship does not 
necessarily imply that a relationship does not exist, but simply that, at times, it cannot 
be observed directly using traditional methods, and without the appropriate control 
variables to account for extant criminogenic forces. Returning to the example of the 
United States, the crack epidemic generated an enormous loss of life. However, once 
the epidemic receded, the homicide rate did not return to the level prior to the 
epidemic, of 7.7 in 1985. Instead, homicides continued to decline to a rate of 5.5 in 
2000, when homicides resumed the relationship they had to the percent youth prior to 
the epidemic. As the percent youth decreased between 1985 and 2000, homicides 
changed accordingly. 
This interpretation of the findings implies that the impact of demographics on 
homicide trends is uninterrupted, but that it may be omitted when age becomes 
secondary to the influence of other drivers of homicide trends. This conclusion also 
implies that the homicide rate of Latin America could be even higher than they are 
currently, was it not for the aging of the region’s population, and that demographic 
shifts will continue to place increased pressure on the rates of violence in that region, 
and around the world. 
It should be noted that this interpretation of results is entirely theoretical, and 
has no parallel in extant macro-level research which I could identify. The current 
study traces a macro-level parallel with the micro-level concept of disadvantage 
saturation found in the literature on individual risk factors for crime (Hannon, 2003; 
Kahlmeter et al., 2017; Raine, 2002), to propose that countries may also experience a 





high levels of social, political, or economic disadvantage are more likely to 
experience many other disadvantages in combination. Those may include high levels 
of poverty, inequality, unemployment, political unrest, instability, the inefficacy of 
criminal justice institutions, challenges in public health and in education, as well as 
high levels of violence. Within the conceptualization of concentrated disadvantage, 
homicides may be interpreted as just one more societal issue, which will emerge both 
as a consequence, and in combination with other country-level disadvantages. 
I argue that the concept concentrated disadvantage adequately explains 
inconsistencies of previous research, in addition to the findings of the current study. 
In particular, it is able to account for the lack of an observable effect of individual 
drivers of homicides, when other drivers gain prominence. Hence, while age 
composition may be key in explaining the international homicide decline and crime 
trends more generally, the effect of population aging may be omitted by concentration 
of other disadvantages driving the changes in homicides in a given country, and 
during a certain period. 
It should also be noted that alternative explanations for my findings are 
possible, and that the current research does not seek to disprove all competing 
explanations. There may be other reasons, besides concentrated disadvantage, as to 
why age composition has no impact on crime trends among countries in Latin 
America, with high levels of State Fragility, or with high levels of homicide. Future 
research should contrast the proposition of the current study with alternative 






Limitations and Future Directions 
This study has several limitations that can be the basis of future research. 
First, several country-level measures that are typically employed as control variables 
in cross-sectional comparative homicide research could not be included in the 
analyses, such as divorce rates, ethnic homogeneity, or female labor participation 
(Nivette, 2011). As these measures are only available for a small subset of countries 
and years, including them would drastically reduce sample sizes, and would limit the 
sample to mostly developed democracies in Europe and North America, and to a 
shorter frame of time encompassing only recent decades. These sample restrictions 
would be much more harmful to the usefulness of this study and to the validity of 
findings than the omission of control variables. 
Several methodological decisions minimized or accounted for the risk of 
omitted variable bias. First, a fixed-effects model accounts for unobserved time-stable 
characteristics of each country that could introduce bias into the relationship between 
age composition and homicide rates. Second, control variables for time-varying 
characteristics of countries were included in the analyses. Third, as the social and 
economic indicators of countries tend to be very highly correlated (Pridemore, 2008; 
Rogers & Pridemore, 2017), the control variables included in the analyses are likely 
to partially capture other features of each country which were not explicitly included 
as controls. Finally, sensitivity analyses were performed with alternative model 
specifications to test for the influence of omitted variable bias in the results, with no 





alternative model specifications, and to the inclusion a wider range of country-level 
characteristics as controls in the regression models. 
A second limitation is the lack of reliable homicide data for many countries 
prior to the 1990s. On that point, the Long Series sample (since 1960) was limited to 
a subset of 26 mostly developed, high-income countries. Future research can extend 
this study by investigating the role of age on homicide trends using a more 
comprehensive set of countries, and a longer series.  
Third, this study focused on the role of percent young (aged 15-29) on 
influencing homicide trends. This age range was chosen as it encompasses the crime-
prone ages (Hirschi & Gottfredson, 1983), and because that range was broad enough 
to accommodate variations in the age and crime curve of countries (Steffensmeier et 
al., 2018). In addition, I performed additional analyses evaluating the sensitivity of 
findings to an alternative operationalization of percentage youth. Findings from these 
analyses show that different measures of percent youth are usually highly correlated 
to each other, and that the relationship between age composition and homicide trends 
seems relatively unaffected by the choice of one particular measure. Still, future work 
can further assess the sensitivity of current findings to alternative operationalization 
of age structure. 
Fourth, the current study focused on the influence of age on trends of 
homicide, as opposed to other violent crimes and property offenses. Given the lack of 
reliable international crime statistics, homicide is generally considered the most 
accurate measure of crime in a cross-national context (LaFree, 1999; Lynch & 





composition and the rates of other forms of criminal activity. In particular, interesting 
variations may exist in the association between age composition, violent crimes, and 
property crimes. As property crimes are distinguished by their motivation for 
enrichment, their trends may entail very different causal processes than homicides, 
which may or may not be as closely related to a youthful population. While 
comparative data on other crimes besides homicides is scarce, and of questionable 
quality, creative data collections strategies such as the International Crime 
Victimization Survey (ICVS) might provide the means to expand this line of research. 
Concerns about data quality are also a limitation of the current study. Chapter 
4 describes in detail the sources of data on homicides, and the procedures performed 
by the UNODC and the WHO in order to ensure, to the extent possible, that the data 
published by the respective organizations is valid. I also provided arguments in 
support of the validity of the data, including the longitudinal and geographic 
consistency of values, the agreement between published values that draw from 
distinct and independent primary sources, and the substantive validity of homicide 
counts. However, despite these arguments, the fact is that neither the UNODC nor the 
WHO nor the academic community in general is certain of the quality of cross-
national homicide counts. I would argue that this fact is also true for almost any other 
data source, including surveys, and that social researchers should always be cognizant 
of the risks measurement error poses to the internal validity of the findings obtained 
(Sherman, 2002). In addition, social research itself should attempt to estimate the 
error structure associated with its data sources. For instance, several high-homicide 





are often connected to organized crime or to the drug trade (Gamlin, 2015). A large 
proportion of these disappearances may actually be homicides of individuals whose 
bodies are hidden from the public and from authorities. As the death was never 
recorded, it never generated a death record in the public health system or a crime 
record in the criminal justice system. Therefore, it introduces a bias in the final 
homicide count of these countries. A second example relates to the intentionality and 
the clarification of killings. A recorded suicide can potentially be a homicide 
committed by an offender who was never caught. In other cases, a recorded homicide 
might be the result of an act of self-defense, but which was committed by a 
perpetrator who was too suspicious of authorities to ever report the incident, or who 
was unaware of one’s right to self-defense. 
The actual impact of these biases on estimated relationships should be 
relatively small. This is particularly the case because countries with an increased 
prevalence of disappearances and with low clarification rates are likely the countries 
with the highest homicide rates. In relative terms, these added killings might 
correspond to a fraction of all homicides that are already recorded. Moreover, the use 
of a log transformation of homicide rates minimizes the influence of extreme values 
on estimated coefficients. Hence, even if the aforementioned issues did exist, the 
relative ranking of countries in regards to their homicide rates should remain largely 
unaltered, as would the differences in the log-transformed homicide rates. It should be 
noted however, that this last point is a speculation. Future research should attempt to 
identify and to address sources of error in the measurement of homicides, and of all 





continuous process with no end in sight, which should not limit the endeavors to use 
these data for research purposes. 
 Finally, one last limitation is this study’s inability to test, and to account for 
all alternative explanations for the United States’, and for the International Homicide 
Decline. The current study never presumed to be a comprehensive investigation of all 
hypotheses. However, a possible challenge to findings and conclusions presented in 
this dissertation is that all trends and relationships found are a product of a third 
unknown factor, and that the association between age composition and homicide rates 
is merely incidental. The current study provided arguments that I believe were 
logically formulated, and that were well supported by both theory and by a wealth of 
empirical evidence. Nonetheless, future research should resume the investigation of 
the causes for the international decline, and for changes in homicide trends more 
generally. That pursuit can entail the identifying and addressing of limitations of the 
current study, or the proposing of alternative explanations for the trends and 
associations I identified. 
Implications for Criminology 
The findings and conclusions of this study hold several important implications 
for the study of crime trends, and for criminology in general. First, for researchers, 
these findings provide evidence that demographic pressures deserve special attention, 
and that social scientists’ focus on age when explaining crime is largely justified. This 
conclusion stands in contrast to extant research that proposes age structure is 
unrelated to country-level crime rates (Levitt, 1999, 2004; Rogers, 2014; Rogers & 





between age and criminality is also central to the understanding of the causes of 
changes in crime trends over time. Researchers should take advantage of this strong 
link for developing macro-level theories of crime, particularly dynamic theories 
(Sampson & Laub, 1997) that are able to explain the causes of changes in crime rates 
over time, as opposed to only the differences in crime rates between places. The 
social sciences still lack a comprehensive explanation for why crime rates change. I 
argue that this comprehensive explanation should pay particular close attention to age 
composition, even if mediated by extant factors. However, age is certainly not the 
only cause for change, even among the most stable and safe countries of the world. 
The development of a complete causal model of crime trends, if ever possible, will 
likely require very extensive research, by many experts. 
Whichever causal model that is, it may need to account for the role 
concentrated disadvantage, specifically by taking note, and by exploring the 
interactions between country-level disadvantages in explaining violence. 
Furthermore, researchers must be cognizant of the challenges of identifying the 
influence of individual causes of violence in the presence of the confluence of several 
other disadvantages – most of which are either unknown to the literature, or have no 
available measures at the international level which can be used as statistical controls. 
One particular disadvantage which is deserving of more detailed consideration 
is the role of political instability, in particular when it translates into states’ inability 
to effectively provide basic services or to maintain some amount of order - often 
amounting to a collapse in political institutions and of civil society more generally. 





such as the broad transitions experienced by Eastern Europe during the 1990s. It may 
also be an ongoing problem across many countries in Latin America, which face a 
range of social and political problems, some of which are beyond governments' 
ability to address them. On a preliminary basis, I directly addressed this discussion 
when investigating how State Fragility moderated the effect of age composition on 
homicide trends, an analysis which indicated for the preeminence of the concept of 
political efficacy and stability in explaining violence, and more generally as a signal 
for the concentration of several other disadvantages in a given country. 
In fact, high levels of homicides are also strongly indicative of the presence of 
social and political instability.37 To some extent, individuals may only feel compelled 
to use violence in the resolution of their own personal conflicts when they are unable 
to resort to a centralized and effective state which is willing and able to make use of 
force on their behalf (Weber et al., 2004). Hence, an otherwise law-abiding individual 
who feels threatened by another may see homicide as the best alternative to protect 
one’s life, family, and property when that individual is unable to rely on a criminal 
justice system. In a country where homicide perpetrators are largely unaccounted for, 
and impunity is the norm, the private use of violence may be both reasonable and 
rational, as the only accessible means to safety for large parts of a population. Many 
communities in the United States may have found themselves in this situation of 












normlessness during the crack epidemic. This collapse in civil society was also likely 
the case in many locations throughout Eastern Europe during the 1990s, and it is 
certainly the current circumstance in many countries in Latin America. 
Researchers can also take advantage of the relationship between age 
composition and homicide rates to forecast future rates of crime. To date, criminology 
still lacks the theoretical and methodological instrumentation to predict future rates of 
violence, and past attempts to do so have notably failed (Dilulio, 1995). The 
development of a comprehensive model for explaining changes in crime rates should, 
over the long term, enable improvements in the accuracy of such predictions. Any 
model for such purposes would need to account for the particularities of each 
location, and for the range of criminogenic pressures influencing rates of crimes, but 
age composition would likely be an important predictor. To be clear, I do not expect 
this forecasting to be ever without error. For example, weather forecasting, a subject 
of research that likely receives considerably more resources than the forecasting of 
crime trends, is very often mistaken about the climate, particularly when making 
longer-term projections (Watts, 2005). However, despite the presence of error, 
weather forecasting has become an essential source of information to the routine lives 
of individuals. I believe the same is true for the forecasting of crime trends, as an 
increase in accuracy would gradually improve the usefulness of this methodological 
instrument, regardless of the incurrence of error. 
Generally, as populations worldwide continue to grow older, the world should 
continue to experience the repercussion of a reduction in the relative size of their 





to place downward pressure on crime trends. However, this aging process should also 
pose a range of social and economic challenges including a decrease in the number of 
individuals of working-age, coupled with an increase in the relative size other age-
segments of the population in need of support (Kinsella & Phillips, 2005). 
Furthermore, the most violent countries in the world, which had the most to gain from 
a decrease in their homicide rates, are not participating in the international homicide 
decline. While these countries are experiencing an aging of their populations, they are 
failing to accrue the pacifying benefits of this process, resulting in even more 
inequality between the homicide rates of the safest, and of the most violent places of 
the world. While the most violent countries will continue to experience population 
aging, governments of these nations may not be able to experience declines in their 
homicide rates until they address the range of other criminogenic forces which are 
dictating the homicide trends of their countries. 
Findings of this dissertation also hold several implications for public officials. 
In the current study, I provided evidence that the decline in homicides experienced by 
many countries since the 1990s was actually an international event, which was likely 
largely driven by cross-national phenomena. In many countries, policymakers often 
link declining homicide trends to the implementation of their own domestic policies 
(Bratton & Kelling, 2015). To be clear, I do not argue that crime policies are 
ineffective. Instead, I propose that realistic assessments of the impact of such policies 
must consider their impact net of the influence of macro social and economic trends 
that have immense repercussions for trends of crimes. A failure to take this approach 





to domestic policies, when in fact such trends may have been largely linked to a 
broader shift in the age structure. 
Furthermore, be emphasizing the strong link between the size of the youth 
population and homicide rates, this study also encourages the use of prevention 
programs focused on the youth as a strategy for addressing crime. Examples of 
demonstrably effective programs are numerous, including the Nurse-Family 
Partnership (Olds, 2006), a program for supporting early mothers and newborns in a 
situation of risk, and Multisystemic Therapy (Asscher et al., 2013), an intensive 
therapy program dedicated to empowering families and communities to decrease anti-
social behavior. Comprehensive lists of programs are maintained by the 
CrimeSolutions.gov, and by the Blueprints for Healthy Youth Development. If 
properly developed and implemented, these programs have the potential to interrupt 
deviant trajectories, and to substantially improve people’s lives (Lipsey, 2009). 
Perhaps even, if implemented effectively and at a large enough scale, these programs 
may be capable of altering the homicide trend of a country – net of the influence of 
macro demographic forces. 
Methodological Implications 
The current study holds three broader methodological implications for the 
study of crime trends, which may support future research. First, that the drivers of 
changes in crime over time may not be the same factors as those explaining 
differences in violence levels across places. This distinction between longitudinal and 





research, and may support parallel developments in both theory and methods to 
explore such differences, and to explain them. 
A second implication relates to the development of the concept of 
concentrated disadvantage (Hannon, 2003; Kahlmeter et al., 2017; Raine, 2002) to 
the study of crime trends. In the current study, I presented evidence that the effect of 
age composition on homicide trends is only directly notable in the absence of other 
country-level disadvantages, which are competing drivers of the homicide trend. I 
believe that conceptualization has several important implications for extant research. 
First, other theoretical propositions attempting to explain crime trends may also need 
to account for the interaction between disadvantages when arguing for the effect of 
any individual variable on rates of crimes. Methodologically, that variation implies a 
heterogeneity in the effect of each disadvantage, across levels of concentration of all 
other disadvantages competing for effect. Unfortunately, that heterogeneity adds 
much complexity to the investigation of the causes of crime trends. As one potential 
solution, I propose the use of quantile regression as a parsimonious and effective way 
to explore variations in effect across levels of concentrated disadvantage. 
Specifically, by utilizing a quantile regression researchers may be able to identify the 
effect of one individual country-level disadvantage at the lowest end of the 
distribution of a dependent variable (e.g. the homicide rate, or the rate of any other 
crime), where competing drivers of that outcome variable are less pronounced. 
Traditional regression analyses have become commonplace across the social 
sciences as a method for estimating average effects. These averages, however, may 





social phenomena. In addition, I demonstrate that a strong relationship may exist 
between two variables, while that relationship is not observable in traditional 
regression analyses due to the heightened influence of other factors driving an 
outcome. This conclusion points to the need for caution in the direct interpretation of 
regression coefficients and highlights the importance of strong theoretical arguments 
in support of such models. 
Finally, a third methodological implication is the need to account for the 
effect of age composition when investigating the impact of other drivers of crime 
trends, such as when estimating the effect of an individual policy. That point stems 
from the strong association between age composition and homicide trends identified 
in the current study. Fortunately, numerous methodological solutions exist to account 
for the influence of demographic composition. In particular, I highlight the use of age 
standardized homicide rates, which is already a common practice in the study of other 
causes of mortality which are closely related with age composition (Ahmad et al., 
2001). For instance, an increase in prevalence of deaths by cancer in a country can 
simply be a consequence of an increase in the population who lived long enough to 
die from cancer. A study attempting to explore the effect of changes in dietary 
practices on the prevalence of cancer must first account for differences in age 
composition across countries, under the risk of confoundedness. A typical solution is 
to calculate age-adjusted death rates (Deane, 1987). This age adjustment artificially 
holds the age distribution of countries constant by decomposing an estimated effect of 





explored in the study of crime trends, in particular given the strength of the 
association between age composition and homicide rates. 
Final Remarks 
I conclude that age composition is a key driver of homicide trends globally, 
including the international homicide decline of recent decades. Through this 
conclusion, I have provided one potential answer to one of the most puzzling 
mysteries of criminological research over recent decades. To be clear, I say “one” 
answer, and not “the” answer. It is my belief that the very definition of scientific 
knowledge prohibits science from ever having final answers to any question (Popper, 
1959), and criminological inquiry is no exception. The falsifiability of science is what 
distinguishes the knowledge it produces from faith, or opinion. Hence, there can 
always be an alternative explanation for the international homicide decline, and it is 
not the intent of this project to disprove all competing theories. To the contrary, 
causes can operate in combination, or through some complex interaction which is yet 
to be uncovered. 
 Nonetheless, the current study provides a wealth of empirical evidence and 
theoretical elaboration in support of its main conclusions, which I hope are 
































Note: The Ratio corresponds to four-year average between the WHO homicide rate and the UN 
homicide rate between 1990 and 1993. The correlation corresponds to the Pearson Correlation between 







Appendix B: List of Countries in each Analytical Samples with Summary 
Statistics 
Region Country Total Years 
Years  Homicide Rate 
First Last a Mean SD Min Max 
Long Series Sample (Since 1960) 
Africa Mauritius 58 1957 2016   1.97 0.99 0.53 5.34 
Asia Hong Kong 62 1955 2016  1.36 0.85 0.24 4.58 
 Japan 67 1950 2016  0.91 0.49 0.28 2.00 
 Thailand 60 1955 2016  12.85 7.38 3.24 33.45 
Eastern Europe Hungary 62 1955 2016  1.83 0.52 1.09 3.02 
 Poland 55 1959 2016  1.25 0.56 0.58 2.39 
Latin America Colombia 58 1953 2016  39.65 18.75 13.03 81.41 
 Costa Rica 61 1956 2016  5.40 2.66 2.24 11.90 
 Mexico 62 1955 2016  17.83 5.78 7.93 33.14 
 Puerto Rico 59 1955 2016  16.47 6.55 5.12 31.40 
 Venezuela 59 1955 2016  20.13 15.95 4.56 61.91 
Northern America Canada 67 1950 2016  2.02 0.56 1.13 3.19 
 United States 67 1950 2016  6.55 1.92 4.08 9.89 
Oceania Australia 67 1950 2016  1.60 0.34 0.94 2.19 
 New Zealand 65 1950 2014  1.10 0.35 0.41 1.90 
Western Europe Austria 62 1955 2016  0.95 0.23 0.52 1.47 
 Denmark 66 1951 2016  0.96 0.32 0.43 1.67 
 Finland 65 1952 2016  2.44 0.45 1.42 3.29 
 Greece 60 1956 2016  1.11 0.40 0.53 2.81 
 Ireland 67 1950 2016  0.70 0.40 0.07 1.87 
 Italy 66 1951 2016  1.49 0.55 0.67 3.39 
 Netherlands 67 1950 2016  0.76 0.33 0.17 1.36 
 Norway 66 1951 2016  0.74 0.34 0.24 2.24 
 Spain 66 1951 2016  0.83 0.41 0.08 1.49 
 Sweden 66 1951 2016  0.96 0.23 0.48 1.39 
 Switzerland 66 1951 2016   0.96 0.28 0.50 1.65 
High Coverage Sample (Since 1990; includes the above) 
Africa Algeria 13 2003 2015   1.10 0.41 0.61 2.01 
 Angola 2 2011 2012  4.60 0.35 4.36 4.85 
 Botswana 10 2001 2010  14.61 1.31 12.14 17.29 
 Burkina Faso 14 2002 2015  0.59 0.12 0.37 0.78 
 Burundi 9 2008 2016  4.82 0.81 3.86 6.02 
 Cameroon 9 2000 2012  4.91 1.22 3.01 6.57 
 Central African Rep 1 2016 2016  19.76  19.76 19.76 
 Egypt 15 1990 2012  1.04 0.87 0.37 3.15 
 Ghana 11 2001 2011  1.91 0.19 1.68 2.23 
 Kenya 13 2004 2016  4.29 1.03 2.89 5.47 
 Lesotho 13 1990 2015  37.31 5.24 30.67 48.09 
 Liberia 6 2007 2012  3.66 0.70 2.85 4.83 
 Malawi 13 2000 2012  3.99 1.99 1.53 7.70 
 Morocco 24 1990 2015  1.35 0.54 0.36 2.63 
 Mozambique 11 2001 2011  4.57 0.93 3.40 5.92 
 Namibia 14 1995 2012  18.47 2.59 13.90 22.53 
 Niger 2 2011 2012  4.66 0.30 4.44 4.87 
 Rwanda 8 2006 2015  2.82 0.72 1.48 3.77 
 Sierra Leone 10 2004 2015  2.20 0.49 1.67 2.98 
 South Africa 23 1994 2016  42.38 11.03 29.76 63.86 
 South Sudan 1 2012 2012  13.90  13.90 13.90 
 Sudan 2 2007 2008  4.92 0.34 4.68 5.16 





Region Country Total Years 
Years  Homicide Rate 
First Last a Mean SD Min Max 
 Tanzania 11 1995 2015  7.66 0.58 6.95 8.72 
 Tunisia 8 2004 2012  2.56 0.31 1.95 3.05 
 Uganda 15 1995 2014  9.28 1.19 7.43 11.52 
 Zambia 16 1990 2015  7.16 1.70 5.28 10.47 
 Zimbabwe 9 1990 2012  9.20 2.89 5.05 12.98 
Asia Afghanistan 4 2009 2012  4.47 1.29 3.41 6.35 
 Armenia 27 1990 2016  3.42 1.68 1.95 8.86 
 Azerbaijan 24 1990 2016  3.48 1.66 2.14 7.55 
 Bahrain 17 1995 2014  0.75 0.34 0.31 1.38 
 Bangladesh 16 2000 2015  2.66 0.13 2.50 2.87 
 Cambodia 20 1992 2011  3.70 1.29 1.84 6.84 
 China 22 1995 2016  1.46 0.58 0.62 2.21 
 Cyprus 27 1990 2016  1.00 0.47 0.13 1.95 
 Georgia 23 1990 2016  6.86 3.48 0.99 16.87 
 India 27 1990 2016  4.50 0.88 3.22 6.15 
 Indonesia 14 1998 2016  0.65 0.19 0.44 1.04 
 Iran 5 2003 2014  2.72 0.22 2.47 3.01 
 Iraq 11 1990 2013  8.42 2.72 5.88 15.79 
 Israel 25 1990 2015  2.44 0.62 1.36 3.64 
 Jordan 20 1990 2016  2.08 1.05 0.77 4.48 
 Kazakhstan 23 1990 2015  11.92 3.87 4.81 16.59 
 Kuwait 13 1996 2012  1.70 0.39 0.98 2.36 
 Kyrgyzstan 27 1990 2016  8.90 3.31 3.62 19.77 
 Lebanon 9 2008 2016  4.00 0.35 3.47 4.47 
 Malaysia 24 1990 2013  2.15 0.28 1.68 2.84 
 Mongolia 14 2003 2016  9.68 3.23 5.66 15.75 
 Myanmar 19 1990 2016  2.18 0.89 1.39 5.04 
 Nepal 20 1990 2016  2.79 0.55 1.89 3.70 
 Oman 13 2002 2014  1.74 1.01 0.66 4.68 
 Pakistan 22 1990 2016  6.86 0.89 4.41 7.96 
 Palestine 17 1995 2016  1.50 1.03 0.54 4.38 
 Philippines 24 1990 2016  9.18 2.25 6.41 14.98 
 Qatar 20 1990 2014  0.60 0.28 0.17 1.21 
 Saudi Arabia 10 1999 2015  1.13 0.20 0.83 1.50 
 Singapore 27 1990 2016  0.77 0.49 0.21 1.76 
 South Korea 27 1990 2016  0.74 0.16 0.48 1.08 
 Sri Lanka 18 1990 2016  6.53 3.27 2.35 11.45 
 Syrian Arab Rep 14 1997 2010  2.28 0.20 1.95 2.71 
 Taiwan 9 2001 2015  0.87 0.21 0.72 1.39 
 Tajikistan 22 1990 2011  5.40 5.08 1.30 23.31 
 Timor-Leste 8 2004 2015  3.87 1.11 2.31 5.82 
 Turkey 10 2003 2012  4.58 0.38 4.17 5.18 
 Turkmenistan 17 1990 2006  6.61 1.59 4.22 9.01 
 United Arab Emirates 11 2003 2016  0.81 0.22 0.59 1.22 
 Uzbekistan 19 1990 2008  4.33 0.83 2.99 5.50 
 Viet Nam 11 2001 2011  1.33 0.11 1.23 1.52 
 Yemen 14 1998 2013  4.62 1.11 3.23 6.66 
Eastern Europe Belarus 25 1990 2014  7.22 2.48 3.51 10.33 
 Bulgaria 53 1964 2016  2.99 1.14 1.14 5.90 
 Czechia 23 1994 2016  1.28 0.40 0.61 2.00 
 Moldova 25 1990 2014  7.62 2.06 3.19 11.40 
 Romania 28 1989 2016  2.46 0.68 1.25 3.59 
 Russia 24 1990 2016  21.97 7.25 10.82 32.25 





Region Country Total Years 
Years  Homicide Rate 
First Last a Mean SD Min Max 
 Ukraine 23 1990 2014  7.15 1.73 4.34 10.03 
Latin America Argentina 3 2014 2016  6.66 0.79 5.94 7.51 
 Bolivia 12 2005 2016  8.59 2.64 5.19 12.83 
 Brazil 40 1977 2016  19.60 6.17 7.07 29.53 
 Chile 13 2003 2016  3.39 0.36 2.51 3.74 
 Cuba 25 1992 2016  5.85 1.03 4.46 8.30 
 Dominican Rep 25 1991 2016  17.77 5.40 10.81 25.92 
 Ecuador 54 1961 2016  9.52 4.28 3.94 18.04 
 El Salvador 23 1994 2016  75.91 29.32 40.20 142.16 
 Guatemala 25 1992 2016  33.97 6.26 23.32 45.39 
 Haiti 10 2007 2016  8.08 2.07 5.09 10.04 
 Honduras 24 1990 2016  49.13 21.05 10.00 85.06 
 Jamaica 27 1990 2016  40.11 11.35 22.44 60.99 
 Nicaragua 27 1990 2016  12.91 2.85 7.37 19.07 
 Panama 27 1990 2016  11.69 2.62 6.52 17.27 
 Paraguay 16 2000 2015  15.02 5.59 8.82 24.91 
 Peru 6 2011 2016  6.68 0.75 5.43 7.67 
 Trinidad & Tobago 16 2000 2015  26.38 9.37 9.46 41.59 
 Uruguay 25 1990 2016  6.66 0.80 5.71 8.54 
Oceania Papua New Guinea 5 1998 2007  8.68 0.74 7.85 9.49 
Western Europe Albania 25 1992 2016  7.41 8.63 2.26 43.13 
 Belgium 24 1990 2015  1.81 0.53 1.02 3.08 
 Bosnia & Herzegovina 17 1990 2016  1.76 0.37 1.28 2.63 
 Croatia 27 1990 2016  2.44 2.01 0.85 9.18 
 Estonia 26 1990 2015  9.46 4.87 3.11 20.73 
 France 27 1990 2016  1.73 0.42 1.22 2.63 
 Germany 27 1990 2016  1.19 0.30 0.81 1.74 
 Kosovo 9 2008 2016  3.64 1.85 1.60 6.47 
 Latvia 24 1992 2015  7.54 3.67 2.45 14.98 
 Lithuania 27 1990 2016  8.67 2.39 4.87 13.84 
 Macedonia 17 1998 2014  2.08 0.59 1.06 3.41 
 Portugal 27 1990 2016  1.22 0.24 0.64 1.74 
 Serbia 17 2000 2016  1.70 0.39 1.17 2.58 
 Slovenia 32 1985 2016  1.34 0.59 0.48 2.39 
  United Kingdom 27 1990 2016   1.36 0.25 0.91 1.87 









Appendix C: List of Countries Absent from the Analytical Samples 
Region Country Total Years 
Years  Homicide Rate 
First Last a Mean SD Min Max 
Small States (bellow 1 million population) 
Africa Cabo Verde 14 2003 2016  8.34 2.66 3.26 12.35 
 Mayotte 3 2007 2009  7.56 6.00 2.55 14.20 
 Réunion 6 2004 2009  2.58 0.52 1.82 3.16 
 Sao Tome & Principe 11 1990 2011  5.39 2.60 2.45 10.10 
 Seychelles 12 2004 2016  11.72 4.76 4.33 19.40 
 St Helena 16 1994 2009  1.42 5.67 0.00 22.69 
Asia Bhutan 26 1990 2016  2.65 1.09 0.80 5.08 
 Brunei Darussalam 16 1996 2013  0.99 0.77 0.25 2.95 
 Macao 26 1991 2016  2.26 2.37 0.00 8.84 
 Maldives 13 1990 2013  1.52 0.78 0.45 2.72 
Latin America Anguilla 25 1990 2014  9.89 11.77 0.00 38.75 
 Antigua & Barbuda 20 1990 2012  7.59 5.14 1.29 18.60 
 Aruba 17 1990 2014  3.87 1.85 0.00 7.47 
 Bahamas 25 1990 2016  21.27 7.55 10.72 37.74 
 Barbados 24 1990 2015  9.07 1.80 6.42 13.06 
 Belize 17 2000 2016  31.82 6.31 16.58 43.06 
 British Virgin Isl 13 1990 2006  5.93 5.37 0.00 17.75 
 Cayman Isl 23 1990 2014  6.49 4.00 0.00 16.21 
 Curaçao 7 2001 2007  22.35 9.90 7.68 33.59 
 Dominica 14 1998 2011  10.61 5.12 1.44 21.00 
 French Guiana 6 2004 2009  18.67 6.54 12.92 29.58 
 Grenada 17 2000 2016  9.40 3.56 3.81 15.39 
 Guadeloupe 6 2004 2009  6.38 1.07 5.23 8.01 
 Guyana 27 1990 2016  16.84 4.36 10.09 27.80 
 Martinique 6 2004 2009  4.70 1.12 2.78 5.79 
 Montserrat 19 1990 2012  7.09 9.03 0.00 20.93 
 St Kitts & Nevis 18 1995 2012  25.71 16.89 6.61 65.38 
 St Lucia 25 1990 2014  16.83 7.39 5.57 26.46 
 St Vincent & the Grenadines 24 1990 2016  19.30 7.20 8.33 36.68 
 Suriname 9 2000 2008  11.96 2.75 8.35 16.54 
 Turks & Caicos Islands 20 1990 2014  5.06 4.71 0.00 13.70 
 Virgin Islands (US) 16 1997 2012  35.76 9.84 21.15 52.76 
Northern America Bermuda 26 1990 2016  5.47 3.71 0.00 12.96 
 Greenland 25 1992 2016  15.12 6.88 1.77 30.18 
 St Pierre & Miquelon 4 2006 2009  7.97 9.20 0.00 15.95 
Oceania American Samoa 16 2001 2016  6.13 2.87 1.72 11.92 
 Cook Islands 1 2012 2012  3.49  3.49 3.49 
 Fiji 20 1990 2014  2.69 0.80 1.64 4.57 
 French Polynesia 4 2006 2009  1.91 1.39 0.38 3.42 
 Guam 12 2000 2011  3.21 2.17 0.63 6.93 
 Kiribati 16 1991 2012  2.47 3.39 0.00 10.51 
 Marshall Islands 3 1991 1994  6.11 3.64 3.95 10.31 
 New Caledonia 4 2006 2009  4.03 0.86 3.23 5.00 
 Samoa 3 2009 2013  6.80 3.16 3.15 8.66 
 Solomon Islands 5 2004 2008  4.74 0.71 3.77 5.53 
 Tonga 16 1995 2012  3.48 2.49 0.95 7.87 
 Tuvalu 11 2002 2012  3.41 6.31 0.00 18.65 
Western Europe Andorra 10 2004 2015  0.37 0.60 0.00 1.31 
 Channel Islands 4 2005 2010  0.64 0.53 0.00 1.29 
 Gibraltar 2 2009 2010  1.51 2.13 0.00 3.01 





Region Country Total Years 
Years  Homicide Rate 
First Last a Mean SD Min Max 
 Iceland 23 1994 2016  0.54 0.48 0.00 1.78 
 Isle of Man 6 2011 2016  1.83 1.27 0.00 3.63 
 Liechtenstein 23 1994 2016  0.62 1.20 0.00 3.04 
 Luxembourg 21 1994 2014  1.04 0.54 0.00 2.04 
 Malta 23 1990 2015  1.25 0.66 0.00 2.85 
 Monaco 12 2001 2015  1.00 1.47 0.00 3.09 
 Montenegro 15 2002 2016  3.14 0.86 1.59 4.46 
 San Marino 17 1995 2011  0.21 0.86 0.00 3.56 
Countries without homicide data 
Africa Benin 0        
 Chad 0        
 Comoros 0        
 Congo 0        
 Côte d'Ivoire 0        
 Djibouti 0        
 DR Congo 0        
 Equatorial Guinea 0        
 Eritrea 0        
 Ethiopia 0        
 Gabon 0        
 Gambia 0        
 Guinea 0        
 Guinea-Bissau 0        
 Libya 0        
 Madagascar 0        
 Mali 0        
 Mauritania 0        
 Nigeria 0        
 Senegal 0        
 Somalia 0        
 Togo 0        
 Western Sahara 0        
Asia Lao 0        
 North Korea 0        
Latin America Caribbean Netherlands 0        
 Falkland Islands 0        
 Sint Maarten (Dutch) 0        
Oceania Micronesia 0        
 Nauru 0        
 Niue 0        
 Northern Mariana Islands 0        
 Palau 0        
 Tokelau 0        
 Vanuatu 0        
 Wallis & Futuna Islands 0        
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